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Abstract
The 2005-2006 edition of Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the World Economy is divided into six chapters.
The first chapter analyses recent trends in the 
international economy and trade, capital flows and 
the region’s trade performance. The causes of external 
imbalances are examined, along with the behaviour of the 
economies of the United States, Japan and the European 
Union, oil prices, interest rates and exchange rates. It 
also presents Latin American trade projections for 2006 
and 2007, as well as looking at the main risk factors that 
could undermine the favourable conditions now existing 
in the region.
The second provides an overview of recent economic 
developments in China and India and examines these 
countries’ trade relations with Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Trade relations between these two Asian 
nations and the Latin American and Caribbean region 
have recently been flourishing thanks, in particular, to the 
prospects for securing access to South America’s natural 
resources. Nonetheless, these two countries have yet to 
take full advantage of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region’s potential as a supplier and buyer. 
The main issues raised by the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations following the Ministerial Conference held in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of 
China are explored in chapter III. The participants in the 
Hong Kong Conference changed the direction of these 
talks and agreed to proceed on an “aid for trade” platform, 
but they failed to alter the political climate for decision-
making sufficiently to permit the main stakeholders to 
reach agreement on a package of measures in the first half 
of 2006. In order for this to have happened, three of the 
major parties to these negotiations would have had to meet 
very specific demands: the European Union would have 
had to agree to lower its agricultural tariffs; the United 
States would have had to make greater commitments to 
cut agricultural subsidies; and the Group of 20 (G-20) 
would have had to reduce industrial tariffs and undertake 
certain commitments on trade in services. The chapter 
concludes with an analysis of the uncertain future of this 
recently suspended round of trade talks.
The fourth chapter assesses the current status of 
regional integration efforts and calls for the revitalization 
of the various initiatives being pursued in this area, not 
only in order to help form closer trade relations within 
the region, but also as a means of capitalizing upon the 
potential benefits of new trade agreements reached by 
Latin American and Caribbean countries and blocs with 
trading partners in other parts of the world. To this end, 
consideration is given to a variety of approaches for bringing 
about convergence among the trade rules governing the 
many different free trade agreements (including subregional 
integration accords) in effect in the region. 
Chapter V looks at how Latin America’s competitiveness 
indicators measure up against those of a set of OECD 
countries that are major natural-resource exporters. The 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)8
competitiveness and innovation strategy used by Australia 
and New Zealand (which have export structures similar to 
those of some South American countries) is then examined 
as an example of a successful effort to use competitiveness 
and technological innovation to position these countries 
advantageously in the international economy. 
The main economic losses associated with bird flu 
and foot-and-mouth disease are discussed in chapter VI. 
The chapter reviews a number of specialized studies on 
the economic and social costs of recent outbreaks of 
these two transboundary animal diseases, which pose a 
formidable challenge for world trade in beef and poultry 
meat. Consideration is also given to how they have 
affected the trade flows of the main exporters of these 
products, and regional policy proposals for dealing with 
their implications are offered.
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Summary
Introduction
The international economy has generally provided favourable conditions for the region in 2005-
2006, including strong international prices for its commodity exports, low international interest 
rates, low inflation and ready access to external financing. These trends are now gradually 
beginning to change somewhat, but without threatening the favourable international outlook 
for the rest of 2006 and for 2007. 
The United States economy has been slowing little by 
little, partly as a result of higher interest rates. These 
trends, combined with the fact that the dollar continues 
to depreciate against the euro, should help to reduce 
its current account deficit. The growth of the European 
Union and Japanese economies in 2006 has outpaced the 
projections made in 2005, and this has helped to offset 
part of the downturn in the United States’ performance. 
The main risk factors continue to be petroleum prices and 
the misalignment of China’s economy, which stems from 
its continued exposure to the risk of overheating and the 
fact that the yuan remains tied to the dollar and is thus 
depreciating against the euro, thereby adding further to 
the country’s already hefty trade surplus.  
Petroleum prices have become a crucial variable in the 
region’s economic performance. The Latin American and 
Caribbean region as a whole is a net oil exporter, but many 
of its small and medium-sized countries are net importers, 
and prices of around US$ 75 per barrel therefore saddle 
them with considerable fiscal and balance-of-payments 
costs. In Central America, in particular, the increase in 
the oil bill is the main reason for the 14% deterioration 
observed in the subregion’s terms of trade since 1998-
1999 and for a loss of income equivalent to nearly 4.5% 
of its GDP. Meanwhile, oil-exporting countries, which 
have witnessed a strong improvement in their terms of 
trade, are confronted with a significant fiscal challenge 
as they look for ways of using these windfalls to save, 
pay down debts or invest in competitiveness. 
The possibility of a sudden correction in the United 
States’ current account deficit and the trend in oil prices 
are not the only risks facing the world economy, however. 
The Doha Round’s uncertain future and the threat of a 
resurgence of protectionism and of spiralling growth in 
bilateral trade accords are also looming large. Outbreaks of 
avian flu are yet another threat that could have extremely 
serious human, economic, and commercial implications 
of global proportions. 
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Within Latin America and the Caribbean, the debate 
about trade negotiations and their possible impacts on 
regional integration is heating up as renewed proposals 
are put forward for making integration schemes more 
pliant and adapting them to changing conditions by, inter 
alia, introducing more flexible types of trade associations, 
both within Latin America and the Caribbean and between 
countries in this and other regions. Experiences of other 
For the fourth year in a row, in 2006 the world economy 
has been growing at over 4% in terms of purchasing power 
parity (PPP). This is the first time such economic buoyancy 
has been seen since the early 1970s and, although it is likely 
to slacken slightly in late 2006 and in 2007, no dramatic 
change in the present growth-friendly international economic 
environment is expected. The major emerging economies 
(China, India and the Russian Federation) have been the 
most dynamic, with higher-than-expected growth being 
led by investment and exports. In fact, when calculated on 
the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s and 
India’s combined growth accounted for one third of the 
increase in world GDP in 2005, thereby overtaking the 
combined contribution of the United States, the European 
Union and Japan (although, in terms of current dollars, the 
European Union and the United States continue to be the 
largest components of the world economy). The current 
growth pattern exhibited by China, India and developing 
Asian countries, as the new global trend-setters in terms 
of production, trade and financial movements, offers an 
encouraging outlook for the trade performance of the 
countries in the region. 
There are a number of potential risks to be considered, 
however. The greatest threat is the impact of the surge 
in oil prices in response to mounting world demand and 
geopolitical tensions in the Middle East. High petroleum 
prices are beginning to have an impact not only on general 
inflation in developed and developing countries alike, but 
also on these economies’ core inflation rates. As a result, 
the central banks of the United States and, to a lesser 
degree, the euro area have been hiking interest rates, which 
could dampen growth in these economies, as is already 
occurring in the United States. In addition, higher interest 
rates will make it harder for countries of the region to 
borrow on international financial markets. 
Figure 1
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c 37 economies.
countries with generous endowments of natural resources 
—such as Australia and New Zealand— that have used 
innovation and competitiveness policies to improve 
their position in the international economy also point up 
relevant strategic considerations for the region. All of 
these elements will have a strong influence on the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries’ economic and trade 
performance.
Chapter I:  World economic trends and their impact on the Latin American 
and Caribbean region’s position in the international economy
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These higher interest rates’ effects in reining in the 
United States economy, in conjunction with the dollar’s 
depreciation against the euro, should pave the way for a 
reduction of its current account deficit, which is one of the 
main imbalances in the world economy. The slowdown 
in the United States economy is being partially offset 
by stronger growth in Japan and the European Union. 
These factors point in the right direction and suggest that 
the international economy may be headed for a gradual 
reduction in global disequilibria. However, this process 
is hindered by China’s and the oil-exporting countries’ 
persistent current account surpluses, as well as the 
yuan’s stickiness against the dollar. This situation and the 
persistence of high petroleum prices are the main sources 
of concern for the world economy at present. The most 
likely scenario, therefore, is not a recession, but instead a 
modest decline in world economic growth, coupled with 
a gradual correction of economic imbalances.
The change in the geographic location of the engines of 
growth and higher interest rates will have less of an impact 
on Latin America and the Caribbean than they would have 
had a decade ago. While the region’s export volumes will 
certainly be hurt by slower growth and slack demand in the 
United States (its biggest trading partner), China’s sustained 
demand will tend to keep commodity prices high. Nor will 
the rise in interest rates have the same impact as before, 
since most of the countries of the region are less vulnerable 
than they used to be, thanks to their larger foreign-exchange 
reserves and the higher level of ongoing inflows of export 
earnings relative to debt amortization and interest payments. 
For some Latin American countries (Argentina, Ecuador 
and Uruguay), however, wider spreads could endanger the 
sustainability of their public debt positions, since the sum 
of these obligations remains at over 50% of GDP and a 
portion of it is denominated in or indexed to the dollar.
For the time being, Latin American and Caribbean 
trade continues to be spurred by strong international 
demand, especially from China, and the greater strength 
of the European and Japanese economies. The region 
continues to have relatively easy access to international 
financial markets, as interest rates are still fairly low. In 
2005, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows expanded less, 
however, than they did in more buoyant economies, such 
as those of China, other Asian countries and Africa.
In real terms, Latin America and the Caribbean posted 
the second-largest increase in exports, after China, in 2005. 
South America posted a sharper upswing in exports than 
Mexico and Central America did because it specializes 
more heavily in commodities, whose prices have been 
climbing steadily. ECLAC projections for 2006-2007 
indicate that Latin American export volumes will grow 
at much the same rate as they did in 2005 (around 7%-
8%), thereby once again coming in second, with China 
remaining in the lead.
In 2006, the region’s exports will continue to benefit 
from a strong improvement in its terms of trade. In 
2005 its terms of trade improved again, with a 5.0% rise 
following the 5.3% upturn recorded in 2004, although 
sharp differences across subregions remain. Oil- and 
copper-exporting countries (Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Chile and Ecuador) saw the largest increase 
in their terms of trade in 2005, while net oil importers 
(Central America and the English-speaking Caribbean) 
witnessed a deterioration. Raw material prices may stay 
high for a while longer because of the strong demand 
being fuelled by world economic growth and especially 
by China and India, but the geopolitical uncertainty 
associated with the conflict in the Middle East and its 
effect on oil prices will continue to generate volatility 
and uncertainty in the world economy. 
Chapter II: China’s and India’s trade relations with Latin America and
the Caribbean: opportunities and challenges
Asia is the most dynamic area of the world economy in terms 
of growth, international trade, FDI, technological innovation 
and its role as a source of financial resources that help 
maintain international balances (see chapter I). One of the 
most conspicuous features of Asia’s emergence as a lynchpin 
of the world economy is China’s and India’s dynamic entry 
onto the stage as leading players around which the rest of 
Asia is arraying itself. Asian countries are also displaying 
an unprecedented interest in forming strategic relationships 
with Latin America and the Caribbean. The high growth rates 
projected for China and India ought to secure their position 
at the very centre of world growth in the coming years. As 
a result, they can offer the countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean a huge potential (and thus far, except in the 
case of a few commodities, largely unexploited) market for 
their exports of both goods and services.
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China’s and India’s combined merchandise exports 
represented 8.2% of the world total in 2005, compared 
to 4.5% in 2000. During 2005, Chinese exports jumped 
by 28% to US$ 760 billion (nearly 1.5 times as much as 
the external sales of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region).1 By 2005, China had become the world’s third-
largest merchandise importer and exporter. In India’s 
case, merchandise exports and imports in 2005 totalled 
US$ 90 billion and US$ 132 billion, respectively, thus 
widening its trade deficit. These two countries are also 
among the world’s top 10 exporters and importers of 
tradable services. In addition, China is one of the largest 
recipients of FDI in the world. Its US$ 72.4 billion in 
FDI inflows for 2005 represents a 19.4% increase over 
the 2004 level and attests to the growing importance of 
transnational corporations in its economy. In contrast, 
FDI inflows to India are much smaller owing to the more 
cautious approach it has taken in opening up its economy 
to these investment flows. 
Despite the Chinese authorities’ attempts to cool down 
the economy, it has continued to surge ahead: in the first 
half of 2006, it posted year-on-year growth of 10.9% as 
a consequence of strong investment and export growth, 
and everything seems to indicate that its growth rate for 
2006 will top 10%. For the first time since 2004, China 
raised its benchmark interest rate in April and again in 
August in an effort to rein in the headlong growth in bank 
lending, but to little avail. The acceleration witnessed in 
2006 by the already buoyant Chinese economy illustrates 
the risks involved in unrestrained growth. This economic 
expansion is being fuelled by the country’s enormous 
trade surplus and is leading to well-grounded calls for a 
steeper appreciation of the yuan. 
The short-term outlook for India is promising, given 
its solid economic growth and moderate rates of inflation. 
Challenges it will have to meet in the medium term include 
the management of its high levels of public indebtedness and 
growing current account deficit and the need to embark upon 
a series of essential reforms. The government must continue 
to consolidate its fiscal position while proceeding with 
much-needed improvements in infrastructure (especially the 
supply of electrical power and the road system) to backstop 
its industrial development, training human resources in 
service-related sectors, and promoting public investment 
aimed at boosting rural productivity. 
The Chinese economy’s remarkable growth has 
turned it into the central pillar of Asia’s dynamism. India 
is gradually becoming part of the Asian production chain 
as it reconfigures itself around China. Meanwhile, China is 
deepening its specialization in high-technology and high-
value-added sectors while gradually moving away from 
the areas in which it has traditionally had a comparative 
advantage, such as textiles and clothing. India has a great 
deal of potential in the heavily export-oriented information 
and communication technology (ICT) and business process 
outsourcing (BPO) sectors, which continue to perform very 
well. The reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers being 
made under China’s trade agreement with the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and under the 
agreement between China and India, which will enter into 
effect in 2007 and cover agricultural as well as industrial 
goods, may have highly significant implications for trade 
between Latin America and Asia. 
Figure 2
CHINA AND INDIA: TRADE WITH LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN
(Billions of dollars)
A. China: 2000-2006 (calendar year)






























Indian exports to LAC Indian imports from LAC Trade balance
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of data from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce [www.mofcom.gov.cn] 
and the Indian Department of Commerce [http://dgft.delhi.nic.in].
a
 India’s fiscal year runs from April to March of each calendar year. 
1
 These trends carried over into the first half of 2006, when exports climbed by over 25% to US$ 429 billion, while imports rose by 21%, to 
US$ 367 billion.
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The figures on trade flows with Latin America and 
the Caribbean reported by Chinese and Indian authorities 
differ substantially from those cited by countries of the 
region, mainly because some of the statistics are f.o.b. values 
while others are c.i.f. and because of some degree of trade 
triangulation through the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of China (see figures 2a and 2b). These discrepancies 
notwithstanding, trade between the region and China has been 
active throughout this decade. Trade between India and the 
region has been growing briskly during the past two fiscal 
years, although starting from a very low baseline.
China has already become a major export market for a 
number of countries in the region. Trade relations between 
South America and China tend to be complementary, 
taking the form of inter-industry trade in which the region 
exports primary commodities and imports manufactures, 
whereas Mexico’s and Central America’s trade with China 
is more asymmetrical. In fact, China buys less than 1% of 
Mexico’s total exports but is its second-largest supplier of 
imports. As a result, Mexico and Central America have 
been building up a growing trade deficit with China.
Mexico and Central America export many of the same 
types of products to the United States market as China does. 
In fact, China has actually superseded Mexico as the United 
States’ top trading partner. This shift is evident not only in 
textiles and clothing but also in such sectors as electrical 
equipment and electronics, including computer hardware. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region is still a 
small —but growing— market for India. As in the case of 
China, the pattern of trade between India and South America 
differs from the structure of trade flows between India and 
Central America and Mexico. In South America, India has 
already concluded trade agreements with MERCOSUR 
and Chile. This subregion should therefore consolidate 
this trend by further strengthening its trade links based 
on the attainment of greater productive complementarity 
with both China and India and the necessary trade and 
technology partnerships. 
Given the inter-industrial pattern of trade between 
South America and these two Asian countries, the next 
step for the subregion is to encourage its firms to share 
in the success of Asian enterprises by becoming part of 
their production units’ supply chains and by furnishing 
more highly processed inputs with greater technological 
content. One way they could start to make headway in 
this direction is by increasing their processing of the 
natural-resource-based products they already export to 
Asia. The recent tendency to consolidate trade relations 
between Latin America and these two Asian countries by 
concluding various sorts of trade agreements will facilitate 
Latin American firms’ incorporation into Asian supply 
chains focusing on China and India.
In order to promote Mexico’s and Central America’s 
strategic relations with China and India, an effort needs to be 
made to ensure a place for this Latin American subregion within 
Asia’s market-led productive integration process, in which 
the two Asian giants are playing a decisive role. Increased 
intra-industry trade between these two Asian countries and 
Mexico/Central America would provide this subregion 
with new access routes to the Chinese and Indian markets. 
This, in turn, would help Mexico and Central America find 
opportunities for incorporating new technologies rather than 
having to compete face-to-face in third markets. The logistical 
advantage of their proximity to the North American market 
is a key variable that should be factored into the relevant 
commercial and technological partnerships. 
Chapter III: The Doha Round: an uncertain future
Towards the end of July 2006, the Director General of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) recommended that 
the negotiations be suspended in view of the fact that 
the main parties to the negotiations have been unable 
to find common ground, particularly with regard to the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products. This step 
makes it unlikely that the Doha Round can be concluded in 
2006 and has given rise to a great deal of uncertainty about 
the inroads that had been made to date in this negotiation 
process, many of which were in the interests of developing 
countries. As of late August, the press was following the 
crossfire of accusations among the main stakeholders, as 
they insisted that they would only soften their positions 
on the condition that the others would do the same, and 
tracking the progress of the various attempts being made 
to get the talks moving forward again.2 In some circles, 
the expectation is that the Round may take between one 
and three years to complete. 
2
 To that end, Brazil proposed that a meeting of the G-20 be held on 9 and 10 September.
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Since the Uruguay Round led to the founding of WTO 
in 1995, the multilateral system has had both successes and 
failures. It has helped to expand international trade, has brought 
a wide range of sectors and issues into the multilateral system, 
has created new rules and has supported the creation of a 
more stable environment for trade activity. Yet significant 
constraints and distortions still exist in agricultural trade. 
Seven years into the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
agreements, these and other factors were the underlying 
reasons for the initiation of the current trade talks, which 
have now been going on for approximately five years. 
The sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Hong 
Kong SAR in December 2005, plotted a course for the 
Doha Round talks, which are the first to be undertaken 
under the aegis of WTO. The text reflecting the consensus 
reached by all the participants set out a work plan and an 
exact timetable,3 but its progress stalled in the first half of 
2006 (see table 1). Despite exhaustive efforts, three key 
issues have proven to be very hard to tackle, with greater 
efforts being required chiefly from three major stakeholders: 
the European Union, which is being called upon to lower 
its agricultural tariffs; the United States, which is being 
asked to make stronger commitments in relation to the 
reduction of agricultural production subsidies; and the 
Group of 20 (G-20), whose members are being urged to 
lower tariffs on manufactures and services.
Table 1
MILESTONES IN THE DOHA ROUND OF TRADE TALKS
1995 Founding of WTO and start of the Uruguay Round agreements’ 
implementation
1999 Demands made by developing countries at the Third WTO 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle
2001 Launch of the Doha Round (also known as the Doha Development 
Round) at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference
2003 The fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, in Cancún, was to 
address a number of crucial issues but ended in deadlock
2004 The “July package” of framework agreements for revitalizing 
the Doha Round is unveiled
2005 Original completion date for the Doha Round
 Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference held in December in Hong 
Kong, China, and reactivation of the Doha Round
2006 New completion date for the Doha Round set at the sixth 
WTO Ministerial Conference. Suspension of the negotiations
(24 July)
2008-2013 Deadlines called for at the sixth Ministerial Conference: 
implementation of Doha Round agreements and elimination 
of agricultural export subsidies
Agreement was reached on the least problematic of the 
three major agricultural issues, i.e., setting a deadline for the 
elimination of export subsidies (2013). Domestic supports in 
the farm sector and market access have proven to be more 
difficult issues to resolve, and the level of ambition regarding 
these points has also defined the scope of the other issues on 
the agenda. This level of ambition reflects a combination of 
commercially significant reductions, on the one hand, and, 
on the other, a range of flexibility which should be defined 
by the parameters of a package of measures in these areas. 
There was no shortage of proposals regarding different 
definitions, however, including the use of a system of 
bands for reductions in domestic farm supports, a “Swiss 
formula” for phasing down bound non-agricultural tariffs 
and determinations concerning various technical issues (such 
as the conversion of specific tariffs into their ad valorem 
equivalents). Attention was also devoted to disciplines on 
fisheries subsidies and antidumping and to arrangements 
for plurilateral negotiations on services sectors. Greater 
progress was made in the areas of trade facilitation and 
transparency in preferential trade agreements, however. 
The Hong Kong Declaration carries on the Round’s 
tradition of “developmentalist” rhetoric as a key aspect 
in maintaining the involvement of most developing 
countries. Nevertheless, recommendations and decisions 
are increasingly focused on the least developed countries 
(LDCs), and Haiti is the only country in the region that 
falls into this category. Although the participants at this 
latest WTO Conference placed emphasis on technical 
assistance and capacity-building (including the Integrated 
Framework), LDCs will be exempt from virtually all of 
the new Doha commitments, and there are practically 
no new disciplines that call for implementation efforts 
on the part of developing countries, which was the main 
criticism made of the Uruguay Round outcomes. More 
attention is also being devoted to the Work Programme on 
Small Economies, which could benefit a larger number of 
countries in the region, especially in the Caribbean. Work 
on special and differential treatment and on implementation 
has been deferred on numerous occasions, however, and 
viewpoints on these issues differ widely. 
As a complement to the Doha agenda and in the light of 
the development dimension that constitutes its central objective, 
the decision was also taken to strengthen the aid for trade to 
be offered to developing countries. In fact, the aid-for-trade 
platform is seen as one of the most important achievements 
of the sixth Conference. The aid for developing countries and 
particularly LDCs provided for in the Ministerial Declaration 
is based on a useful, innovative approach to building these 
countries’ supply capacity and related infrastructure so that 
they will be able to implement WTO agreements, benefit 
from them and expand their trade flows. 
3
 The United States trade promotion authority —which is of key importance for the conclusion of the negotiations— will be in force until mid-
2007, when the member countries of WTO planned to ratify the Doha outcome. 
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Debates among the most influential WTO members 
have eclipsed the advances made in these areas as well 
as the more lasting importance of WTO as the mainstay 
of the multilateral trading system, which offers a number 
of opportunities not available under regional, bilateral or 
other preferential arrangements. Its importance lies in the 
possibility of fashioning a reliable system of consensus-
based rules, providing a level negotiating table where 
parties in widely differing positions can address the 
asymmetries existing in their capacities and needs, and 
furnishing a sound scheme for dealing with disputes. 
The recent suspension of negotiations (as of the closing 
date for this edition) has therefore generated a great deal 
of uncertainty regarding the fate of existing agreements 
and those that were nearing completion, many of which 
—such as the aid-for-trade recommendations— are highly 
important for developing countries. 
Another question has to do with how effective the 
outcomes of this round will be in providing ways of dealing 
with the problems and challenges of the twenty-first century, 
such as those posed by cross-border anti-competitive 
practices; e-commerce and information technologies; and 
domestic security, environmental and other regulations and 
their impact on trade. The multilateral system has lagged 
behind bilateral rules on these subjects agreed upon by 
many of its members, including developing countries, in 
other international forums.
The countries of the region have continued to play an 
active role in a number of interest groups, particularly with 
regard to agriculturally related issues (the Cairns group, G-20, 
G-33). Brazil, in particular, has assumed a highly important 
role in various parts of the negotiations through its leadership 
of the G-20 and its involvement in key groups such as the 
G-6 (Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India, Japan and 
United States). Other subjects that have drawn the region’s 
interest include trade facilitation, antidumping measures, and 
fisheries subsidies. The varying interests stemming from the 
different countries’ positions in the international economy 
and their priorities in this connection have prompted them 
to adopt differing stances on some points, however. 
In addition, as first occurred during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations, shifting alliances are being formed 
that transcend the North-South dichotomy as the major 
stakeholders seek to coordinate their interests. The
G-6, for example, which has played a central role in this 
phase of the negotiations, is the object of developing-
country demands for representation and participation. 
On the one hand, attempts are being made to differentiate 
between the larger developing countries and the rest of 
the developing world and to pressure the former to make 
greater concessions. On the other, specific demands are 
being lodged with a view to winning consideration of 
the special conditions existing in small economies or 
LDCs. All of these different factors go to show just how 
difficult it is to coordinate negotiations within WTO, which 
employs a consensus-based decision-making system, as 
the number of participants grow (the number of members 
currently stands at 149). 
Chapter IV: Regional integration and trade-agreement convergence
The region’s recent experiences have shown that 
intraregional trade facilitates export diversification, 
is more SME-friendly and is more intensive in value-
added than trade with the rest of the world is. Progress 
has also been made in establishing integration policies 
and institutions, perhaps most notably in the Andean 
Community and Central America. Recent advances 
include the Andean Community’s creation of social 
development programmes, the structural convergence 
funds established by MERCOSUR and the efforts made 
to agree upon uniform customs codes and extend the 
application of the common external tariff to all tariff items. 
Similar inroads are being made in Central America and 
the Caribbean. Given the urgent nature of the challenges 
faced by countries’ seeking to position themselves on a 
competitive basis in the international economy, however, 
the regional debate tends to centre on the weaknesses 
and shortcomings of the integration process. 
In the first half of the 1990s, intraregional trade was 
liberalized with the help of agreements signed under the 
aegis of LAIA. In the second half of that decade, particular 
importance began to be placed on signing agreements 
with trading partners outside the region, such as Canada, 
the European Union, Japan, the United States and, more 
recently, China and other Asian countries. This heralds 
a new phase in Latin American and Caribbean trade 
policy, as well as a definite reconfiguration of trading 
patterns that poses a formidable challenge for existing 
integration schemes.
Substantive differences exist between the scope of the 
rules and disciplines included in each type or category of 
agreement. Intraregional agreements tend to be composed 
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primarily of trade defence instruments designed to expedite 
tariff reduction schedules and avert the introduction of 
non-tariff trade barriers. These arrangements do not, 
however, provide for broader coverage of other types of 
rules which, because they are not fully harmonized, also 
act as non-tariff barriers (e.g., sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and technical regulations). In addition, in the 
case of disciplines on trade-related matters (services, 
investment, government procurement, intellectual property), 
intraregional agreements fall far short of the coverage 
afforded by agreements with outside countries.
The coverage of commitments on trade disciplines 
also varies from one intraregional agreement to the next. 
South America’s customs union arrangements and the 
associated bilateral agreements offer a high degree of 
coverage in terms of trade defence and dispute settlement, 
but this is not the case for sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures or technical barriers. In contrast, the free trade 
agreements (FTAs) signed between Chile and Mexico and 
by them with Central American countries provide more 
comprehensive coverage in these areas. 
There is a striking asymmetry between bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements within the region and the agreements 
reached with countries elsewhere, especially some of those 
in the North. The latter contain more stringent commitments 
backed up by more binding mechanisms entailing greater 
legal certainty than do subregional arrangements, which, 
by the same token, are less demanding in terms of trade 
and non-trade disciplines and rules.
The present assemblage of bilateral, plurilateral 
and regional trade agreements in Latin America and the 
Caribbean could result in discrimination against some 
countries or subregional groups as a consequence of the 
wide variety of provisions in force with regard to coverage, 
types of treatment and the depth of the commitments 
entailed by the various disciplines and rules included 
in these agreements. Unless urgent steps are taken to 
achieve convergence among these different agreements, 
trade diversion will increase and the transactions costs 
for intraregional trade will climb.
Four types of problems need to be addressed: 
(i) operational issues, such as customs, transit and storage 
procedures and rules, where a lack of familiarity with the 
formalities or confusion about methods of application can 
become hidden trade barriers; (ii) the presence of rules 
and disciplines that are formalized in some agreements but 
absent from others (investment, services and intellectual 
property, for example), that have different depth and coverage 
in intraregional agreements than they do in agreements 
with outside countries, or that have differing provisions 
regarding similar issues (national treatment) or treat 
identical subjects differently (commitment or negotiation 
models); (iii) the institutional structure of trade agreements, 
and (iv) discrimination between trading partners (less 
favourable treatment) as a result of differences between 
intraregional and extraregional agreements’ regulations, 
policies and liberalization measures. 
Convergence can be promoted by various sorts of stimuli 
and different sorts of modalities, which should be examined 
on a topic-by-topic basis. In order to do so, a flexible outlook 
that is conducive to creative solutions must be maintained. 
Regional integration is both necessary and a matter of 
urgency. In addition to the traditional reasons for pursuing 
it, the current phase of the globalization process generates 
integration-oriented demands, such as the need for strategic 
international alliances in the areas of production, logistics, 
marketing, investment and technology. The demand for 
competitiveness and technological innovation are mounting, 
while China’s, India’s and other Asian nations’ competitive 
leapfrogging has redrawn the global map of trade flows and 
comparative advantages. Expanded markets, legal certainty 
and the convergence of rules and disciplines, in conjunction 
with advances in infrastructure, energy and connectivity, 
are now essential ingredients of growth with equity.
While recognizing countries’ differing sizes and trade 
orientations, the gains of existing integration schemes 
must be preserved by fostering convergence on trade and 
non-trade issues alike. Certainly, the countries belonging 
to each individual integration scheme must ask themselves 
what that scheme is doing to contribute to their growth and 
competitiveness. Be this as it may, prevailing conditions 
make it advisable to place a higher priority on regional 
cooperation than on trade negotiations as such.
Current integration efforts should focus on establishing 
common ground as a platform for convergence in energy 
and infrastructure policies, first of all, and, later, in 
policies on the environment, tourism, connectivity, ICTs, 
e-commerce, regulatory practices and other matters. If 
regional cooperation efforts in these areas succeed in 
rebuilding confidence among the countries, then, in addition 
to paving the way for competitiveness gains, they will make 
it less difficult, later on, to build bridges among the various 
intraregional trade arrangements by defining a basic set 
of shared obligations and flexible timetables, particularly 
for the smaller economies, together with infrastructure, 
trade facilitation and connectivity programmes that would 
provide for special and differential treatment. 
Progress also needs to be made in gradually building 
institutional bridges among the various integration schemes, 
without abandoning any of their overarching objectives, 
such as expanded markets, the free movement of goods 
and factors of production, macroeconomic coordination, 
binding dispute settlement procedures, appropriate 
treatment of asymmetries, structural funds, social policy 
coordination and bold initiatives in the fields of energy 
and infrastructure. 
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The most pressing task of all, however, is to re-establish 
a climate for dialogue in which no party is excluded or 
disparaged. This stage in the process calls for tolerance 
of the diversity of national interests and trade strategies. 
The validity of existing mechanisms should be respected 
and used as a basis for identifying areas and instruments 
that can serve as a platform for progress, first, in carrying 
forward regional cooperation initiatives and, later, in 
devising means of fostering convergence in the areas of 
trade and integration. 
4
 Innovation and technology readiness indices are components of the competitiveness growth index. The former measures factors that have to do 
with innovation capacity and management, the available supply of scientists and engineers, intellectual property protection, and the degree of 
collaboration between the academic and business communities. The latter measures how fully ICTs have been incorporated into production and 
government services and how developed the country’s technological infrastructure is.
In order to achieve these objectives, the approach used 
in promoting integration must be a suitable one based on 
respect for differences, observance of established procedures 
and structures, mechanisms for providing flexibility, an 
understanding of the interests of each country and of their 
diversity in terms of economic and commercial conditions, 
priority on consensus-building and a focus on the most 
meaningful areas of agreement, and an awareness of the 
relevance of integration efforts and of the need to adapt 
them to the demands of today’s world. 
Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INNOVATION
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Chapter V:  Competitiveness, technological innovation and natural 
resources: the experiences of Australia and New Zealand
The region’s competitiveness indicators show that, 
although Latin America has seen strong export growth 
in recent years and has gained improved market access, 
its progress in this area has been limited. Since the mid-
1990s, economic reforms, market liberalization, trade 
agreements and greater macroeconomic stability have 
enabled the region to regain some of the ground it had 
lost in world markets, but it still has a long way to go. 
This slow pace of progress in boosting competitiveness 
has been coupled with no more than limited advances in 
the area of innovation, although the region’s innovation 
indicators are nonetheless similar to the averages for 
other developing regions, including India and China 
(see figure 3).4 
This chapter analyses Australia’s and New Zealand’s’ 
international competitiveness and positioning strategies. 
These two countries have similar production structures to 
those of many Latin American countries and have achieved 
per capita export levels that are five or six times greater 
than the region’s, high per capita income levels and stable 
economic growth. Innovation has become a lynchpin of their 
development strategy and their position in the international 
economy. Information about this experience can therefore 
be very useful for the region, particularly at a point in 
time when a number of its economies are enjoying highly 
favourable terms of trade and are in the process of debating 
how to make the best use of their windfalls.
Source:  World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2006.
a
  The indices go from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 7. The closer an index is to 
zero, the weaker a country or region is in these areas; higher ratings point to strength 
in these spheres. 
Competitiveness and innovation strategies are 
discussed and promoted at the highest level of government 
in these countries. Programmes in these fields are not only 
amply funded (through grants, research and development 
(R&D) subsidies, tax breaks, business start-up subsidies, 
international marketing subsidies, etc.) but are also based 
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on precisely defined targets and objectives, as well as 
indicators for evaluating their results and outputs.
The authorities of both countries realize that policy 
implementation is extremely difficult without close 
collaboration among business, the public sector and the 
scientific community. Their national innovation systems are 
therefore envisaged as a complex network of interdependent 
relationships rather than as an uncoordinated assemblage 
of separate agencies and stakeholders. Business plays 
a leading role, but academic institutions also perform 
an essential function by virtue of their ability to create 
new knowledge and transmit it to businesses. The State 
makes a determined effort to set up links among scientists 
working at different universities, independent research 
centres and business enterprises with a view to building 
trust and creating incentives for collaboration.
These countries target their policies, placing priority 
on the development of innovations in natural-resource-
processing industries, but also in new industries, 
especially in the fields of biotechnology and ICTs. This 
is not by coincidence, but is instead focused on devising 
cross-cutting mechanisms for covering the requirements 
and needs of the widest possible range of activities. 
Biotechnology provides the foundation for newly created 
knowledge, contributes a large part of the value added to 
natural resources and makes it possible to market new 
agribusiness, forestry, aquaculture and mining products. 
Information technologies that can be applied to such 
tasks as database administration are key components of 
the integrated management systems that play a vital role 
in innovation.
This chapter of the report suggests that the following 
aspects of these experiences can be particularly helpful 
in guiding the regional debate on competitiveness and 
technological innovation: 
• innovation is at the very core of policies for promoting 
productivity, competitiveness and economic 
sustainability;
• the innovation process is systematically linked 
to the competitiveness policies advocated by line 
ministries;
• efforts to help the business and academic sectors work 
together have led to the creation of different types 
of organizations and the establishment of associated 
institutional structures;
• this institutional framework ensures that SMEs will 
have suitable access to technological modernization 
and innovation processes;
• both Australia’s and New Zealand’s innovation systems 
include programmes and funds to meet the needs 
of the businesses situated along the entire length 
of the innovation chain: R&D; new business start-
ups; service, technology or product marketing; and 
incentives for the formation of ties with international 
networks;
• these business funds account for an increasingly 
large part of system-wide innovation expenditure 
and play a particularly important role in supporting 
the marketing of innovations; and 
• public financing for these numerous programmes is 
locked-in for the medium term so that funding will 
not be interrupted by changes in the Administration 
or by cyclical factors.
The differing configurations of these innovation models 
reflect these countries’ histories, culture and growth processes, 
but the above aspects are of key importance in strengthening 
any national innovation system. Consequently, once the relevant 
institutional adjustments have been made, the steps they have 
taken in these areas can serve as a source of inspiration for 
policymakers in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Chapter VI: Bird flu and foot-and-mouth disease: impacts and
regional cooperation
Transboundary diseases are one of the main challenges 
for the world meat trade and for the stability of the 
agricultural exports of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region, where many worldwide poultry and beef 
exporters are based. Bird flu, foot-and-mouth disease 
and “mad cow” disease have strongly influenced the 
direction of trade flows for meat products in recent 
years by prompting the diversion of such flows to 
uninfected countries. 
Bird flu is unequalled in its ability to spread, its human 
dimension and the scale of its possible social and economic 
impact, which could include the loss of many human lives, 
as well as of days worked and labour productivity, and 
enormous medical costs. The present outbreak began in 
East and South-East Asia, has spread to a number of other 
continents and could reach the Americas, which has so far 
been free of the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain. In Asia alone 
—the region that has been hardest-hit by this disease— the 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy • 2005-2006 19
poultry-raising sector’s economic losses are estimated at 
around US$ 10 billion.5 As a consequence of this disease, 
Asian exports of chicken products were down sharply in 
2004. The greatest losses in that year were sustained in 
Thailand and China, where the volume of poultry exports 
plunged by 63% and 35%, respectively. 
As the outbreaks in Asia were mounting, the main 
Asian exporters’ poultry sales gradually declined while 
the poultry exports of South America, which has still not 
been infected by the H5N1 virus, have soared. In 2004, 
South America’s exports jumped 28% by volume, with 
particularly steep increases being registered by Chile 
(93%) and Brazil (26%) (see figure 4). Japan, which is 
Uncertainty about the spread of the disease sparks 
widespread fear that rattles all the world’s markets, not just 
those where the disease is present, both because worldwide 
consumption of poultry products decreases and because of 
the effects of the resulting increase in sanitary and health 
restrictions. In Europe, for example, poultry consumption 
has plunged by between 70% in Italy and 20% in France. 
This situation is exacerbated by the widespread tightening 
of sanitary and health restrictions in general, which makes 
it harder to penetrate consumer markets and thus dampens 
the growth of the region’s main poultry exporters’ sales. The 
growth rate for Brazil’s export volumes, for example, tumbled 
from 26% in 2004 to just 10% in 2005 (see figure 4).
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Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Meat Market Assessment and Statistics, June 2006.
Note:  Up to 2003, the calculations refer to the 15 countries that belonged to the European Union at that time; the estimates for 2004 and the projected figures shown for 2005 
correspond to the present European Union membership of 25 countries.  
The cases of “mad cow” disease found in the United 
States, Canada and various European countries have 
also had the effect of diverting world beef imports. This 
disease has caused United States and European exports to 
plummet, with the United States registering the steepest 
drop following the case discovered in December 2003 in the 
State of Washington, which triggered an 82% slide in the 
volume of exports in 2004 (see figure 4). Latin American 
countries have seen their share in the international beef 
market increase as a result, but the presence of another 
transborder disease in South America (foot-and-mouth 
disease) has prevented them from taking greater advantage 
of the void left by North America.
one of the world’s largest consumers of poultry, imported 
as much as 70% of the poultry exports of China and 
Thailand in 2001, but this figure slipped to 49% in 2004, 
which represents a drop from 609,000 to 360,000 metric 
tons.6 During that same time period, Brazil’s share in the 
Japanese import market swelled from 15% to 44% (from 
131,000 to 328,000 metric tons) and its exports to Saudi 
Arabia climbed from 257,000 to 334,000 metric tons, while 
China’s shrank from 40,000 to 5,000 tons. The disease-
control measures put in place by the Chinese and Thai 
Governments helped these countries regain part of this 
lost ground in 2005, however, when they posted growth 
rates of 21% and 36%, respectively (see figure 4).
Figure 4
REPERCUSSIONS OF BIRD FLU AND FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE ON THE REGION’S MEAT EXPORTS, 2001-2005
(Growth rates for export volumes, in percentages)
5
 Values and figures registered as of April 2006.
6
 This is primarily attributable to the reduction in imports from China from 367,000 metric tons in 2001 to 288,000 in 2003 and to 199,000 in 
2004 (FAO, Meat Market Assessment and Statistics, June 2006).
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Foot-and-mouth disease poses the biggest threat to the 
stability of the region’s meat trade and is regarded as one 
of the main health problems for the stock-raising sector 
in South America. It has been an influential factor in a 
reshuffling of market shares in the region that threatens 
to undermine Brazil’s position as the world’s largest 
exporter now that the country faces the imposition of trade 
embargoes in a number of import markets in response to 
the outbreaks that occurred in the states of Paraná and 
Mato Grosso do Sul in 2005. The region’s second-largest 
beef exporter, Argentina, has also been hard hit. When 
outbreaks of this disease occurred in Argentine territory in 
2001, its export volume plunged by 55%. The Argentine 
Government then implemented a strict disease-control 
programme and won official recognition of the improved 
health status of some of the country’s regions. This set 
the stage for an export recovery in 2002. This trend was 
cut short, however, by another outbreak in 2003. Exports 
are expected to decline once again in 2006 in the wake 
of the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in February 
in Corrientes Province. 
The presence of transboundary diseases has interrupted 
export growth for meat and related products and has 
redirected these products’ trade flows in recent years. 
In the long run, world markets are likely to import the 
bulk of such products from countries that remain free of 
these diseases and succeed in meeting consumer markets’ 
increasingly stringent health and sanitation standards. In 
order to maintain its access to major markets, the industry 
will have to restructure and adopt biosafety measures that 
are up to increasingly rigorous international standards. 
Unless public programmes are put in place that support 
efforts to increase competitiveness, small and medium-
sized producers will be at a serious disadvantage, since 
they will be unable to afford to make the necessary changes 
to meet the world market’s new requirements. 
Success in normalizing exports and in expanding and 
recovering major international markets will depend on 
efficient, effective collaboration between the public and 
private sectors of the sort seen in East and South-East Asia 
and Argentina in 2002. A number of regional initiatives to 
control and prevent bird flu and foot-and-mouth disease are 
beginning to be implemented, but their effectiveness hinges 
on intersectoral cooperation (especially between the health 
and agricultural sectors) and on coordinated action by the 
countries concerned. Steps should also be taken to ensure that 
trading partners apply the regionalization principle, which 
has safeguarded Latin American meat export flows despite 
some countries’ reticence to implement such schemes.
Under such circumstances, preventive measures are 
a matter of urgency, since the difficulty of recovering 
from international trade bans and of regaining consumer 
markets’ confidence makes the re-establishment of lost 
commercial ties a very slow process. The region needs to 
act swiftly to firm up coordinated disease-control plans 
and programmes based on sound scientific evidence and 
international organizations’ expertise. If the region is to 
deal with these threats, it will have to place priority on 
pooling the efforts of the agricultural, animal health, health 
care and financial sectors and on taking advantage of the 
technical and financial assistance proffered by international 
agencies and developed countries. Regional cooperation 
can be especially effective in strengthening surveillance, 
prevention and disease-control measures, as well as in 
developing a harmonized system of health and sanitation 
standards and regulations that will ensure a balanced form 
of protection for the region that is compatible with the 
circumstances in each country. 
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Chapter I
World economic trends and their impact on 
the Latin American and Caribbean region’s 
position in the international economy
Introduction
Despite the high prices of petroleum and other non-renewable resources, international trade 
and the world economy continued to expand apace in 2005 and the first half of 2006. Midway 
through the year, however, the increasing severity of various risk factors began to generate greater 
volatility in financial and commodity markets, and economic growth is therefore expected to 
slow in the second half of 2006 and in 2007. Even so, world economic growth measured in 
terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) is set to exceed 4% in 2006 for the fourth year in a row, 
making this the longest uninterrupted growth spurt since the 1970s. Moreover, all the world 
regions are experiencing growth, including Japan and the European Union, for the first time 
in many years. Latin American and Caribbean trade is still benefiting from persistently strong 
international demand, especially from China and the United States, and from highly favourable 
terms of trade. In addition, the region has been enjoying ready access to international financial 
markets at low interest rates. Thus, as in 2005, Latin America and the Caribbean should post a 
growth rate of around 5% this year. This is a positive result when viewed from the standpoint 
of the region’s medium-term and potential growth trends, but is less heartening when compared 
with the considerably higher rates being recorded in emerging economies in Africa, Asia and 
Eastern Europe. 
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Although external disequilibria in the major economies 
pose a threat to continued world economic growth, a 
number of trends are mitigating this risk. It is particularly 
significant that the engine of economic growth has shifted 
from the United States to Japan and the European Union, 
which will help to lessen external imbalances. Economic 
growth in the United States slowed from 5.6% in the first 
quarter of 2006 to 2.5% in the second, with consumption 
exhibiting a particularly sharp decrease, as a result of the 
Federal Reserve’s steady increase of interest rates up to 
July 2006. Some analysts fear that the United States may 
slip into a recession, but this seems unlikely given the 
strength of other components of demand. Meanwhile, the 
European Union’s growth rate rose from 1.7% in the last 
quarter of 2005 to 2.4% in the second quarter of 2006. 
Japan’s economic recovery has also remained on track, 
since its pace of expansion is expected to pick up in the 
second half of 2006 after slack growth in the second 
quarter. Another positive trend is the United States dollar’s 
depreciation against the euro, since this also helps to ease 
imbalances among the world’s large economies.
Nevertheless, persistently high oil prices and the 
inflexible yuan-to-dollar exchange rate continue to fuel 
external imbalances. In fact, two thirds of the increase 
in the United States’ current account deficit in 2005 was 
attributable to rising petroleum prices. The Chinese monetary 
authorities’ reluctance to allow the yuan to appreciate more 
against the dollar is another contributing factor. The dollar 
has depreciated considerably against the euro, however, 
thereby generating fresh surpluses with the European Union, 
which may account in part for the new high recorded by 
China’s total trade surplus in July 2006.
The slowdown in the United States economy should 
affect Latin American and Caribbean commodity export 
volumes and prices less than other downswings have done 
during the past decade. In the last few years, the region’s 
terms of trade and international commodity prices have 
been less vulnerable to fluctuations in the United States 
economy’s growth rate1 thanks to China’s emergence as the 
world’s largest importer of natural resources. The weakening 
of United States demand will thus be offset by China and, 
to a lesser extent, by Japan and Europe, thereby softening 
its impact on the volumes and prices of the Latin American 
and Caribbean region’s commodity exports. 
World growth and the region’s access to international 
financial markets could also be hurt if interest rates 
are raised further in an effort to contain inflation (and 
inflation expectations) in the face of persistently high oil 
prices. Petroleum prices are pushing up core inflation in 
developed countries, and their central banks (including 
those of the United States and the euro area) are therefore 
stepping up their interest rate hikes. This appears to 
herald the end of the period of low real interest rates that 
has lasted for most of this decade. It is also prompting 
a flight to quality in capital flows, which is detrimental 
to emerging markets. Although Latin America is now 
much less vulnerable to financial volatility than it was 
a few years ago, a number of countries are still carrying 
large amounts of dollar-indexed public debt and could 
therefore be negatively affected by this situation. The 
region may also feel the dampening effects of higher 
interest rates on world economic activity, which would 
undoubtedly act as a brake on demand, commodity 
prices and exports. 
To sum up, then, interest rates are rising in the 
United States, economic activity is slowing, the dollar is 
depreciating against the euro, and the current account deficit 
is narrowing. Japan and the European Union are partly 
making up for slower growth in the United States economy, 
but trends in China are moving in the other direction, as 
economic growth in 2006 has been even higher than it 
was in 2005 and has been paired with a mounting trade 
surplus and a depreciation of the yuan against the euro. 
The most likely outcome is not a recession, however, but 
rather a soft landing for the world economy and a gradual 
correction of its current disequilibria.
This chapter looks first at recent trends in the major 
economies and their international trade activity, capital 
flows, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the Latin 
American and Caribbean region’s trade performance. 
It then goes on to examine the various external 
disequilibria and the forces shaping them, such as the 
economic performance of the United States, Japan 
and the European Union, oil prices, interest rates and 
exchange rates. The chapter concludes with regional 
trade projections for 2006 and an overview of the 
main factors that could influence the currently positive 
economic environment.
1
  The correlation between the United States industrial production index and commodity prices, not including energy products, declined from 0.52 
in 1986-1995 to 0.11 in 1996-2005 (J.P. Morgan, 2006).
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A. World economic conditions in 2005 and 2006
In 2005 and 2006, the world economy has continued to 
outstrip expectations. The major emerging economies 
(China, India and the Russian Federation) have been the 
most dynamic, with higher-than-expected growth being 
led by investment and exports. In fact, when calculated 
on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), China’s 
and India’s combined growth accounted for over one 
third of the increase in world GDP in 2005, thereby 
overshadowing the combined contribution of the United 
States, the European Union and Japan (see table I.1). This 
means that China and India are definitely playing a role in 
keeping the world growth rate above the 4%-mark since 
2003. When GDP is measured in terms of current dollars, 
however, the European Union and the United States are 
still the largest components of the world economy (see 
table I.1 and IMF, 2006).
Table I.1 
CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD GDP GROWTH, BY COUNTRY AND REGION
(Percentages of the world total)
 Contribution to growth a Share of world GDP, 2005
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 b 2007 b Current  Purchasing
 dollars  power parity
United States 13.4 14.5 16.0 17.7 17.2 15.9 16.7 28.1 20.1
European Union 19.9 13.8 11.8 13.6 12.0 12.5 13.1 30.3 20.3
Japan 3.7 2.1 3.7 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.2 10.3 6.4
Latin America and the Caribbean 7.0 4.5 2.5 5.0 7.8 7.0 6.5 5.5 7.4
Developing Asian countries 39.9 44.7 43.6 37.2 41.7 42.3 42.5 8.9 27.1
 China 27.1 30.0 27.7 23.7 27.2 28.1 27.8 5.0 15.4
 India 6.9 7.4 8.9 7.3 8.2 7.7 7.9 1.7 5.9
Annual GDP growth c 1.6 1.9 2.8 4.1 3.6 3.6 ... ... ...
Annual GDP growth (PPP) d 2.6 3.1 4.1 5.3 4.8 5.1 4.9 ... ...
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs.
a
 Contributions were calculated on the basis of GDP expressed in terms of purchasing power parity.   b On the basis of projections by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
c In constant 2000 dollars.  d In purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars.
In 2005 the developed economies (with the exception 
of Japan) grew more slowly than in 2004. The rate for the 
United States declined to 3.9% in 2004, although this was still 
the highest in the developed world, and its current account 
deficit swelled to almost US$ 800 billion. The European 
Union witnessed a sharp slowdown to 1.5% owing to weak 
domestic demand, especially in its larger member countries, 
such as Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. Japan’s 
economic growth rate was surprisingly strong, at 5% in the 
first half of 2005, though slightly lower in the second. Japan 
also turned in an impressive export performance thanks to 
China’s dynamism and stronger domestic demand against a 
backdrop of job creation and a net increase in credit.
International trade slowed less than had been expected 
at the start of 2005, partly because commodity prices (except 
for agricultural goods) remained high. Exporters of energy 
products and metals, including those of Latin America and 
the Caribbean, benefited the most from this situation.
The world economic outlook for 2006 is also quite 
positive, and analysts project a growth rate similar to 
that of 2005 (see figure I.1), despite a number of risk 
factors appearing on the horizon. For now, the large 
countries’ industrial output and investment continue to 
expand rapidly. Unemployment is still declining, and 
trade and financial flows remain buoyant. In addition, 
the engine of growth has shifted from the United States 
to the European Union and Japan, with the United States 
economy slowing in the second quarter after a very 
dynamic first quarter. Meanwhile, the Japanese economy 
is gaining momentum, with an annualized growth rate 
of 3.1% in the first quarter and, despite a slack second-
quarter performance, is expected to expand more swiftly 
in the second half of 2006. The euro area’s economy 
is also showing signs of more robust activity, with an 
expansion of 2.4% in the second quarter, and emerging 
economies continue to grow briskly.
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Figure I.1
WORLD ECONOMIC INDICATORS
(Percentages and billions of dollars)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund, United Nations Conference on Trade 
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In line with economic growth, world trade volumes 
surpassed expectations in 2005. For example, IMF raised 
its 2005 growth estimate from 7.0% in September 2005 to 
7.3% in September 2006 and revised its 2006 projection 
upward, from 7.4% to 8.8%. These rates are lower than 
the 10.3% recorded in 2004, however. The slowdown 
seen in 2004 and 2005 was even steeper in current values 
(from 21% to 13%) because prices rose less in 2005 than 
in 2004. Trade in services also expanded more slowly in 
current values, sliding from 19% in 2004 to 11% in 2005, 
and has performed quite evenly across its subcategories 
(transport, tourism and other business services).
In real terms, Latin America and the Caribbean 
recorded the second-largest increase in exports, after 
China, in 2005. South America posted a sharper 
upswing in exports than Mexico and Central America 
did because it specializes more heavily in commodities, 
which were more buoyant than other products (see 
figure I.2). The region also ranked second in terms of 
real import growth. In nominal terms, however, the 
region registered an even sharper increase in imports, 
while the faster expansion of exports was attributable 
to trends in trade flows of petroleum and petroleum 
products (WTO, 2006).
Figure I.2
REAL GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICAN MERCHANDISE IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT, 2000-2004, 2005 AND 2006
(Annual growth rates)
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B.  External disequilibria: trends and prospects
Trade imbalances continued to worsen in early 2006. 
The United States’ current account continued to show 
a deficit in 2005, with the negative balance standing 
at US$ 792 billion at the year’s end. This represented 
almost 6.4% of GDP and a year-on-year increase of 
US$ 126 million (5.7% of GDP). The deficit widened 
slightly to 6.6% of GDP in the first and second quarters 
of 2006 and is expected to reach 7% of GDP by the 
end of the year. Two thirds of the 2005 increase is 
attributable to increased imports (40%) and rising 
petroleum prices, while the remainder is due to the 
country’s deepening trade deficit (25%) with China. 
The United States deficit is offset by the mounting 
surplus of the emerging Asian economies, petroleum-
exporting countries and the nations of Latin America 
and the Caribbean (see figure I.4).
Figure I.4
CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES IN SELECTED ECONOMIES, 1997-2006
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
High commodity prices continue to contribute to 
the region’s satisfactory performance. The terms of trade 
(including the prices of petroleum products) have improved 
significantly in the last few years for both South America 
and Mexico, although less markedly in the latter case (see 
figure I.3). The Central American countries have witnessed 
a steep downturn in their terms of trade, however, mainly 
because of the rising prices of energy imports.
Financial flows to emerging economies were up by 
almost 10% in 2005. As part of this pattern, FDI flows rose 
for the second consecutive year in 2005, with an increase 
of 29%, or almost US$ 900 billion, over the 2004 figure. 
The FDI growth rate in developing countries overall was 
on a par with the rate for developed countries, but flows 
to Latin America and the Caribbean climbed more slowly 
(11%), and the region thus continues to lose ground to 
more dynamic FDI destinations, such as China, other 
Asian countries and Africa (ECLAC, 2006a).
Figure I.3
TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS
(Variation between the 1990s and 2005, 2006 aand 2007 b)
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1. Performance of the United States economy and savings trends
The pace of growth of the United States economy has 
gradually slowed in 2005 and 2006 relative to its 2004 
level, with an especially sharp downswing being registered 
in late 2005 in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The 
economy rebounded strongly in the first quarter of 2006, 
but slowed again in the second. Growth is expected to 
continue to decelerate throughout the rest of the year. One 
of the main reasons for this trend is the more sluggish 
expansion of private consumption in response to higher 
gasoline prices and the apparent end of the real estate 
boom, which may erode consumer confidence in the 
short term. Export and import volumes are both rising 
more sedately, but in value terms imports are continuing 
to outpace exports, partly because of the high cost of oil 
imports, all of which has steepened the deterioration in 
the trade balance.
The greatest risk factor for the United States economy’s 
growth is an increase in inflation and in inflationary 
expectations, which are being spurred by rising fuel prices, 
the strong demand for labour and the upward pressure 
on import costs exerted by a depreciating dollar. In view 
of this situation, the Federal Reserve has continued to 
increase interest rates up to mid-2006. 
The Latin American and Caribbean region has reaped 
the benefits of rapid growth in the United States, which is 
its main export market. In fact, the United States absorbs 
half of Latin America’s exports and accounted for 40% of 
the increase in the region’s external sales in 2005, although 
this share varies sharply across countries, standing at over 
two thirds in the case of Mexico and Central America, one 
half in the case of the Andean Community and only a small 
fraction for the MERCOSUR countries (see table I.2). 
Table I.2
TRADE RELIANCE ON THE UNITED STATES, 2005
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
 Exports to Percentage Trade Trade
 the United of exports balance balance
 States going to with United with the
  United States world
  States
Mexico 183 351 85.8 65 089 -7 559
    
Honduras 3 309 75.6  154 -106
Nicaragua  991 63.0  401 -619
El Salvador 2 051 60.6  272 -3 332
Guatemala 2 694 50.1  29 -3 431
Ecuador 4 950 46.5 4 107 420
Costa Rica 3 177 44.8 - 119 -2 717
Panama  973 14.8 -1 009 -2 000
    
Dominican Republic 4 325 77.9 - 26 -1 544
CARICOM 9 167 52.2 2 330 1 052
Cuba  0 0.0 - 361 -2 970
    
Venezuela (Bolivarian
 Republic of) 32 587 58.8 25 987 29 674
Colombia 8 849 41.8 2 843 1 988
Peru 5 173 30.4 3 052 4 917
Uruguay  761 22.4  489 -474
Brazil 22 472 19.0 8 918 44 758
Chile 6 248 15.8 1 821 9 142
Bolivia  383 14.0  59 1 007
Argentina 4 321 10.8 1 357 11 320
Paraguay  54 3.2 - 774 -1 564
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official information from the countries and the United States 
Department of Commerce. 
2. Japan’s recovery
The Japanese economy is showing signs of recovery. 
In fact, in 2005 it posted a growth rate of 2.6%, after 
four sluggish years (2001-2004) owing to slack private 
consumption and investment. In the first quarter of 2006 
Japan’s economy continued to expand robustly and, 
although its second-quarter performance was somewhat 
disappointing, stronger growth is expected in the second 
half of the year. Unemployment is declining and wages 
have risen. Industrial output and exports continue to climb, 
and increased profits have enabled firms to absorb their 
higher energy costs. 
The first few months of 2006 marked the end of eight 
years of deflation and of the central bank’s expansionary 
policy. Prices had continued to decline in 2005, and the 1.7% 
year-on-year drop in the GDP deflator was the steepest since 
early 2003. Early in 2006, however, prices began to climb, 
partially in response to sharply rising energy prices. With 
the end of deflation, Japan’s central bank dismantled the 
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expansionary monetary policy it had been implementing 
for the last five years (see figure I.5). The bank raised its 
benchmark interest rate in July 2006, and long-term rates 
are also on the rise.2 The country will now be called upon 
to undertake a large-scale fiscal restructuring effort, given 
its huge public debt (160% of GDP) and fiscal deficit, 
which will reach 5.5% of GDP in 2007. The government 
will thus have to cut spending and raise taxes and employer 
contributions, which could dampen private consumption 
and corporate profits over the medium term. 
Figure I.5
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the Cabinet Office of the Government of Japan [online] http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/
sna/qe054-2/kiyo-jcy0542.csv.
With domestic demand growing briskly, Japan’s imports 
are expected to rise and, although exports are continuing 
to expand, its trade and current account surpluses are 
narrowing, which means that Japan is helping to reduce 
the disequilibria affecting the world economy. Japan is 
running a hefty surplus with the rest of Asia, Europe and 
the United States, but has a large and growing deficit with 
the Middle East. It is also posting a surplus with Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
From Japan’s standpoint, the Latin American and 
Caribbean region is a relatively small market, and its 
importance as a trading partner is waning. In fact, in 
2005 the region accounted for only 4% of Japan’s exports 
and 3% of its imports. Meanwhile, Japan absorbed less 
than 2% of the Latin American and Caribbean countries’ 
exports in 2005, except in the cases of Chile (12%), 
Bolivia (5%), Peru (4%) and Brazil (3%). China, on 
the other hand, accounts for a much larger percentage. 
Trade between Mexico and Japan expanded considerably 
in 2005, thanks to the Agreement between Japan and 
the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the 
Economic Partnership, which came into effect in April 
2005. Among Mexico’s exports to Japan, the main items 
are fuels, which represent three quarters of the increase 
recorded in 2005 and the first two months of 2006, iron 
ore and non-ferrous metals. 
Japan is a relatively significant source of FDI for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, however, since it contributed 
US$ 6.4 billion of a total of US$ 45 billion in FDI inflows 
in 2005. Apart from FDI in tax havens such as the Cayman 
Islands, Japan invested quite heavily in Brazil (mainly in 
transport equipment, food and some services sectors) and 
Mexico (transport equipment and textiles). The upswing 
seen in Japanese FDI in Mexico since the two countries 
signed a free trade agreement (FTA) shows that FTAs may 
be a way of encouraging Japan to invest in the region. 
Japan is currently negotiating an FTA with Chile. 
In view of the Asian economies’ dynamic performance, 
which is led by China but has clear implications for 
the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), Latin America and the Caribbean 
will have to compete with Asian economies to attract 
Japanese FDI. Under its preferential agreement with 
ASEAN, since July 2005 China has begun to cut tariffs 
on many goods from ASEAN member countries, and 
in December 2005 the Republic of Korea signed a 
2
  The interest rate on the Japanese Government’s 10-year bonds (the market’s main benchmark) rose to almost 2.0% in mid-2006, up from the 
1.3% level recorded just two months earlier. This was the highest point it had reached since September 2000.
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framework agreement with this association. After an 
eight-month interruption, Japan resumed negotiations 
on an FTA with the most developed ASEAN economies, 
with the idea being that the scope of the agreement 
might be extended to the entire bloc at a later stage. 
Japan already has a strategic partnership agreement 
with Singapore, has an accord with Malaysia that is 
awaiting ratification, and is looking at other schemes 
with Thailand and the Philippines, with which it has 
already worked out the basic principles.
Box I.1
ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED MEXICAN STATES
This is the first broad-ranging agreement that 
Japan has signed. It has 18 chapters, which 
contain rules and disciplines on: (i) market 
access; (ii) sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; (iii) rules, technical regulations 
and compliance assessment procedures; 
(iv) rules of origin; (v) investment; (vi) services 
(transboundary trade and financial 
services); (vii) government procurement; 
(viii) competition; (ix) safeguards, and 
(x) entry for nationals and temporary 
leave to remain for business purposes. 
In addition, as a partnership agreement, 
it contains provisions on improving the 
business climate (chapter 13) and bilateral 
cooperation (chapter 14), aimed at 
strengthening economic relations between 
the two countries. Under the agreement, 
Japan will eliminate duty on 95% of tariff 
items applicable to Mexico, 91% immediately 
and 4% in the medium term. Conversely, 
Mexico will eliminate tariffs on only 44% 
of tariff lines immediately.
Between April and December 2005, 
bilateral trade was up by 21.9% year on year 
(surpassing the previous decade’s average 
growth rate of 7.9%). Japan’s imports from 
Mexico rose by 19.2% to US$ 1.9 billion, 
while Mexican imports of Japanese goods 
jumped 22.3%, to reach US$ 10.4 billion. In 
2005 Japan’s direct investments in Mexico 
amounted to US$ 629 million, triple the 
2004 figure. 
In Japan, the automobile sector has 
benefited the most as regards exports to 
Mexico, with a surge of 42.0% to US$ 996 
million in total. In Mexico, agriculture 
has gained the most from the free trade 
agreement. Exports of orange juice to 
Japan were up by 46.3%, to US$ 2.5 
billion, and exports of bananas by 7.3%, 
to US$ 2.82 billion. Mexico’s beef exports 
to Japan tripled to US$ 38 million as a 
result of Japan’s ban on beef imports from 
the United States, which made Mexico an 
alternative source of supply for Japanese 
butchers. Japan is the world’s largest 
importer of beef, importing almost US$ 50 
billion per year.
Thanks to the legal cer tainty 
consolidated under the agreement, 
Japanese firms are showing mounting 
interest in investing in Mexico and more 
confidence in its economy. In January and 
February 2006, a number of Japanese 
firms announced 10 investment projects 
worth a combined US$ 924.5 million, 
including three in the automobile and 
autoparts sector: Toyota and JATCO are to 
extend their plants in Baja California and 
Aguascalientes, respectively, and Suzuki 
Motor has invested in new sales points 
for its vehicles. 
Source: Organization of American States (OAS), “Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership” [online] 
Foreign Trade Information System (SICE) <http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/JPN_MEXDraftEPA_s/JPN_MEXind_s.asp>; Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) 
“Report examines effects of Japan-Mexico EPA one year after its entry into force”, press release, April 2006; El Economista, “Se dispara intercambio comercial México-
Japón” [online] <http://www.economista.com.mx/articulos/2006-04-07-10623> and La Crónica, “Explotan TLC México-Japón” [online] http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.
php?idc=231361.
3. Renewed strength in Europe
In 2006 the European Union (25 members) showed a stronger 
performance, after having posted a growth rate of only 
1.5% in 2005. Although the economy’s expansion slowed 
in the last quarter of 2005, better first- and second-quarter 
results in 2006 confirm the existence of an upturn. Growth 
is being driven by domestic demand, particularly private 
investment, which is, in turn, being spurred by optimistic 
expectations regarding future trends in consumption, 
still-low interest rates and limited idle capacity. Private 
consumption is also up, thanks to more robust job creation. 
With external conditions remaining favourable, exports are 
climbing rapidly. Imports, too, are on the rise owing to the 
strength of domestic demand (see figure I.6). 
Monetary and fiscal policy is sustaining this 
economic reactivation in 2006. The European Central 
Bank raised the interest rate by 25 points in December 
2005 and in March, June and August 2006 in response 
to the upswing in inflation caused by high oil prices and 
the brighter economic outlook. The euro area’s budget 
deficit remained at 2.3% of GDP in 2005 and is unlikely 
to narrow in 2006. In 2005, a number of countries strove 
to observe the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact, 
but budget deficits worsened in some others, including 
Italy and Portugal. Several countries have announced 
that they are embarking on a fiscal consolidation 
effort —including Germany, which intends to reduce 
its deficit to 3% by 2007, and France, which is to cut 
public spending by 1% in 2006— but these measures 
will probably be insufficient to ensure compliance with 
the terms of the Pact.
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Figure I.6
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT), 
Economic Forecast Spring 2006.
A major challenge facing a number of European 
Union countries is to find a way of maintaining their 
growth potential and sustaining job creation in the 
medium term. The most difficult task in this respect is 
to build a public consensus around reforms in several 
key areas, including the labour market. One recent 
illustration of this point was the French Government’s 
attempt to introduce more flexible contracts for young 
people, known as “first-job contracts”. The move was 
intended to improve the situation of young people, among 
whom unemployment is extremely high in France. After 
several weeks of mass protests in March and April 2006, 
the government had to withdraw the proposal. Another 
area that holds out great growth potential, but in which 
consensus-building for liberalization poses difficulties, 
is the European services market.
The euro area’s trade surplus decreased from € 72 
billion in 2004 to € 23 billion in 2005, while the European 
Union’s deficit widened from € 63 billion to € 106 billion. 
This deterioration is largely attributable to the higher cost 
of importing petroleum and petroleum products. Europe’s 
surplus with the United States increased, its deficit with 
China and the Russian Federation deepened, and its deficit 
with Japan stabilized. 
In 2004 and 2005 the European Union succeeded in 
stabilizing its trade surplus with Mexico, Central America 
and the Caribbean (almost € 9 billion) and its deficit with 
South America. Within South America, its balance with the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador worsened, 
but improved with respect to the other countries of the 
subregion. Latin America maintained its relative position 
among Europe’s extraregional trading partners, representing 
around 5.7% of exports and 6.0% of imports. Between 2000 
and 2005, the European Union’s share in Latin American 
exports rose by one percentage point to 12%. In 2005, it 
was the largest single destination for Brazilian and Chilean 
exports (29% and 25%, respectively), but represented a 
very small proportion of Mexican, Venezuelan and Central 
American exports (except for Panama). Negotiations between 
the European Union and the regional blocs had stalled for a 
time, but then gained fresh impetus at the fourth European 
Union and Latin American and Caribbean Summit, held in 
May 2006 in Vienna (see box I.2).
Box I.2
ADVANCES IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The fourth European Union and Latin 
American and Caribbean Summit, held 
in May 2006 in Vienna, saw a number of 
advances in trade negotiations between 
the two regions and in modalities of 
cooperation. Given the positive impacts 
of accords already in place between the 
European Union and Mexico and Chile, it is 
important to consolidate a strategy of trade 
liberalization and to heighten cooperation 
between the European Union and the 
regional blocs:
MERCOSUR: the Summit paid much 
attention to completing negotiations for 
a partnership agreement encompassing 
political, economic, trade and cooperation 
ties between the European Union and 
MERCOSUR. The negotiators were 
instructed to step up their efforts to 
move the process forward, even though, 
•
the task is admittedly not an easy one, 
and the outcome of these negotiations 
also depends on progress in the Doha 
Round.
Andean Community: the Summit resolved 
to start working in 2006 towards the 
negotiation of a partnership agreement 
between the European Union and the 
Andean Community. To this end, the Andean 
Community and the European Union agreed 
to hold as many meetings as necessary 
prior to 20 July 2006 to clarify and define 
the bases of the negotiation. 
Central America: the Summit resolved to 
undertake negotiations on a partnership 
agreement, taking into account an 
evaluation exercise conducted by the two 
regions. The Central American countries 
undertook to ratify the Central American 
agreement on investment and trade 
•
•
in services and to develop a regional 
mechanism to ensure the application of 
regional economic legislation. Panama is 
also to participate in these negotiations, 
after it formally joined the Central American 
economic integration process.
The Caribbean: the European Union and 
the countries of the Caribbean Forum of 
African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
(CARIFORUM) are negotiating bilateral 
economic partnership agreements under 
the Cotonou Agreement signed by the 
European Union and the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States. This framework 
agreement contains provisions on trade, 
assistance and political cooperation and it 
enshrines preferential relations between the 
countries of the group and the European 
Union on market access and technical 
cooperation, among other matters.
•
Source: European Union, official site [online] http://europa.eu.int; bilaterals.org, official site [online] http://www.bilaterals.org.; Puentes quincenal, vol. 3, No. 9, 8 May 2006; 
Council of the European Union, “Declaration of Vienna”, fourth European Union and Latin America and the Caribbean Summit, Vienna, 12 May 2006.
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4. Petroleum
Steadily rising oil prices have added to trade imbalances 
around the world in the last few years and, in particular, 
have exacerbated the United States’ current account deficit. 
In fact, two thirds of the increase in its deficit in 2005 
was attributable to this factor. Oil-producing countries 
have seen their trade surpluses swell, thus contributing 
to expanded savings and liquidity. 
Prices for petroleum and petroleum products 
continue to trend upward and to display considerable 
volatility. In 2005, prices shot up in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina and the damage it caused in the 
southern part of the United States in September, but 
later subsided to previous levels thanks to the release 
of strategic oil reserves and augmented supplies from 
OPEC countries. Prices have risen again since early 
2006, however, driven mainly by mounting geopolitical 
uncertainty in the Middle East, Iraq and Nigeria (see 
figure I.7). 
Oil consumption rose less sharply in 2005 (1% 
compared with 4% in 2004), partly because of the declining 
pace of economic growth. The sharpest slowdowns were 
in the United States and China. 
Figure I.7
PETROLEUM: DEMAND, EXCESS CAPACITY AND PRICES,a 1990-2005 AND 1960-2006
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); 
British Petroleum (BP) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor of the United States.
a
 Petroleum prices have been deflated using the United States producer price index and are expressed in constant 2005 dollars (January-December 2005).
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At the world level, petroleum output rose slightly in 
2005, in keeping with the OPEC countries’ decision to 
increase supply, while the production levels of non-OPEC 
countries were flat. Within the latter group, production 
declined in the United States and the Russian Federation 
but rose in African oil-producing countries. Developed 
countries’ oil reserves expanded in 2005, despite the high 
price levels. This is just the opposite of what has occurred 
on past occasions and reflects the precautions being taken by 
governments and consumers with a view to the future.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) expects 
demand to rise by at least 1.2 million barrels per day 
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in 2006 and, in view of existing geopolitical tensions, 
projects further price rises. Investment in expanding 
capacity was up in nominal terms in 2004 and 2005, but 
is probably not enough in real terms to keep pace with 
the rapid increase in demand. This means that excess 
capacity will continue to be quite limited for several more 
years, and prices are therefore likely to remain high for 
some time, as suggested by current trends on the relevant 
futures markets.
In 2004-2005 the rise in oil prices was reflected in 
two different trends in Latin America and the Caribbean: 
expanding surpluses in exporting countries and increasing 
deficits in net oil importers. The petroleum surplus in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, for example, has jumped 
from less than 30% of GDP to almost 40%. In Ecuador and 
Colombia the increase has been comparatively smaller, 
while in a majority of the other countries in the region, 
oil-related deficits have widened (see figure I.8).








  Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
  Chile








  Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)
2004 2005
Figure I.8
TRADE BALANCE FOR PETROLEUM AND PETROLEUM 
PRODUCTS, 2004 AND 2005
(Percentages of GDP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database 
(COMTRADE) and figures from the countries. 
5. Interest rates
At present, interest rates are facilitating the financing of 
the United States’ external deficit, since short-term spreads 
between the major economic blocs widened in the first 
half of 2006. Specifically, higher rates in the United States 
have made it easier to cover the current account deficit. 
These increasing spreads are the reflection of differing 
stages in the monetary policy cycle in the United States, 
on the one hand, and in Japan and the euro area, on the 
other. In the United States, the Federal Open Market 
Committee gradually raised the federal funds rate from 
1% in June 2004 to 5.25% in June 2006 in order to ease 
mounting inflationary pressure and slow the economy’s 
rapid growth. The latter objective was achieved, judging 
by the slowdown in the second quarter. The euro area’s 
central banks are gradually abandoning their expansionary 
stance, as reflected in an increase of 25 basis points in 
December 2005, followed by similar hikes in March and 
June 2006. Lastly, Japan’s central bank discontinued its 
policy of monetary flexibility in mid-July 2006, when it 
raised the interbank rate from 0% to 0.25%. 
Yield curves, which represent the profile of interest 
rates on bonds at different maturities, are flat or slightly 
inverted3 at the moment in the United States and, to a lesser 
degree, in Europe due to the fact that, unlike short-term 
rates, long-term rates are rising very little. In Japan, in 
response to the change in the direction of monetary policy 
and to the economy’s recovery, the long-term rate rose 
to almost 2% in April 2006, from 1.5% in February, thus 
reaching its highest level since mid-2000. 
Interest rate spreads in emerging economies are also at 
historical lows, which reflects the fact that these countries 
have achieved more solid economic fundamentals, thanks 
to their lower public debt levels and more abundant foreign 
exchange reserves. With developed-country interest rates 
on the rise, however, this period of abundant liquidity is 
coming to an end, and capital flows are veering towards 
less risky markets in a flight to quality assets. This has a 
negative impact on emerging markets, as is shown by the 
slight increase in Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI+) 
spreads in 2006.
3
 This profile differs from the usual upward slope because, at longer maturities, investors demand a higher interest rate to cover the risk of inflation 
and other economic uncertainties. Variations in the shape of the curve are very important, as they may reflect changes in the growth rate, in 
central bank policy, or institutional and other types of changes. 
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The United States Federal Reserve has been hiking 
interest rates for a number of reasons. The main purpose 
is to check inflationary expectations, which have mounted 
recently owing to the rise in core inflation in the first half of 
2006. (The desired target range for inflation is around 2%.) 
Second, higher rates are needed to keep foreigners interested 
in continuing to finance the country’s deficit in a context 
of increased exchange-rate uncertainty. The willingness of 
emerging economies and oil-producing countries to continue 
financing the United States’ external deficit depends largely 
on the size of interest rate spreads across the various countries 
and their expectations with regard to the exchange rate. With 
a very low real yield of 2% at the most, and with the dollar 
expected to continue declining in the near future, yields on 
investments in the United States will drop even further and 
may in fact turn negative.
Figure I.9
INTEREST RATES IN MAJOR MARKETS AND RISK LEVELS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS AND IN LATIN AMERICA, 2000-2006
(Percentages and basis points)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the United States Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, European Central 
Bank and J.P. Morgan, “Emerging Markets Index Bond Monitor”.
6. Exchange rates
Exchange rates and expectations regarding their behaviour 
are another important variable in relation to international 
external disequilibria. A depreciation of the dollar, among 
other things, could lessen these imbalances. Just the opposite 
pattern was seen in 2005, since the dollar appreciated as 
interest rate spreads between the major blocs widened. 
In the first half of 2006, however, the dollar depreciated 
against the euro (see figure I.10). 
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Figure I.10
















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Trends in Asian currencies in 2005 did little to help 
correct external disequilibria. Despite the flexibilization 
of the yuan’s exchange rate in July 2005, the Chinese 
currency continues to fluctuate very close to the dollar. 
The yuan appreciated by 2.5% in 2005, after the Chinese 
authorities revalued the currency by 2.1% against the 
dollar and replaced their exchange-rate peg with a 
controlled crawling peg regime, with daily adjustments 
of up to 0.3% against the dollar and 1.5% (3% as of 
September) in relation to a currency basket. In practice, 
the authorities allowed the currency to rise only slightly; 
the rate of appreciation will probably increase as a 
more sophisticated foreign-exchange market develops, 
however. More financial agencies (including foreign 
ones) have now been authorized to participate in the 
interbank foreign exchange market and to engage in 
over-the-counter trading through 13 financial operators 
(IMF, 2006; Scotiabank, 2006). The yuan depreciated 
considerably against the euro in the first half of 2006, 
however, making Chinese export prices more competitive 
relative to the European Union’s.
With the normalization of monetary policy almost 
concluded in the United States and starting in Japan, the 
yen is likely to appreciate against in the dollar in 2006 
and 2007.
C. Outlook and risks 4
External demand will continue to help drive growth in Latin 
America and the Caribbean thanks, among other factors, 
to a 6% improvement in the region’s terms of trade in 
2006, which will mainly benefit oil- and metal-exporting 
countries. The nations that stand to gain the most will be 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, Chile and 
Peru, which will see their terms of trade increase by 25%, 
22%, 18% and 14%, respectively. As a result, exports and 
imports in current dollars will expand by 20% and 17% 
in 2006, respectively (see table I.3). Just over half of this 
rise will reflect higher export prices, while in the case of 
imports, only one fifth of the increase will be attributable 
to prices and the remainder to volumes. Projections point to 
a continuation of the uptrend in the region’s trade balance 
for goods, expressed in current dollars, which began in 
2001. Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Mexico 
are the only countries to have posted merchandise trade 
deficits since 2001.
According to ECLAC projections, in 2006-2007 Latin 
America’s exports will expand at a similar rate to 2005 in 
terms of volume, that is, between 7% and 8%, although 
with large differences across countries (see figure I.11).
4
 The international trade projections given in this section are based on ECLAC (2006b). 
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Figure I.11
LATIN AMERICA: INCREASES IN EXPORTS, 2004-2007
(Billions of current dollars).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
Economic Projections Centre, 2006.
The greatest risk is inflationary pressure, owing to 
the persistently high prices of petroleum and some other 
commodities, especially metals, both in the United States 
and in other developed countries. Data for mid-2006 
reflect upward trends not only in total inflation, but also 
in core inflation, and this is a matter of great concern to 
central banks. The United States and European monetary 
authorities, among others, are raising their benchmark rates 
accordingly. Interest rate hikes in developed countries have 
generated greater risk aversion and are steering capital 
flows in the direction of a flight to quality, which negatively 
impacts emerging markets. As a result, emerging-economy 
stock exchanges and commodity prices have been very 
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This situation is compounded by uncertainty over how 
global external disequilibria will evolve. More specifically, 
it is unclear whether the drop in the United States’ external 
deficit in the first quarter of 2006, combined with smaller 
external surpluses in other countries, constitutes a trend 
that will firm up in the future. The narrowing of the 
deficit reflects two trends: first, a geographical shift in 
world growth dynamics, with a deceleration in the United 
States and acceleration in Japan and in the European 
Union. Slower growth in the United States is the result 
of a series of increases made in the federal funds rate up 
to July 2006, which also encourages domestic saving 
and, hence, helps reduce the external deficit. Second, the 
dollar is depreciating in relation to the euro, which helps 
to diminish trade imbalances between these economies. 
There are two other trends that hinder the reduction 
of external disequilibria, however. First, petroleum prices 
remain very high and could rise further, given geopolitical 
uncertainty in the Middle East and relatively tight supply. 
Second, the Chinese currency’s partial link to the dollar, 
combined with the dollar’s effective depreciation against 
the euro, has helped China’s exports retain much of their 
buoyancy and thereby generated yet another record trade 
surplus for China in July 2006.
The change in the geographic location of the engines of 
growth and higher interest rates will have less of an impact 
on Latin America and the Caribbean than they would have 
had a decade ago. While it is true that the region’s export 
volumes will undoubtedly be hurt by slower growth and 
slackening demand in the United States, the present high 
prices of commodities are not likely to fall substantially, 
thanks to steady and mounting demand from China. The 
Table I.3
LATIN AMERICA: EXTERNAL TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES, 2006-2007
(Annual percentage rates of variation)
 Millions of current dollars Local currency at constant prices
 2006 2006 2007
 Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Exports Imports
Argentina 13.9 23.0 -5.5 9.6 19.2 6.5 11.5
Bolivia  28.0 20.0 84.9 7.7 8.0 7.0 7.4
Brazil 17.0 22.0 8.8 9.3 13.0 8.0 9.0
Chile 43.1 23.1 102.8 6.0 14.0 7.0 11.5
Colombia 18.8 17.4 36.9 4.1 12.6 4.0 10.0
Costa Rica 17.0 12.0 4.6 6.3 7.3 8.8 9.6
Ecuador 21.7 18.0 80.3 5.5 10.2 4.0 8.0
Guatemala 13.0 9.0 -5.4 5.3 6.4 4.0 5.2
Honduras 10.0 11.3 -13.5 5.4 2.3 5.0 2.0
Mexico 15.8 14.1 32.4 10.5 13.0 9.0 12.0
Nicaragua 11.3 12.4 -13.6 8.4 7.6 8.0 7.0
Peru 31.8 19.0 61.9 2.6 9.7 3.0 8.0
Dominican Republic 5.0 10.0 -18.8 4.0 4.8 3.1 5.8
Uruguay 13.1 17.7 -268.6 12.0 10.0 1.1 3.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 30.4 20.5 37.9 3.5 17.0 3.0 10.0
Total 19.8 16.7 38.4 8.5 13.7 7.2 10.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Economic Projections Centre, 2006.
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region will also feel the impact of interest rate hikes less 
than in the past because most of the countries are now less 
vulnerable, among other things because they have larger 
foreign-exchange reserves and, thanks to higher export 
earnings, a better ratio of debt and interest payments 
to stable export revenues. For some Latin American 
countries (Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay), however, 
wider spreads could endanger the sustainability of their 
public debt positions, which total well over 50% of GDP, 
and part of the debt is denominated in or indexed to the 
dollar (ECLAC, 2006b).
Bird flu, which could have severe human and 
economic impacts, represents another risk factor for 
trade activity. The disease, which began in South-East 
Asia, has already spread to several continents and 
could reach the Americas, where the highly pathogenic 
H5N1 virus has not yet been detected. Fear among the 
general population could drive down world poultry 
consumption. In Europe, consumption has already 
declined by between 70% in Italy and 20% in France, 
and trade in poultry is down by 8%. The impact could 
be significant in the Americas, since Brazil and the 
United States are the world’s two largest exporters of 
poultry. Consumption, production and trade in poultry 
products are all expected to contract again in 2006 in 
countries where bird flu has been detected. In view of 
these developments, the adoption of preventive measures 
is a matter of urgency. 
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Chapter II
China’s and India’s trade relations with 
Latin America and the Caribbean: 
opportunities and challenges
Introduction
The robust growth occurring in China and India is of great importance for the world economy and 
in particular for Latin America and the Caribbean. As indicated in chapter I of this report, these 
two countries together have accounted for over 30% of annual world GDP growth (measured 
in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP)) since 2001. Their contribution to the global rate 
has therefore been significant. In 2005, the Chinese economy (US$ 2.2 trillion) overtook the 
United Kingdom and France and now ranks as the world’s fourth largest economy (the second 
in terms of purchasing power parity), after the United States, Japan and Germany. India —the 
second-most populous country on the planet, after China, with 1.08 billion inhabitants— has 
emerged as a world power in recent decades and now ranks as the eighth-largest economy in 
the world (US$ 868 billion).
Both countries have rapidly taken their places among 
the leading world economies, are making a notable 
contribution to economic growth and world trade 
with their high growth rates, are helping to maintain 
fragile world equilibria and are generating a strong and 
growing demand for commodities in the region. This is 
particularly true of China, which competes with Latin 
America and the Caribbean in third markets. Given the 
high growth forecast for both of these Asian countries, 
they are expected to continue to be the most important 
pole of world growth in the coming years, since they offer 
countries in the region a market of huge potential for their 
exports, which so far has been largely underexploited 
except in some primary sectors.
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A. Main characteristics and economic and trade    
 performance
The Chinese economy grew by 10.2% in 2005, thanks 
to strong domestic investment and buoyant exports. This 
figure corroborates the close-to-double-digit average that 
the country obtained over the past 28 years. For its part, 
India displayed growth that was no less appreciable, at 
8.4%, in the fiscal year ending 31 March 2006, with 
a similar level of expansion in domestic consumption 
(8%) (see figure II.1). Following the application of 
the country’s new economic policy in 1991, based on 
promotion of economic liberalization and the correction 
of macroeconomic disequilibria, it posted annual growth 
of between 4% and 8% in the period 1999-2004. Between 
1990 and 2005, the economy underwent a major structural 
change: the share of services in GDP expanded from 
34% to 54%, while the agricultural sector saw its share 
shrink from 47% to 20%. The industrial sector continued 
to account for between 20% and 25% of GDP.
In 2005, the Indian manufacturing sector grew by 
9.0%. The most dynamic categories were textiles and basic 
metals and their alloys, and transport equipment. Thus, 
India’s comparative advantages in the industrial sector are 
fairly similar to those of some Latin American economies. 
The agricultural sector grew by a mere 2.3% in 2005 
due to low productivity. This growth rate is expected to 
hold in the next few years, while the services sector will 
continue to function as the engine of economic growth, 
expanding by 10% per year.
China’s prominence is evident not only in global 
trade but also in the financial sphere. The country is 
playing an increasingly important role in maintaining 
world economic equilibria, since, with its abundant cheap 
supply, it is helping to sustain high, low-inflation demand 
in the United States; it provides cheap savings for that 
country by helping to keep interest rates under control, 
and it builds up reserves by buying treasury bills, thus 
helping to finance the United States current account deficit. 
China’s reserves stood at US 853 billion in February 2006, 
exceeding, for the first time, Japan’s reserves, which in 
the same month stood at US$ 850 billion.1
Figure II.1
PER CAPITA GDP AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
(In constant 2000 dollars and percentages of GDP)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of figures from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
China’s weight in world trade far overshadows India’s. 
The boom in Chinese exports, which had intensified since 
the beginning of the current decade, continued apace in 
2005. Exports expanded by 28% to stand at US$ 762 
billion, almost 1.5 times the total exported by Latin 
America and the Caribbean and equivalent to 7.3% of world 
merchandise exports. Imports also increased by 18% and 












































































































1 In December 2005, treasury bonds held by the Chinese authorities totalled US$ 257 billion, but Japan was the main purchaser, with US$ 680 
billion in its possession. India’s reserves are much smaller. The Reserve Bank of India holds reserves of US$ 137 billion and only US$ 12.6 
billion in United States treasury bonds (United States Department of the Treasury, 2006).
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In 2005, China became the third importer and exporter of 
goods world-wide (WTO, 2006a), which resulted in an 
even greater expansion of its trade surplus. India’s role 
in world trade is much smaller: in 2005, its exports and 
imports totalled US$ 89.8 billion and US$ 131.6 billion, 
respectively.
India’s trade openness is much more limited than 
China’s (see table II.1). While China presents a much 
smaller and more linear tariff structure, India still harbours 
pockets of protectionism, especially in the agricultural 
sector. The reduction in tariffs and other non-tariff barriers 
being implemented under the trade agreement between 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and China may have serious implications for the future of 
Latin American trade with this Asian region, in particular 
in terms of trade diversion. Similar reductions envisaged 
as part of the India-China trade agreement (scheduled 
to enter into force in 2007 and encompassing industrial 
as well as agricultural products) will also affect Latin 
American trade. 
Table II.1
CHINA AND INDIA: DIFFERENT TRADE POLICIES
 China
 100% tariff binding coverage scheduled for 2010
 (Simple average of ad valorem tariffs)
 Applied 2004 Final bound
  (2010) 
All goods  10.4 10.0
Agricultural goods  16.2 15.8
Non-agricultural goods 9.5 9.1
Non-ad valorem lines 
 (percentage of total tariff lines) 0.5 0.0
 India
 73.8% tariff binding in 2005
 (Simple average of ad valorem tariffs)
 Applied 2004 Final bound
  (2005)
All goods 29.1 49.8
Agricultural goods  37.4 114.5
Non-agricultural goods 27.9 34.3
Non-ad valorem lines
 (percentage of total tariff lines)  0.0 7.2
Source: World Trade Organization (WTO), “Trade profiles” http://stat.wto.org/
CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFHome.aspx?Language=E, 2006.
China still exports more services than India, but the 
latter is expected to catch up shortly, since its exports 
are growing at a faster rate. As an exporter of services, 
China ranked eighth in 2005, accounting for US$ 81.2 
billion, and, as an importer of services, it was seventh 
with US$ 85.3 billion. India was in tenth place in exports 
(US$ 67.6 billion) and imports (US$ 67.4 billion). 
However, between 2003 and 2005, exports of services 
from India grew at more than twice the rate recorded by 
China (WTO, 2006a).
India has continued developing and still has a strong 
potential within the information and communications 
technology (ICT) sector and in the area of business process 
outsourcing. These two areas are strongly export-oriented 
and continue to perform well, thanks to the growing 
demand for labour that is cheap but reasonably proficient 
in English, the advantages of the time difference with the 
northern hemisphere and the construction of an undersea 
fibre-optic network. During 2004-2005, India accounted 
for 65% of the global market for ICT trade services and 
46% of the business process outsourcing market. ICT 
services still represent a small part of the overall services 
sector. In the 1990s, the country’s software sector expanded 
systematically, growing by close to 50% per year, and in 
the current decade it continues to grow by 25% per year. 
The ICT sector is expected to reach 7% of GDP (currently 
4%) and 35% of total exports in 2008. Thus, exports of 
ICT services and business process outsourcing could 
generate US$ 60 billion in 2010. A major challenge for the 
expansion of the ICT sector is the current underinvestment 
in technological capital (Government of India, Ministry 
of Finance, 2006) and human capital, due in both cases to 
the scope of the dynamic expansion of the ICT sector.
In the first half of 2006, China recorded growth of 
10.9% compared with the same period in 2005. Initial 
forecasts put growth at between 9.5% and 9.9% in 2006 
and between 8.8% and 9.0% in 2007 (IMF, 2006; ADB, 
2006). Despite the authorities’ plan to reorient demand 
towards private consumption instead of investments, 
growth in 2006 and 2007 will probably continue to be 
investment-driven. Fixed capital formation could account 
for a larger share of GDP, rising to close to 50% in the 
coming years (ADB, 2006). In fact, there is no guarantee 
that growth will moderate. At present, indications are that 
the monetary base will expand and may be granted to the 
industrial sector as additional credits.2
Growth in exports is expected to abate to between 
15% and 20%, owing to the voluntary restrictions applied 
to some sectors, the reduction in indirect subsidies and 
2  Money in circulation (M2) in May 2006 increased by 19.5% over the amount recorded in the same month in 2005, far exceeding the goal set by 
the People’s Bank of China, and bank lending almost doubled during the same period (The Economist Intelligence Unit, April 2006; Financial 
Times, 2006). Partly thanks to this growth in the money supply, industrial production expanded by 17% in the first five months of 2006. For 
the first time since 2004, China raised its benchmark rate by 0.27% in April and again in August in an attempt to put a brake on the economy, 
discouraging the excessive growth in bank loans.
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escalating labour costs.3 Imports are forecast to increase 
by a similar rate, since demand for energy products, 
raw materials, agricultural products and intermediate 
industrial inputs will continue to expand rapidly. A 
growing trade surplus could offset the services deficit. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2006) estimates 
that the current account surplus could range between 5% 
and 7% of GDP for 2006-2007, adding further pressure 
on the yuan.
It should be noted that 2006 is the first year of the 
eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and 
Social Development (2006-2010).4 This plan addresses 
the country’s structural weaknesses, the result of rapid 
industrialization and modernization, such as the idle capacity 
in some sectors, the expansion in income inequality, in 
particular between urban and rural areas and between the 
coastal areas and the interior of the country, as well as 
the acute environmental problems.5 The main objective 
of the Plan is to promote a more balanced, equitable 
and sustainable approach to growth, using strategies 
designed precisely to correct these problems.6 This plan 
could change the composition of aggregate demand and 
rein in economic growth to levels that would be more 
sustainable in the long term. 
For India, the outlook for the short-term is promising, 
since sound economic growth has been recorded (between 
7% and 8% for 2006-2007)7 (IMF, 2006; ADB, 2006), 
together with moderate inflation. Indeed, according to 
preliminary figures, the Indian economy grew by 8.9% in 
the first quarter of the fiscal year (April-June), compared 
with 6.9% in the same period of 2005-2006. Inflation was 
below 5%, despite the rise in oil prices. However, the high 
levels of public debt, a growing current-account deficit and 
the need to address crucial reforms are the main challenges 
for the medium term. The government must, as a matter of 
urgency, consolidate its fiscal position, while implementing 
the necessary infrastructure improvements (especially 
in the area of electricity supply and the road system) in 
order to support industrial development, human resource 
training in service-related sectors and public investment 
in rural initiatives to increase productivity in these areas. 
The growing trade deficit could lead the country to speed 
up the process of depreciation of its currency (the rupee), 
which would boost exports.
B. Latin America and the Caribbean: growing trade   
 relations with China and India
3
 These figures are, however, at variance with the high rate of growth in exports in the first half-year (25% higher growth than in the same period 
of 2005).
4
 One of the main objectives of this plan is to raise the volume of external trade to US$ 2.3 trillion by 2010. This would almost double the 2005 
figure (US$ 1.4 trillion), which represented a 23.2% increase over the previous year’s value.
5 The high levels of investment have been reflected in idle industrial capacity, which in turn has meant an increase in stocks and a fall in prices 
in sectors such as aluminium, automobiles, cement and steel (ADB, 2006). Another problem is the growing debt of municipal corporations that 
finance urban infrastructure projects, especially road construction, through land purchases or loans to municipal governments, an item that is 
not accounted for in these governments’ budgets. In 2005, China constructed approximately 128,000 kilometres of roads, of which only 6,400 
were funded by the central government (Wall Street Journal, 2006).
6 Recently, President Hu Jintao pointed to the need to change the structure of China’s growth, improving the national capacity for innovation, 
modernizing industry as a whole, encouraging the development of advanced manufacture and services, but always taking into account energy-
saving and environmentally-friendly practices as well as the need to step up training for workers. The eleventh Five-Year Plan states that in the 
next five years, the priority will be placed on upgrading rural infrastructure ahead of urban areas, ensuring that students in rural areas receive 
nine years of schooling to match the achievement already made in urban areas and setting aside more resources for research and scientific 
development. 
7  The fiscal year in India runs from April to March.
Between 1990 and 2005, trade between the countries of 
the region and China and India expanded considerably, 
with increases recorded especially in the most recent five-
year period. These two countries have developed similar 
patterns of trade with the subregions of Latin America. 
While South America shows trade surpluses with both 
countries, Mexico and Central America maintain growing 
deficits. China, in particular, plays a very important role 
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as a trading partner for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Regional exports to China exceeded US$ 19 billion in 
2005 or close to 3.5% of the region’s total exports, while 
exports to India stood at just US$ 3 billion, a very low 
figure accounting for only 0.5% of the regional total. 
The main exporting countries in the relationship with 
China are, by order of magnitude in 2005, Brazil, Chile, 
Argentina, Peru and Mexico; in the case of India, the 
same countries are present except Peru. India’s share as 
an importer is very low (see table II.2).
Latin American imports from India are equivalent 
to barely one tenth of those originating in China. 
Recently, however, purchases of Indian products have 
been on the rise.
Table II.2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS TO CHINA AND INDIA, 2005
(Millions of dollars and percentages of total)
 
Trade flows
 Total exports by Percentage of total for Latin Percentage of total
 destination  America and the Caribbean  of each country
Countries India China World India China India China
Latin America and the Caribbean  3 048 19 442 555 445 100.0 100.0 0.5 3.5
Andean Community 115 3 009 106 981 3.8 15.5 0.1 2.8
Bolivia 1 19 2 734 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.7
Colombia 5 237 21 187 0.2 1.2 0.0 1.1
Ecuador 26 82 10 649 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.8
Peru 79 1 826 17 001 2.6 9.4 0.5 10.7
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4 845 55 410 0.1 4.3 0.0 1.5
MERCOSUR 1 875 10 317 163 414 61.5 53.1 1.1 6.3
Argentina 729 3 302 40 013 23.9 17.0 1.8 8.3
Brazil 1 137 6 834 118 308 37.3 35.2 1.0 5.8
Paraguay 5 61 1 688 0.2 0.3 0.3 3.6
Uruguay 4 120 3 405 0.1 0.6 0.1 3.5
Chile 493 4 390 39 536 16.2 22.6 1.2 11.1
Central American Common Market  17 349 21 806 0.6 1.8 0.1 1.6
Costa Rica 8 245 7 090 0.3 1.3 0.1 3.5
El Salvador 2 2 3 383 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1
Guatemala 3 80 5 381 0.1 0.4 0.1 1.5
Honduras 5 15 4 377 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3
Nicaragua 0 7 1 574 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4
Mexico 522 1 091 213 711 17.1 5.6 0.2 0.5
Other countries of Latin America
and the Caribbean 26 287 9 998 0.9 1.5 0.3 2.9
Panama 22 23 2 013 0.7 0.1 1.1 1.1
Cuba 2 247 2 430 0.1 1.3 0.1 10.2
Dominican Republic  3 17 5 554 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the countries and figures from the International Monetary Fund, 
Direction of Trade Statistics, 2006. 
1. Trade relations with China: South America compared with    
 Central America and Mexico
China’s trade interests in Latin America vary considerably 
depending on whether it is dealing with South America or 
Central America and Mexico. A number of factors enter 
into its interests in South America. First, its rapid growth 
calls for the supply of raw materials, food products and 
energy products. Second, it has sought a favourable market 
context for its exports and, in an attempt to limit accusations 
of trade defence measures, such as antidumping, which 
it considers “abusive”, it has been keen to obtain market 
economy status with 27 countries, seven of which belong 
to Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, 2005).
China is already one of the main export markets for 
several countries of the region (see figure II.2-A). South 
American trade flows have been quite strong, and the 
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subregion has posted a trade surplus for four consecutive 
years up to 2005 (see figure II.2-B). However, the 
accumulated surplus is concentrated in primary products 
and resource-based manufactures, and the deficit in 
technology-based manufactures has increased.
Given its extensive natural resource endowment, 
the region has become an important supplier of primary 
products to China, since it provides, for example, more than 
60% of Chinese imports of soybean (chiefly from Brazil 
and Argentina), 80% of fishmeal (from Peru and Chile), 
close to 60% of edible poultry offals (from Argentina 
and Brazil) and 45% of wines and grapes (from Chile) 
(see table II.3).
Figure II.2
CHINA’S IMPORTANCE AS A DESTINATION FOR EXPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (A) AND SOUTH AMERICA’S 
GROWING TRADE BALANCE WITH CHINA (B)
 (A) China’s share of total exports (B) Trade balance with South America
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).
Table II.3
THE 15 MAIN PRODUCTS IMPORTED BY CHINA FROM SOUTH AMERICA, 2004
(Millions of US$ and percentages of total, SITC Rev.2)
     Rest of 
South World
 
% of totalMain products Argentina Brazil Chile Peru  South 
America (A) (B) C= (A)/(B)
     America
Soybean (2222+4232) 2 555 2 619 0 0 0 5 174 8 528 60.7
Iron (2815+2816+6712+6725+6746) 25 3 252 168 256 208 3 909 19 677 19.9
Copper (2871+2882+6821+6822) 12 40 2 793 540 73 3 456 13 532 25.5
Wood and woodpulp (2482+2483+2517+6416) 36 527 371 4 6 943 4 584 20.6
Crude oil (3330) 183 423 0 0 139 745 33 912 2.2
Fishmeal (0814) 17 0 103 502 2 623 770 80.9
Leathers and wools (6114+6512+6129+2681) 145 301 2 1 88 537 4 152 12.9
Ferro-alloys (6713+6716+6727+6749) 6 203 0 0 233 442 9 613 4.6
Lead (2874) 0 0 0 122 0 122 437 27.9
Aluminium (2873+6845) 0 67 0 0 37 105 2 069 5.1
Other vehicle parts and accessories (7849) 3 101 0 0 0 104 7 305 1.4
Poultry, dead and edible offals (0114) 37 53 0 0 0 90 154 58.7
Cotton (2631+2632+2633+2634) 0 31 0 0 49 80 3 242 2.5
Tobacco (1211-1212) 0 74 0 0 0 74 232 31.6
Grapes and wine (0575+1121) 1 0 61 0 0 61 135 45.4
Total sample 3 019 7 690 3 497 1 424 834 16 465 108 342 15.2
Other products  236 978 170 99 148 1 630 442 973 0.4
Total Imports 3 255 8 669 3 667 1 523 982 18 095 551 315 3.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).
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The mix of products that Mexico and Central America 
export to the United States market is fairly similar to 
that of the products that China sends to that market (see 
figure II.3-A). This subregion exports more intermediate- 
and high-technology-intensive manufactures (for example, 
electrical and electronic articles, including computer 
equipment, and automotive industry products), both in 
absolute and relative terms, while China specializes more 
in low-technology products (for example, textiles and 
garments). Although each group exports high-technology 
products equivalent to US$ 40 billion to the United States 
market, the greater competition between the two is still 
in the manufactures of low and intermediate technology 
manufactures. From this perspective, the protectionist 
tendency of the United States affects both regions in an 
interrelated manner, as occurred with the negotiation of 
the Dominican Republic —Central America— United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in 2005 
(ECLAC, 2005).
China has displaced Mexico as the United States’ 
main trading partner (see figure II.3-B). This displacement 
is very evident in the case of textiles and clothing, 
where both Mexico and Central America have lost an 
important share of the market (see figure II.3-C). The 
situation is even more acute in the case of the electrical 
and electronics sector, especially computer equipment 
(Dussel Peters, 2005). Trade between the two groups 
is very asymmetrical; China imports less than 1% of 
Mexico’s total exports but is the second supplier for 
Mexico’s imports. Consequently, Mexico and Central 
America have a growing trade deficit with China (see 
figure II.3-D). This asymmetry is also reflected in the 
fact that the 15 main imports into China from Mexico 
and Central America are manufactures, especially in the 
electronic sector, with the exception of copper and iron 
ore. The share of each product in the Chinese market is 
still very limited (see table II.4).
In view of this trend, rather than competing only in 
the main markets (United States and European Union), the 
subregion should strengthen its trade links and seek greater 
productive complementarity with China by establishing 
the necessary trade and technological alliances. This could 
help to avert the protectionist pressures that could arise 
in these industrialized countries. 
Figure II.3
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA AND CHINA AND ITS REPERCUSSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES MARKET
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)44
Table II.4
THE 15 MAIN PRODUCTS IMPORTED BY CHINA FROM MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA, 2004
(Millions of dollars and percentages, SITC Rev.2)
   Other Mexico and    Percentage South Percentage
Main products Mexico Costa Central  Central  World of total America of total
  Rica America America (B) C=(A.1)/(B) (A.2) C=(A.2)/(B) 
    (A.1)
Electronic parts and accessories (7599) 322 0 0 323 13 887 2.3 0 0.0
Electronic microcircuits (7764) 263 592 0 856 61 047 1.4 2 0.0
Copper minerals and concentrates (2871) 133 0 0 133 2 236 5.9 1 217 54.4
Iron ingots (6725) 125 0 0 125 1 443 8.7 186 12.9
Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap (2882) 116 1 20 138 3 577 3.8 144 4.0
Other electrical machinery and equipment (7788) 110 1 1 111 7 503 1.5 14 0.2
Diodes, transistors and photocells (7763) 74 8 0 82 7 416 1.1 0 0.0
Electrical apparatus for making/breaking electrical
 circuits (7721) 65 2 0 67 8 673 0.8 8 0.1
Heterocyclic compounds with oxygen (5156) 58 0 0 58 1 247 4.6 8 0.7
Polycarboxylic acids (5138) 55 0 0 55 5 106 1.1 4 0.1
Parts n.e.s. internal combustion engines (7139) 53 0 0 53 1 671 3.2 33 2.0
Synthetic filament tow (2666) 51 0 0 51 383 13.2 2 0.5
Other parts and accessories of motor vehicles (7849) 48 0 0 48 7 305 0.7 104 1.4
Iron ore agglomerates (2816) 41 0 0 41 1 824 2.2 741 40.6
Telecommunications parts and accessories (7649) 39 2 0 41 17 868 0.2 5 0.0
Total sample 1 553 606 21 2 180 141 187 1.5 2 470 1.7
Other products  587 35 55 704 410 128 0.2 15 625 3.8
Total imports 2 140 641 76 2 900 551 315 0.5 18 095 3.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).
2. Latin America and the Caribbean: trade with India
The Latin American and Caribbean market is still not very 
significant for India, although it is gaining in importance. In 
2005, the region accounted for only 3.0% (US$ 2.168 billion) 
of India’s exports and 1.8% (US$ 1.882 billion) of its imports, 
which yielded a surplus in favour of India. Nevertheless, 
these figures indicate that its exports to the region tripled 
and its imports doubled in the past two years.
As in the case of China, India’s pattern of trade with 
South America is different from the pattern it maintains 
with Central America and Mexico. Under existing trade 
agreements with India, the countries of MERCOSUR and 
Chile exported to India in 2004 vegetable oils (37% of 
exports to that country), minerals and their concentrates 
(21%) and sugar and honey (12%). Similarly, these 
countries imported from India refined petroleum products 
(36% of imports from this country), medicines and 
pharmaceutical products (8%), other organic chemicals 
(6.7%) and textiles (5.7%).8 On the other hand, trade 
between India and Mexico and Central America is very 
limited. This subregion exports mainly oil, pharmaceutical 
products and telecommunications equipment and imports 
automobiles and automobile parts as well as textiles and 
clothing, items that seem to offer a comparative advantage 
to the region.
8
  On the basis of official figures from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE).
3. China as the key actor in the intra-Asian trade boom
Based on its vigorous economic growth, China has become 
the key actor in the Asian trade boom. The other Asian 
countries have, of course, played an important role as suppliers 
for China: in 2005, Japan, Taiwan Province of China, the 
Republic of Korea and the ASEAN countries supplied half 
of China’s imports. China’s overall trade balance with these 
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countries —especially the Republic of Korea and Japan— is 
negative, since they are the main source of capital goods 
and intermediate inputs for its manufacturing sector. The 
manufactures it produces are then exported to the rest of 
its trading partners, in particular the United States and the 
European Union, with which it invariably maintains the highest 
trade surpluses in low- and high-technology manufactures 
and, to a lesser extent, in intermediate-technology products 
(ECLAC, 2005). Thus, the trade deficit with Asia, which 
exceeded US$ 70 billion in 2005, has been offset by huge 
and growing trade surpluses with the United States (US$ 114 
billion) and the European Union (US$ 70 billion).9
9
  United States statistics put its current account deficit with China at US$ 202 billion in 2005, almost double the level reported by the Government 
of China. There is a similar statistical problem with other countries and regions of the world, including Latin America and the Caribbean. 
According to the Japanese authorities, Japan continues to record a large trade deficit with China. This deficit may be related to the triangulation 
of Chinese trade via the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China.
4. Trade between China and the United States: “exuberant” growth
As indicated, China and India have become important 
trading partners for the United States and imports from 
those countries have skyrocketed. China accounted for 
16% of United States imports from Asia in 1996 and for 
as much as 41% in 2005, with an exponential growth rate 
of 19%, five times more robust than the average for Asia 
without China (just 3.7%). During the same period, India’s 
share of total United States imports increased from 2% to 
just over 3.2%, while Japan, Singapore, Taiwan Province 
of China and the Philippines lost some of their share of 
this market. These overall trends meant that from 2000 the 
United States trade deficit with China increased four-fold, 
which represents half of the United States’ trade deficit 
with that zone (see table II.5 and figure II.4). In the same 
period January-May 2006, United States purchases grew 
by 17%, which suggests that the United States deficit 
will remain high.
Figure II.4
UNITED STATES: TRADE BALANCE WITH ASIA, 1996-2005
(Millions of current dollars)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
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Table II.5
UNITED STATES: TRADE BALANCE WITH ASIA, 1996-2005
(Millions of current dollars)
 1996-1999 a 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Total Asia -164 991 -245 374 -221 430 -247 287 -263 760 -319 690 -373 388
China -53 708 -83 810 -83 046 -103 115 -123 961 -161 978 -201 626
Japan -60 346 -81 322 -68 963 -70 055 -65 965 -75 194 -82 682
India -4 153 -7 024 -5 973 -7 720 -8 067 -9 467 -10 849
ASEAN (10) -29 325 -40 609 -32 527 -36 392 -36 597 -40 315 -49 347
Republic of Korea -2 471 -12 398 -12 988 -12 979 -12 865 -19 829 -16 109
Rest -14 989 -20 211 -17 933 -17 025 -16 306 -12 906 -12 775
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the United States Department of Commerce Data bank (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/
scripts/user_set.asp).
a
  Annual averages.
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5. The trading partners of India and China: the role of ASEAN and   
 Latin America
India’s export basket is quite distinct from China’s. 
While the specialization of Chinese exports has changed 
significantly, India’s export mix has not changed much 
during the past 15 years. China is becoming increasingly 
specialized in high-technology and value-added sectors 
and, little by little, has graduated from the areas that offer 
traditional comparative advantages, such as low-technology 
manufactures (including textiles and garments). India, on 
the other hand, has not managed to penetrate the markets 
for cutting-edge technology products and has specialized 
essentially in traditional industrial products. That is, in 
seeking its place in the global economy, India has not 
produced significant synergy between the hardware and 
software sectors linked to information and communications 
technologies and outsourcing relating to these sectors. In 
India, trade and foreign direct investment are still not closely 
linked, unlike the situation in China. This not only poses a 
difficulty for the country in terms of carving a niche for itself 
in world markets for value-added and knowledge products, 
but also hinders its entry into the dynamic network of Asian 
intra-company trade and intra-industry trade.
Nevertheless, as shown in table II.6, which presents 
China’s and India’s percentage shares of trade flows 
with the two groups of developing countries (that is, 
ASEAN and the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA)), India is starting to join the network of Asian 
intra-industry trade. For India, the ASEAN countries are 
a very important supply source for primary goods and 
resource-based manufactures, much more so than the 
LAIA countries. Moreover, ASEAN countries account 
for a relatively high percentage of India’s imports of 
manufactures. Approximately 16% of India’s imports of 
high-technology manufactures and over 8% of intermediate- 
and low-technology manufactures originate in neighbouring 
countries that belong to ASEAN. Besides, the LAIA 
countries play a very insignificant role as destinations 
for India’s exports.
At present, China depends more on LAIA than on 
ASEAN countries for its supplies of primary products. As 
far as resource-based manufactures are concerned, however, 
the ASEAN share is twice that of LAIA on the Chinese 
market. Around 20% of high-technology manufactures 
imported by China come from ASEAN countries and more 
than 8% of Chinese high-technology exports and more than 
11% of resource-based manufactures are sent to ASEAN 
countries. These relatively high percentages indicate that 
there is an intra-industry trade network between China 
and ASEAN countries and that a significant proportion 
of raw materials and resource-based manufactures belong 
to sectors in which LAIA member countries face stiff 
competition from their Asian counterparts.
Table II.6
CHINA AND INDIA: COMPOSITION OF TRADE WITH ASEAN AND 
LAIA COUNTRIES, 2004
(Percentage shares of trade flows of each group of products)
Category Group
 China India 
 Imports Exports Imports Exports
Primary ASEAN 9.0 9.9 16.1 8.4
 LAIA 13.3 0.9 6.8 0.3
Resource-based
 manufactures  ASEAN 15.6 11.1 14.5 16.5
 LAIA 7.8 3.4 3.9 3.1
Low-technology
 manufactures  ASEAN 5.0 4.1 8.2 3.4
 LAIA 2.4 2.2 0.9 1.3
Intermediate-
 technology
 manufactures  ASEAN 6.2 8.4 8.3 11.5
 LAIA 1.2 3.1 1.5 3.7
High-technology
 manufactures  ASEAN 19.5 8.3 15.9 9.7
 LAIA 0.6 1.7 0.4 4.4
Other ASEAN 4.7 3.2 2.1 23.8
 LAIA 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).
India has been a largely unexploited market for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. In addition to growth of 
the information and communications technology sector, 
there has been a noteworthy advance in other sectors, 
such as the automotive industry, electronics and transport 
equipment. In addition, the Government of India supports 
the pharmaceutical industry as well as the biotechnology 
sector, which is flourishing, the idea being to make maximum 
use of its human and biogenetic resources. Furthermore, 
given the rate of population growth, it is predicted that India 
will become not only a labour market with an abundant 
skilled labour force, but also a major consumer market, the 
outcome of the rising purchasing power of the middle class. 
In order to participate in the Chinese and Indian markets, 
Latin American firms must seek ways of effectively fitting 
into the value chains in different manufacturing sectors in 
Asia. This will promote reciprocal foreign direct investment 
between China, India, the ASEAN countries and those of 
Latin America and the Caribbean.
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6. Free trade agreements with China and India
In recent years, China and India negotiated several 
trade agreements. Initially, China signed special trade 
agreements with Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and Macao Special Administrative Region, 
then concluded a free trade agreement with Chile and 
an “early harvest” arrangement with Pakistan and 
started to reduce trade tariffs it applied to the ASEAN 
countries. China has signed or is negotiating free trade 
agreements with at least 27 countries (see table II.7) 
(People’s Daily Online, 2006). India is also creating 
a complex network of trade agreements; it has signed 
13 free trade agreements, including the partial scope 
agreements with Chile and MERCOSUR, is negotiating 
agreements with three other groups of countries and is 
exploring the possibility of reaching agreements with 
another eight individual countries (see table II.8).
Chile is the first Western country with which China 
has signed a partial scope agreement focusing mainly on 
goods. On the basis of this agreement, a zero tariff will be 
applied to 92% of current exports from Chile to China, 
including exports of copper, vegetables and pulses, and 
cotton. With respect to other products, such as salmon, 
grapes, cherries, peaches and apples, the agreement calls 
for the progressive phaseout of tariffs 10 years after the 
entry into force of the agreement. Excluded from the 
agreement are cereals, flour, oils, sugar, wood articles, 
paper, cements and textile products, which together 
account for 1% of exports. The agreement establishes a 
dispute settlement mechanism and incorporates the issue 
of cooperation in areas such as science and technology, 
social security, education, investment promotion, culture, 
small and medium-sized enterprises, intellectual property 
and the environment. The two countries have planned 
to include other issues in addition to liberalization of 
merchandise trade.10
The Partial Scope Agreement between India and Chile 
—signed on 8 March 2006 and currently being ratified by 
the Chilean Congress— stipulates that (i) 98% of Chilean 
exports and 91% of Indian exports will obtain an average 
tariff rebate of 20%; (ii) Chile will lower the tariffs on 296 
Indian products, while India will lower the tariffs for 178 
Chilean products. These rebates will vary between 10% 
and 50% of rates. Among the Chilean exports favoured 
are copper, wood pulp, wood panels and salmon.
The Partial Scope Agreement between MERCOSUR 
and India is important from the point of view of South-
South cooperation.11 Although the Agreement is not 
expected to result in any immediate wide-ranging trade 
benefits (reciprocal trade accounts for barely 1% of the 
trade of each bloc), India aspires to expand its exports 
of strategic items, such as those of pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals, transport equipment, textiles and clothing, while 
the MERCOSUR countries are interested in diversifying 
their existing export basket, which consists mainly of 
vegetable oils (soybean), of ferrous mineral concentrates 
and non-electrical machinery.
C. China and India: different approaches to
 international integration and their outcomes
10
  For additional information, see www.direcon.cl/.
11
 MERCOSUR and India signed a framework agreement on trade on 17 June 2003, which provides, as a first step, for the negotiation of a 
partial scope agreement. In this context, on 25 January 2004, a preferential trade agreement was signed between the countries that regulates 
the safeguards, antidumping and countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, as well as dispute 
settlement procedures. The lists of concessions have not yet been completed.
China and India have adopted significantly different 
strategies for international integration. While China bases 
its international expansion on the attraction of foreign 
direct investment geared to production for export, India 
until recently showed caution in opening up its economy 
to this type of investment.
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Table II.7
CHINA: PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED OR CURRENTLY BEING NEGOTIATED
Country or group Date of entry Date of Provisions Type of Notes
  into force  GATT/WTO  agreement
   notification
Signed/in force
Asia Pacific Trade  17/06/1976 02/11/1976  Enabling clause Non-reciprocal  Positive list with the possibility of future
Agreement (formerly     agreement tariff reductions through negotiations
referred to as the     (annual reviews). China joined the
Bangkok Agreement) a     Agreement in 2002. Notification of WTO
      for its accession in accordance with the
      enabling clause in 2004
ASEAN 01/07/2003 21/12/2004 Enabling clause Framework Positive list. Elimination of tariffs by 2010
     agreement for the ASEAN 6 (Brunei Darussalam,
      Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore
     Regional and Thailand) and China, and by 2015 for
     preferential the new members of ASEAN. The  “early
      agreement  harvest” programme will reduce tariffs
      on most of the products to less than 5%
      in 2004-2010. Dispute settlement
      agreements and subsequent negotiations for
      services are envisaged
Hong Kong (Special 01/01/2004 12/01/2004 GATT Art. 24, Bilateral free Hong Kong (Special Administrative
Administrative Region   GATS Art. V trade agreement Region) continues to apply zero tariffs to
of China) (Closer Economic     products from China. Services included.
Partnership Agreement     Provisions relating to its own rules of origin
(CEPA))
Macao (Special Administrative 01/01/2004 12/01/2004 GATT Art. 24, Bilateral free Macao (Special Administrative Region)
Region of China) (Closer   GATS Art. V trade agreement continues to apply zero tariffs to
Economic Partnership     Chinese products. Services included
Agreement (CEPA))
Pakistan  2005 Not notified  Bilateral free “Early harvest” programme for a number
     trade agreement of products, whose liberalization will be
      accelerated in the subsequent phase
Chile  Signed in Not notified  Partial scope Immediate tariff reduction on 92% of
  October   agreement Chile’s exports to China and on 50%
  2005.    of China’s current exports to Chile. Further
  Ratified in    reductions will be implemented in one,
  August 2006    five and 10 years on access of Chilean
      products to China and in one, two, five
      and 10 years for Chinese exports to Chile
Under negotiation
Australia    Bilateral free Fifth round of negotiations in May 2006.
     trade agreement Covers goods and services, recognition of
      standards, customs cooperation, intellectual
      property and investments
Gulf Cooperation     Regional free Includes investments, goods, services,
Council (GCC) b    trade agreement  government procurement and rules of origin
New Zealand     Bilateral free Sixth round of negotiations in March 2006.
     trade agreement  Includes goods, rules of origin, trade
      defence, sanitary and phytosanitary rules,
      technical barriers, customs, services,
      investments and intellectual property
South African Customs    Regional free Announcement of intent to sign a free
Union (SACU) c    trade agreement  trade agreement between the two in
      June 2004, as a result of South Africa’s
      recognition of China as a market economy
In the study phase 
India 2003   Bilateral free The first meeting of the study group in
     trade agreement  Beijing in March 2004
Iceland     A study on the feasibility of a free trade
      agreement was completed in July 2006
Peru     Discussions since 2004 on the basis of
      a comprehensive cooperation partnership
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of People’s Daily Online, “China accelerates pace on FTA establishment in past five 
years” [online] 2006 http://english.people.com.cn/200601/29/print20060129_239189.html; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) “Asia-Pacific 
Preferential Trade and Investment Agreements Database (APTIADA)”, Asian Development Bank, 2005 and bilaterals.org, official site [online] http://www. bilaterals.org/.
a Initially, the five States participating in the agreement were Bangladesh, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Republic of Korea, and Sri Lanka. The United Nations Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) acts as secretariat for the agreement. 
b The members are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
c The members are Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.
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Table II.8
INDIA: PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS SIGNED OR BEING NEGOTIATED
Country or group Date of entry Date of  Provisions Type of  Notes
  into force GATT/WTO  agreement
   notification
Implemented/signed 
Asia Pacific (formerly 17/06/1976 02/11/1976 Enabling  Non-reciprocal Applies principally for Bangladesh, India, Republic of
Bankok Agreement)   clause agreement Korea and Sri Lanka. Positive list with the possibility
      of negotiating further tariff reductions (annual reviews)
ASEAN  2004 Not notified  Economic Includes an “early harvest” programme. Gradual tariff
     Cooperation reduction from 2004 to 2007/2010  (ASEAN 6/New
     Framework ASEAN members)
     Agreement (EC)
Singapore  01/08/2005 Not notified  Bilateral free Twelve negotiating rounds carried out prior to signing
     trade economic 
     cooperation
     agreement 
Bhutan  2/03/1995 Not notified  Bilateral free The 1995 agreement was renewed in 2005 and will hold
     trade agreement until a new agreement enters into force
Afganistan  Signed Not notified   Preferential Preferential tariffs for a limited number of products
  06/03/03   agreement
Sri Lanka 15/12/2001 27/06/2002 Enabling Bilateral free India complied with the schedule for tariff reduction down
    clause  trade agreement to zero in March 2005 except in the case of 429 products
      Sri Lanka will do the same by 2008. A Closer Economic
      Partnership Agreement (CEPA) is being negotiated
Bangladesh  01/04/2006 Not notified  Framework Will be in force for three years; subject to renewal
     agreement 
Thailand  2003 Not notified  Bilateral free “Early harvest” programme with products that are freed
     trade agreement with effect from 2004
MERCOSUR Signed Not notified  Preferential Framework agreement signed 17/06/2003. Positive list.
  25/01/2004   agreement Does not envisage total tariff elimination. The object is
      to reach a free trade agreement
Nepal 06/03/2002 Not notified  Bilateral  Positive list. Preferential treatment for Nepalese products.
      Transit agreement in force since 5 January 1999 and a
      cooperation agreement in force since 6 March 2002
South Asian 07/12/1995 25/04/1997 Enabling Preferential Tariff preferences initially by product. Five negotiating
Association for   clause agreement rounds have been held for more than 5,000 products
Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) 
Bangladesh, Signed Not notified  Framework Negative list. Tariff elimination by 2012 (2017 for the least
India, Myanmar, 08/02/2004   agreement developed countries)
Sri Lanka and Thailand 
Chile Signed Not notified  Preferential Positive list. An average 20% tax rebate will be applied
  08/03/2006   agreement from the outset (entry into force) to 98% of Chilean
      exports and 91% of Indian exports 
Being negotiated
Southern African    Preferential Negotiations have been underway since 2002. The Joint
Customs Union    agreement Group finalized the draft framework agreement in
(SACU)     September 2004
South Asia a Signed in Not notified  Regional free  Formally known as the South Asian Preferential Trade
  January 2004   trade agreement Agreement (SAPTA). Negative list for sensitive products.
      Tariff rebates of 0% to 5% in 7 years (8 years for Sri
      Lanka, 10 years for the least developed countries
Gulf Cooperation    Regional free  The first round of negotiations took place in March 2006
Council (GCC)     trade agreement
Being studied
China    Bilateral free With study group (March 2004)
     trade agreement
Egypt    Bilateral free The draft text of the preferential agreement has been
     trade agreement drawn up
Indonesia     The Memorandum of Understanding for the creation of a
      study group has been signed
Japan     Bilateral free With study group (July 2005). The two countries agreed
     trade agreement to start negotiations in July 2006
Malaysia    Economic cooperation  With study group (2005)
Mauritius    Bilateral free  With study group (2003)
     trade agreement
Peru     Bilateral free In June 2006, the parties agreed to start discussions for
     trade agreement  an agreement on a limited number of products, along
      similar lines to the agreement negotiated between
      India and Chile
Republic of Korea    Bilateral free With study group (free trade agreement + Cooperation)
     trade agreement
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) “Asia-Pacific Preferential Trade and 
Investment Agreements Database (APTIADA)”, Asian Developing Bank, 2005; National Informatics Center (NIC), “India’s trade: business opportunities” [online] http://www.indiainbusiness.nic.in/
trade-india/fta-rta.htm, India Economic Survey 2005-2006, chapter 6 [online] http://indiabudget.nic.in/; General Directorate for International Economic Affairs (DIRECON) 
[online] http://www.direcon.cl/documentos/India2/antecedentes_generales_india.pdf and bilaterals.org, official site [online] http://www. bilaterals.org/.
a Refers to Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
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The Ministry of Commerce of China released revised 
statistics in June 2006, which indicate that China’s actual 
foreign direct investment (FDI) amounted to US$ 72.4 
billion in 2005, up 19.4% over the 2004 figure; this points 
clearly to the increasingly important role that transnational 
corporations have been playing in the Chinese economy. 
Official calculations show that although foreign firms 
account for only 3% of all firms in China, they contribute 
28.5% of the country’s total industrial value added and 
20.5% of tax revenue.12 The latest information available 
indicates that in the first four months of 2006, 12,639 
foreign capital firms set up operations in China and 
foreign direct investment amounted to US$ 18.48 billion, 
which represents a 5.7% increase over the same period 
in 2005 (China Daily, 2006 and Xinhuanet, 2006). In 
2005, exports by foreign firms accounted for 58% of the 
total exported by China. In the first quarter of 2006, this 
percentage had increased to 60%.
India has been slower to open up its economy. 
Foreign capital inflows amounted to just US$ 5.135 
billion in fiscal year 2005-2006. However, this value 
is the highest that has been recorded and represents an 
increase of 60% over the previous year. In March 2006 
alone (last date available) FDI inflows were US$ 831 
million, an increase of 200% compared with March 2005. 
Once reinvested earnings have been calculated, total 
FDI for the period 2005-2006 should be close to US$ 
8.3 billion, an increase of 50% over the previous year 
(Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 2006). This new 
FDI boom seems to come in response to the new policies 
for attracting investors, including the establishment of 
special economic zones (see box II.1).
Box II.1
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN INDIA
A policy was introduced in April 2000 for 
the establishment of special economic 
zones in India with a view to providing an 
internationally competitive and hassle-free 
environment for exports. Units may be set 
up in such zones for the manufacture of 
goods and rendering of services. All the 
import/export operations of the units are on 
a self-certification basis. The units in these 
zones have to be net foreign exchange 
earners but they are not subjected to any 
value added or minimum export performance 
requirements. Sales in the domestic tariff 
area by special economic zone units are 
subject to the payment of the full customs 
duty and to the import policy in force. 
Furthermore, offshore banking units may 
be set up in these zones.
The policy provides for the establishment 
of special economic zones in the public, 
private, joint sector or by State governments. 
Some of the existing export processing 
zones are also earmarked to become 
special economic zones. Accordingly, the 
government has converted export processing 
zones located at Kandla and Surat (Gujarat), 
Cochin (Kerala), Santa Cruz (Mumbai-
Maharashtra), Falta (West Bengal), Madras 
(Tamil Nadu), Visakhapatnam (Andhra 
Pradesh) and Noida (Uttar Pradesh) into 
special economic zones. In addition, three 
new special economic zones approved for 
establishment at Indore (Madhya Pradesh), 
Manikanchan-Salt Lake (Kolkata) and Jaipur 
have since commenced operations.
In addition, approval has been given 
for setting up 42 special economic zones 
in various parts of the country in the 
private/joint sectors, or by the State 
government.
Characteristics of Indian policy 
relating to the special economic 
zones 
The proposal is that the private sector 
or State governments in association 
with the private sector should establish 
the zones and that the private sector 
should be invited to set up infrastructure 
in the zones.
The State governments have a 




A commercial framework is being 
developed by creating special windows 
under existing rules and regulations of the 
central government and State government 
for the special economic zones.
Requirements for the creation of a 
special economic zone
In order to create a special economic 
zone, it is necessary: (i) to generate 
new economic activities; (ii) to promote 
exports of goods and services; (iii) to 
promote investment based on national and 
foreign sources; (iv) to create employment 
opportunities; (v) to develop infrastructure; 
and (vi) to maintain the sovereignty and 
integrity of India, State security and friendly 
relations with foreign States.
Units in operation, investment and 
employment
As at 31 March 2005, there were 811 
units in operation in the eight operational 
special economic zones, representing an 
investment of some US$ 2 billion (18.309 
billion rupees). These units provided 
employment for almost 100,650 persons, 
of whom 32,185 were women.
•
Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry, “Special Economic Zones in India” [online] Department of Commerce http://www.sezindia.nic.in/, 2006.
12
  In addition, the official statistics show that in 2005, foreign firms accounted for 87.89% of high-technology exports.
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D. Conclusions
China’s and India’s economic, strategic and demographic 
importance place them at the forefront of development in 
Asia. Their relations with Latin America and the Caribbean 
are, however, in the early stages. While the relationship 
with China has recently been spurred essentially by that 
country’s interest in securing guaranteed access to natural 
resources from South America, for both countries, Latin 
America remains largely unexploited as a trading partner 
(both as supplier and purchaser).
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
must take advantage of the growing importance of Asia 
and of these two countries particularly in the present 
international economic environment. As shown in this 
chapter, South America’s trade with China and India has so 
far been centred on the export of resource-based products, 
while the region’s purchases from these sources tend to be 
low-, intermediate- and high-technology manufactures. It 
should be remembered that China has become one of the 
main destinations for exports from countries of Asia and 
the Pacific and that, gradually, these exports are becoming 
specialized, so that these countries have ceased to be just 
suppliers of resource-based manufactures and have become 
providers of more complex inputs. In this way, the other 
Asian countries are becoming part of the distribution chains 
of the large companies that have been attracted by the low 
cost of labour and China’s large market potential; thus, China 
has ceased to be just one option for avoiding the high wages 
of the developed countries in the sector of products with a 
low technological content, and has become an inexhaustible 
source of new advanced-technology products.
Given the inter-industry relationships between South 
America and these two Asian countries, the region must 
be prepared to allow its companies to build ties with 
successful Asian firms by forming part of the supply chains 
of the production units, with more complex inputs and 
incorporation of technology. In addition, it could consider 
the possibility of participating in these chains by producing 
more manufactures based on the natural resources that are 
currently being exported to Asia. As regards Mexico and 
Central America and the strategic relations maintained 
with these two countries, this subregion should become 
involved in the regional process of productive integration 
stimulated by the Asian markets in which China and India 
are playing an increasingly crucial role. The strengthening 
of trade relations through the signing of different types of 
trade agreements by Latin America and China and India 
tends to facilitate the possible incorporation of Latin 
American companies into Asian trade chains, whose 
activities centre on these two Asian countries. Rather 
than competing in major third markets, Mexico and 
Central America should seek to become part of a more 
intensive intra-industry trade with these two countries, as 
this will provide this subregion with new access routes 
to the Chinese and Indian market, thereby fostering the 
incorporation of new technologies.
Latin America should take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by both China and India to become 
part of existing production and distribution chains. 
One way of achieving this integration is to seek trade 
agreements with both of these Asian countries. The 
agreement already signed by Chile and China and the 
agreement negotiated between India and MERCOSUR 
are promising, but require further deepening and a wider 
scope. Thanks to the investments in the Asian and Latin 
America countries, it should be possible to achieve greater 
mutual understanding and this could form the basis for 
more flourishing trade relations between China and India, 
on the one hand, and Latin America, on the other.
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Chapter III
The Doha Round: an uncertain future
Introduction
The previous issue of Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy reviewed the 
trade negotiation process launched in 2001 as the Doha Round in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), discussing in particular the impetus and shift in focus arising from the “July package” 
of 2004. This latest edition of the report describes the debates surrounding the main negotiation 
topics, including market access, particularly for the agriculture sector, and the deepening of 
trade rules. As on previous occasions, it also explores the interests and involvement of the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries in this process. This year’s issue reviews the negotiations 
in the light of the guidelines that emerged from the sixth WTO Ministerial Conference and 
examines the approach now being taken to the development dimension in the Doha Round, 
particularly as regards “Aid for Trade”. 
A week from the end of July 2006, the Director-General 
of WTO recommended the negotiations be suspended 
after the main actors had failed to bridge their differences, 
particularly on agricultural liberalization. This means 
that the Doha Round will not be concluded this year, 
and the progress made in the negotiations thus far, much 
of it beneficial to developing countries, is now shrouded 
in uncertainty. 
The sixth WTO Ministerial Conference, held in Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of China (SAR) in 
December 2005, had given renewed focus to the Doha 
Round negotiations (the first trade round held under 
WTO auspices) and set a tight decision-making schedule. 
The conference made it possible to maintain the pace of 
negotiations with a view to their conclusion in late 2006, 
promoting the development dimension as proposed. Since 
then, however, and despite moments of high expectation, 
the successive deadlines set for defining modalities have 
been missed; and to all intents and purposes the process 
ground to halt in the first half of 2006. Despite intensive 
negotiations, three key issues have proven extremely difficult 
to resolve and require major efforts from a triangle of leading 
players: the European Union on agricultural market access, 
the United States on domestic agricultural subsidies, and 
the Group of Twenty (G-20) on industrial tariffs and the 
liberalization of services (WTO, 2006b). Ultimately, the 
talks were suspended because the gaps remained too wide, 
especially in the first two of these areas. 
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A. How the process has unfolded since the launch
 of the Doha Round in 2001
1. The economic dimension of the Doha Round: the interests
 at stake
Since WTO was created in 1995 as part of the results 
of the Uruguay Round, the multilateral system has had 
both achievements and setbacks. It has contributed to the 
expansion of international trade, brought a broad range of 
sectors and issues into the multilateral arena, created new 
rules and supported a more stable trade environment. At the 
same time, however, considerable barriers and distortions 
remain in agricultural trade (ECLAC, 2005b).
Econometric estimates of the potential welfare 
gains from trade liberalization in the Doha Round vary 
according to the methodology used and the scenarios 
modelled (see UNCTAD, 2003; Newfarmer, 2005; 
OECD, 2006 and World Bank, 2006a); but they tend 
to coincide on a number of key aspects. First, further 
openness would yield proportionally greater benefits in 
agriculture than in the non-agricultural sector, because 
of the higher levels of protection currently prevailing. 
Second, the greater benefits from trade liberalization in 
agriculture come from tariff reductions rather than cuts in 
domestic support or export subsidies, although subsidies 
are essential in gaining market access for some agricultural 
goods. Third, there would be large potential gains from 
liberalization in developing countries, especially in the 
agriculture sector, and this would impact on South-South 
trade (OECD, 2006).
Table III.1 summarizes the findings of two of the most 
widely used models: the Global Trade Analysis Project 
(GTAP) and the World Bank’s LINKAGES model. The 
main difference between the two is that GTAP is a static 
general equilibrium model while LINKAGES is a dynamic 
one. As the table shows, the gains from full liberalization 
of goods trade are quite small in relation to GDP. As 
with previous multilateral trade negotiations, however, 
the Doha Round does not aim at the full liberalization 
on which the exercise reported in table III.1 is based, 
so its outcomes are likely to be even more modest. The 
estimates suggest small gains for developing countries; 
and even these would be confined mainly to just a few 
countries: Argentina (6%), Brazil (23%), China (24%), 
India (7.7%) and Viet Nam (8.6%). 
Table III.1
POTENTIAL GAINS FROM TRADE LIBERALIZATION a
  Benefits from full liberalization b Benefits from full liberalization b Doha benefits c
  (in billions of dollars) (percentages of GDP) (percentages of GDP)
 Year
  Developing Developed World Developing Developed World Developing Developed World
  countries countries  countries countries  countries countries
Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP) 2005 22 59.5 84 0.44 0.23 0.27 0.08 0.10 0.09
Global Trade Analysis
Project (GTAP)  2002 108  254
LINKAGE 2005 90 197 287 0.80 0.60 0.70 0.14 0.24 0.23
LINKAGE 2003 539  832      
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of F. Ackerman, “The shrinking gains from trade: a critical assessment of Doha Round 
projections”, Global Development and Environment Institute Working Paper, Nº 05-01, 2005.
a
  The LINKAGE model projects results to 2015. 
b Assumes tariffs on all products and all agricultural subsidies are lowered to 0%.
c For trade in agricultural goods, reductions of 45%, 70% and 75% in three tariff bands for developed countries, and cuts of 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% in four tariff bands for 
developing countries; non-agricultural tariffs, a reduction of 50% in developed countries and 33% in developing countries. Does not include estimates for liberalization of the 
services sector. 
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Table III.1 also reveals differences between the most 
recent estimates and previous exercises using these models. 
These occur for a number of reasons, including:
• Differences in the base year used for the simulations 
(1997 versus 2001). This is important because a 
change in base year can capture a trade expansion 
that is not attributable to liberalization.
• The incorporation of new information, particularly 
regarding actually applied tariffs, free trade agreements 
and special tariff arrangements, such as the Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP), the Cotonou Agreement, 
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA), and so forth. This helps to pinpoint the 
real impact of reducing most favoured nation (MFN) 
tariffs because, when the tariffs actually applied are 
already below MFN rates, lowering the latter does 
little to boost trade. Moreover, the tariffs negotiated 
under WTO auspices are bound tariffs, which are 
higher than those actually applied, and so reducing 
bound rates also has no direct impact on trade. The 
free trade agreements negotiated in various parts of 
the world are in practice generating a kind of extra-
WTO trade liberalization.
• The models that used 1997 as the base year do not 
factor in the positive effects on world trade of China’s 
accession to WTO, whereas this liberalizing effect 
is reflected in the more recent models. 
An evaluation of the benefits of the Doha Round should 
also take into account the role of WTO as an international 
institution, particularly in terms of stabilizing trade flows 
and anchoring the terms and conditions under which trade 
takes place. During the Asian crisis, for example, WTO 
helped to contain potential protectionist pressures, since 
member countries could not alter their tariffs or take 
unilateral steps to restrict trade that were not allowed 
under WTO agreements. The tariff cuts secured have in 
practice consolidated market access conditions. By the 
same token, the possible elimination of export subsidies 
and lower levels of domestic support for agricultural 
goods represent headway in building a fair trading system, 
which is proving to be a difficult and costly process. 
Also, the greater certainty afforded by improvements to 
a number of trade rules, such as those concerning the use 
of antidumping measures, provides a broader horizon for 
investment decisions. 
The problem in reaching agreements broadly stems 
from differences between one group of developed countries 
that favours substantive agricultural liberalization (the 
United States and Australia) and another that would prefer 
to keep significant levels of protection (the European Union, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea). The negotiations are 
also highly complex, because of the differential impact of 
liberalization among developing countries (not all of which 
gain from liberalization in the short term), not to mention 
the nature of negotiations themselves, in which delicate 
balances have to be struck to produce a single undertaking 
that draws together a matrix of interdependent countries 
and issues. Moreover, the emergence of the developing 
countries, including the least developed countries (LDCs), 
as active participants in the negotiating process, makes 
an outcome that fails to provide substantive responses to 
their demands less likely.
2. Five years into the Doha Round
The WTO Ministerial Conference held in Hong Kong SAR, 
which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the creation 
of WTO, breathed new life into the Doha Round,1 which 
had been launched at the fourth Ministerial Conference 
at Qatar in 2001, almost seven years after the entry into 
force of the Uruguay Round agreement.
(a) Ambition of the agenda 
The Doha Agenda expanded the negotiations on 
agriculture and services trade envisaged in the outcome 
of the Uruguay Round (the “built-in agenda”), to address 
traditional areas of trade in non-agricultural goods, along 
with new areas and, in particular, the implementation-
related problems reported by developing countries. 
The adoption of agreements on 1 August 2004, known 
collectively as the “July package”,2 narrowed the coverage 
of new trade-related issues, by excluding three of the four 
issues identified at the first WTO Ministerial Conference 
in Singapore in 1996 (investment, competition policy 
and transparency in government procurement), while 
retaining the fourth (trade facilitation), along with aspects 
1
 Sutherland and others (2004) make a broad assessment of the functioning of the multilateral trade system. The results and initial evaluations of 
the Ministerial Conference are contained in ECLAC (2006a).
2
 These agreements made it possible to break the impasse that had arisen at the 2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún. For a review of this 
subject see the previous edition of this report (ECLAC, 2005a; chapter II); see also WTO (2005b) and ICTSD (2005). 
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of the trade-environment relationship. A more precise 
interpretation of the agreement on intellectual property 
and its relationship with public health was reached at 
Doha and refined during subsequent phases, particularly 
during the Hong Kong meeting. 
(b) Development dimension 
The core objective of the Doha Round was divided 
into two broad areas of negotiation: issues relating to the 
implementation of the Uruguay Round accords, and the 
application and strengthening of special and differential 
(S&D) treatment. Integration of these two issues into the 
debate on other specific areas or negotiation topics failed 
to keep pace with the schedule leading up to the Hong 
Kong Conference. For example, the systemic aspects of 
S&D treatment were not taken up again until the start of 
2006, when the mechanism for supervising this, which had 
been proposed several years earlier, underwent a further 
review.3 In addition, three areas of interest for developing 
countries are being addressed through task forces, namely 
debt and financing, technology transfer and the specific 
aspects of small, vulnerable economies. Of these, only the 
last has permeated the general negotiations, specifically in 
relation to access to goods and services markets.4 Lastly, 
a relative consensus is emerging on the relation between 
“aid for trade” and the capacity of developing countries 
to fulfil commitments (conditionality), which seems to be 
creating a new focus in the treatment of the development 
dimension in the multilateral trading system. 
On 24 July 2006, the WTO Director-General 
announced that the Doha Round negotiations were being 
suspended “to enable the serious reflection by participants 
which is clearly necessary.” He did not specify when the 
process originally scheduled to conclude in 2005 might 
be resumed; but the hiatus is likely to last several months 
or even years. The announcement came after the failure 
of the most recent meeting of the Group of 6 (G-6), 
consisting of Australia, Brazil, the European Union, India, 
Japan and the United States, which had become the main 
interlocutors of the process. This decision was justified 
because the gaps between the interlocutors remained too 
wide (see ECLAC 2006d). 
The United States refused to give way on further 
reductions to agricultural subsidies. The European Union, 
meanwhile, failed to adopt a clear position on additional 
tariff cuts on agricultural products, still less regarding its 
intentions concerning the universe of sensitive products 
to which such reductions would not apply. Brazil and 
India were reluctant to accept significant commitments 
to lower their bound tariffs to help ensure a satisfactory 
outcome to the negotiations. The large number of issues 
that remain outstanding because of the backlog of key 
decisions in this domain, compounded by the suspension 
of negotiations, further reduce the chances of conclusion 
in 2006. 
3
 Developing countries feared that this mechanism would be used as a tool for classifying and differentiating between countries.
4
 The demands and proposals of small, vulnerable economies are attracting increasing attention. Several initiatives have been presented by an 
active group of 22 countries, mostly from Latin America and the Caribbean, together with a number of island states. Landlocked countries, 
meanwhile, have formulated the Asunción Platform for the Doha Development Round (WT/COMTD/SE/3).
5
 In particular, decisions requiring specific numbers to give content to the formulas being bandied about. 
B. Pillars of the negotiations and results achieved
 since the sixth Ministerial Conference
1. Main contributions and challenges
The sixth Ministerial Conference began by considering 
a wide-ranging draft based on the guidelines of the 
2004 July package, but which called for political and 
technically complex decisions that ultimately could not be 
taken.5 In the days leading up to the conference, a number 
of potentially beneficial agreements were reached for 
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developing countries, this time in the area of intellectual 
property, which eased the ministers’ agenda somewhat. 
On taking office as WTO Director-General in September 
2005, Pascal Lamy inherited a troubled scenario and a very 
poor outlook for the upcoming Ministerial Conference to 
be held in Hong Kong SAR (see ECLAC, 2006a). For that 
reason, several weeks earlier he acknowledged the need to 
adjust expectations, while insisting that WTO Members 
still maintained their level of ambition for the results. In 
fact, it proved possible to focus the work and formulate a 
consensus-based declaration, agree upon a work plan with 
precise dates, and assume the commitment to conclude 
negotiations by late 2006. The fact that a declaration was 
approved, unlike what happened in Cancún, regardless of 
its substantive content and even though the commitments 
established in it have subsequently not been fulfilled, 
allows that Ministerial Conference to be duly recorded in 
the history of the Organization (see WTO, 2005c). 
The main results were to keep the negotiating process 
going, set deadlines for its conclusion, provide detailed 
—albeit not always consensual— guidelines and adopt 
various decisions that specifically address the issues of 
LDCs (on market access and intellectual property, among 
other things)6 and to complement the Doha Agenda with 
aid for trade. In addition, the least complicated of the three 
agriculture pillars was resolved, i.e., a date for eliminating 
export subsidies, which should be completed in 2013 (see 
scheme III.1). No progress was made on market access, 
the area in which the European Union had most problems. 
In addition, the resolution to successfully conclude the 
Doha Round by late 2006 was reaffirmed, which implied 
starting implementation in 2008.7 
6
 With regard to S&D treatment, the decision was taken to adopt five proposals put forward by LDCs, including a seven-year extension to the 
transition period for the agreement on trade-related investment measures (Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, paragraph 36). 
7
 The negotiating authority of the Government of the United States —a key element for concluding, although not for holding the negotiations— will 
be valid until mid-2007. That year had been intended for ratification of the results of Doha in WTO member countries.
Scheme III.1
TIMETABLE OF NEGOTIATIONS AND IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE WTO DOHA ROUND
 1995 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008-2013
Anticipated
2007: Modifi cation of 
TRIPS - health
2008: Start of 
implementation of the 
Doha Round
2010: Substantive 
reduction in export 
subsidies
2013: Deadline for 
eliminating agricultural 
export subsidies 
Deadlines envisaged in the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration
• 28 February: Plurilateral petitions on 
services
• 30 April: Market access modalities a
• 31 July: New negotiation schedules, 
revised offers and others (application) b
• 31 October: Draft fi nal schedules on 
services
• December: Decisions on special and 
differential treatment, replies on small, 
vulnerable economies and others
• End of export subsidies for cotton
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That the negotiating process faced enormous difficulties 
in 2006 was revealed in July, when the process had to be 
suspended. On agriculture, simultaneous movement was 
needed on market access, the ending of export subsidies, 
and a substantive reduction in domestic support. On market 
access, in addition to tariff reductions, the number of 
exclusions had to be reduced and compensated by substantial 
increases in existing quotas. Domestic support had to be 
reduced from the amounts authorized in WTO, which are 
considerably higher than those currently in force, and the 
negotiation had to come close to the current situation at 
least, to avoid regression to the practices prevailing prior 
to the Doha Round.8 This reduction was intended to pre-
empt the use of devices for allocating the same resources 
through other channels, by broadening the definition of 
the blue box, as proposed by the industrialized countries. 
This delicate agricultural balance then had to be weighted 
against negotiations on non-agricultural products and 
services, where other major difficulties are in play, albeit 
less problematic than those in agriculture. The United 
States, the European Union and Japan have of course made 
the scale of their agricultural liberalization conditional 
on the level of openness that developing countries can 
offer on trade in non-agricultural products and services. 
This is one of the aspects that held up progress in the 
Doha negotiations, because the developed countries have 
insisted that Brazil and India, in particular, should accept 
significant liberalization on non-agricultural market access 
(NAMA) and services. 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration maintains a 
development rhetoric, which is crucial for involving the majority 
of developing countries in the negotiation process. Nonetheless, 
the recommendations and decisions are increasingly focused 
on LDCs, a category in which the only Latin American and 
Caribbean member is Haiti. Relatively more attention is also 
being paid to the Work Programme on Small Economies, 
which could bring benefits to a larger number of the countries 
in the region, especially in the Caribbean. 
8
 In addition, supervision mechanisms needed to be improved to oversee the fulfillment of commitments and minimize the potential for transfer 
between the amber, blue and green boxes. This had already been curtailed in the July package, by reducing the overall base level of support, 
which incorporates the amber and blue boxes at least (see WTO, 2004a, annex A, paragraph 7). 
9
 The initial deadline established for this task in Doha was March 2003.
10
 In the first half of 2006, the General Council met three times and the Trade Negotiations Committee met on four occasions. There were also informal 
ministerial meetings (Davos, Paris), meetings of G-6 and between Brazil, the United States and the European Union (Rio de Janeiro). 
11
 Cuba and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela have expressed their disagreement with the procedures for preparation and running of the 
conference, and also with the subsequent work. 
2. Key issues for furthering the negotiations
Few results have been achieved in the first half of 2006, 
since the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. Neither 
the established deadlines nor the objectives initially 
proposed on modalities have been met,9 nor has the aim 
of concluding the Doha Round in 2006. Nonetheless, 
progress on technical aspects aroused expectations that 
major decisions could be adopted in the negotiations.10 
Apart from the lack of consensus to address the development 
dimension, however, differences also remained between 
developing countries and within their groupings, raising 
doubts about the latters’ representativeness in some cases. 
A new form of coordination among WTO members also 
emerged in the form of G-6, but this mode of work has been 
called into question by developing countries, including 
some in the region, in relation to its inclusiveness and 
representativeness.11 In response to this criticism, the 
WTO Director-General stated that the progress made in 
the deliberations did not constitute adopted decisions, 
and all delegations were being kept informed to ensure 
transparency. 
(a) Organization of the negotiations
As the negotiations in 2006 were split between 
establishing modalities no later than 30 April, and submitting 
global schedules of undertakings on trade in goods (both 
agricultural and non-agricultural) and services by 31 July, 
this meant that the latter indirectly became the critical date 
for determining whether the negotiations would be brought to 
a successful conclusion by the end of the year. The sequence 
of negotiations on access for agricultural and non-agricultural 
products actually shows that the first stage focused on the 
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tariff reduction mechanism (use of the global negotiation 
formula or traditional procedure for exchanging petitions 
and offers by product). Once a liberalization methodology 
had been agreed upon, the subsequent discussion had to 
focus on the parameters to be fed into the formula, and hence 
the possibility of obtaining an approximate outcome to the 
negotiations. The value of the results and the details, which 
are very important, centre on the verification of schedules, 
the negotiation of exceptions to the formulas, their trade 
importance and their treatment.
That stage was fundamental for evaluating the outcome 
in the case of agriculture, especially the treatment of tariff 
quotas. Although no formula was agreed upon in this sector 
of the negotiations, the basic methodological parameters 
were defined as follows: (i) cuts based on bound tariffs; 
(ii) classification of agricultural products into four tariff bands; 
(iii) proportionately larger reductions for the highest tariffs; 
(iv) the existence of sensitive and special product categories 
that would receive different treatment, and other elements 
relating to market access, such as special safeguards and 
specific issues for developing countries. In agriculture, the 
modalities also include formulas for reducing domestic support. 
Table III.2 summarizes the main proposals presented. 
Work in the first half of 2006 focused on the three 
key issues where differences were greatest and the level 
of ambition also defined the scope of the remaining issues 
on the agenda, namely domestic support in agriculture, 
and market access in both agriculture and non-agricultural 
goods. The level of ambition stems from a combination 
of reductions with trade significance, and the flexibility 
to be defined by the parameters for a set of instruments, 
such as the new blue box, sensitive and special products, 
the special safeguard mechanism for developing countries, 
and others. The chairperson of the agriculture negotiations 
decided to prepare reference papers addressing the three 
pillars of the agreement in the sector (WTO, 2006a).12 
(b) Domestic support in agriculture
This involves defining cuts in the amber box 
(subsidies that most distort trade), disciplines for the 
green box (permitted subsidies) and various instruments 
in relation to cotton.13 Nonetheless the greatest debate 
arose in relation to the blue box (subsidies not linked 
to production levels) —in particular, cuts in average 
expenses; caps applicable to specific products as part of 
the value of production; and new disciplines for those 
subsidies. The new blue box, which does not impose 
limits on production, is an issue on which the main 
stakeholders hold divergent positions. For example, the 
European Union would accept spending caps on certain 
products if the United States would stop opposing new 
rules on the blue box. 
(c) Market access for agricultural products 
In addition to work to agree upon thresholds and 
tariff cuts in the sector,14 the largest gaps emerged in the 
treatment to be received by sensitive products. For these, 
the proposals on the percentage of tariff lines ranged 
between 1% and 15% before the Hong Kong conference, 
and this issue was not clarified in 2006. Another debate 
revolved around criteria for quotas to ensure a substantive 
improvement in market access for products subject to 
this type of measure.15 Exporting countries have lobbied 
to restrict sensitive products, deepen the proposed cuts 
and curb the use of the special safeguard mechanism by 
developing countries that have adopted a defensive stance 
on this subject (G-33). Some developing countries fear 
protectionist effects from this mechanism in South-South 
trade. A similar debate arose on special products, especially 
regarding the definition of criteria, the treatment to which 
they would be entitled, and acceptable deviation from 
the formula. Positions on the number of tariff lines that 
could be designated as special products varied between 
five lines and 20% of them.
The gap between positions in the sector is clearly 
reflected in the extensive final draft of possible agricultural 
modalities, submitted by the chairperson of the respective 
negotiating committee on 12 July, which stresses that 
“this document is not, [...] agreed by Members, even as 
a draft” (TN/AG/W/3).
12
 The reference papers, which were the responsibility of the chairperson, initially consisted of drafts on issues that were not priorities and contained 
text rather than figures.
13
 Some analysts highlight the overestimates of support given to the agriculture sector and the limited real effects of the suggested reductions, in 
addition to the costs involved for those who apply them, given the gaps that exist between bound and applied rates (see Panagariya, 2005). 
14
 The report that the chairperson of this negotiation took to Hong Kong stated that there was greater consensus on thresholds than on the cuts, 
and that work needed to be done on tariff caps. 
15
 The criteria include the basis on which the increase in quotas would be calculated, either linked with domestic demand or with imports and 
current quota commitments.
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(d) Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 
The debate on the parameters of the tariff reduction 
formula, flexibility for developing countries (including 
the possibility of exempting some of their goods from 
the reduction) and the treatment of unbound tariffs has 
been particularly difficult. Two opposing groups have 
emerged: those supporting an agreement without full 
reciprocity, and those who proposed real market access 
by liberalizing applied tariffs instead of bound tariffs (a 
position rejected by developing countries). The divergence 
between the two positions is also apparent in the gap 
between the coefficients proposed by the developing 
countries (25) and the developed countries (5) (WTO 
documents JOB(06)200/rev.1 and TN/MA/W/79). An 
additional front of discussion also opened up with the 
arrival of proposals on export restrictions in the framework 
of non-tariff barriers (WTO, 2006c).
The NAMA-11 group of developing countries16 
supported the following principles: flexibility to 
ensure policy spaces, results that are fair and balanced 
with other areas of negotiation, and recognition that 
development concerns will be addressed in the modalities 
(see WTO, 2006d and 2006e). The group also supports 
the concerns of least developed countries and other 
small, vulnerable economies, without creating a new 
subcategory of members. In addition, NAMA-11 insists 
on maintaining its option of recourse to flexibility and 
differential coefficients in the formula, in keeping with 
its interpretation of the July package (see paragraph 8 
of the annex on NAMA). 
While the developed countries stressed differential 
coefficients as the main flexibility mechanism, developing 
countries evaluated the asymmetries existing between the 
offers made by the developed countries on agriculture 
and their demands in terms of non-agricultural market 
access. They are also demanding the comparability 
envisaged in the Hong Kong Declaration, which ensures 
a relatively high level of ambition in market access 
for agriculture and NAMA (see paragraph 24 of the 
Ministerial Declaration of Hong Kong and Inside US 
Trade, 13 January 2006). 
Argentina prepared criteria for that comparison and 
proposed work on four elements: reduction formulas, 
flexibilities and sensitive products, tariff caps and the relation 
between bound and applied tariffs, and tariff simplification. 
Its arguments highlight the methodological differences 
on tariff reduction between the two sectors —bands or 
formula— and specifically consider the equivalency 
of the proposals, in terms of what their application in 
each case would mean in the other sector. This exercise 
reveals a sharp inter-sectoral asymmetry.17 Another point 
highlighted is the need to evaluate not only proposals for 
designating tariff lines for sensitive agricultural products 
but also their significance in trade-value terms and the 
imports affected. 
The final document presented by the group chairman 
on NAMA, dated 26th June, reflects the distances between 
the positions, and laments the fact that the report is “at best 
a step in the direction of full modalities”. The annexes on 
the most contentious issues firstly contain the structure and 
coefficients of the formula and flexibilities of paragraph 
8. It is also claimed that the negotiation work has been 
constrained and conditioned by the agricultural sector 
(JOB(06)200/rev.1). Nonetheless, the outline content of the 
possible agreement in this sector is relatively well-defined, 
with the following general constituent parts: the formula, 
the treatment of unbound tariffs, deadlines for developing 
countries and other flexibilities (see box III.1).
In fact, regarding the agriculture and non-agricultural 
negotiations alike, the widespread opinion is that because 
of the flexibilities contained in the different negotiating 
modalities, a large group of developing countries, in 
addition to LDCs, would not have to make significant 
liberalization commitments. Moreover, in terms of rules 
there is a limited negotiation on new substantive disciplines, 
one of the main difficulties that developing countries have 
faced as a result of the Uruguay Round obligations.
16
 Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa and Tunisia.
17
 One of the examples, illustrated in the document for an original tariff of 35%, states that the coefficient of 10 proposed by the European Union 
and the United States for access to markets for non-agricultural products would result in a tariff of 7.8%, equivalent to a linear cut of 77.8%; 
whereas the proposal made by the bloc to reduce the same original tariff in agriculture would be 42.8%, reaching a tariff of 19.3% (rounded to 
one decimal place). See the communication from Argentina dated 9 March (TN/MA/W/67; TN/AG/GEN/14).
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Box III.1
CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A POTENTIAL NAMA AGREEMENT
1. A Swiss Formula applied on a line-by-line 
basis for bound tariffs and different coefficients 
for developed and developing countries.
2. Treatment of unbound tariffs:a non-linear 
mark-up, with a constant amount in terms of 
percentage points to be defined, to determine 
the basis for applying the formula; the base 
rate (focus of discussion) would be defined 
as: Tb = Ta + mark-up, where Ta is the applied 
tariff and Tb is the base rate from which the 
reduction would occur.  This already formed 
part of the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration 
(paragraph 17), so the centre of discussion 
has been the level of mark-up (which would 
be fixed). Its impact therefore depends on the 
level of the applied tariff. This is potentially a 
very important result giving countries certainty 
regarding tariffs in force in the destination 
market for their exports. 
3. Apart from longer implementation periods 
for developing countries, the negotiation 
focused on flexibilities for these countries 
in adopting the general formulas. For 
example, up to a certain percentage of 
tariff lines (10% has been mentioned) 
could apply a smaller reduction, but not 
less than half of the general formula. Other 
more specific exceptions would be in terms 
of unbound tariff lines or without applying 
the formula. 
4. Other flexibilities for exemption from 
the formula would be applied to countries 
whose binding coverage of non-agricultural 
tariff lines is less than 35% (Cuba and 
Suriname in the region), provided they bind 
the majority of their tariff universe (100% 
has been suggested) at an average level 
no greater than the overall average of tariffs 
committed to by developing countries in 
the Uruguay Round. This provision was 
set out in paragraph 6 of the annex on 
NAMA in the July package, with numbers 
to be confirmed.
5. The negotiations also considered 
the potential sectoral agreements 
that are being promoted, and there is 
additional flexibility for small, vulnerable 
economies. 
a  This is exclusively a NAMA issue, since one of the obligations on members in the Uruguay Round was to bind all their agricultural tariffs. The majority of unbound tariffs 
correspond to developing countries.
3. Other developments of interest
(a) Trade facilitation 
Progress has been made in improving mechanisms 
relating to merchandise movements and reducing the 
degree of discretion with which this is managed. The use 
of information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
and the introduction of international standards play a very 
important role here. The proposals presented in the last 
few months are evidence of an intent to find mechanisms 
to implement the measures agreed upon and coordinate 
them with technical assistance instruments, capacity 
building and special and differential treatment. These have 
generated broad interest in the region, emphasizing the 
importance of S&D treatment and presenting alternatives 
for making it operational (particularly WTO documents 
TN/TF/W/41 and TN/TF/W/81). Other proposals relate 
to the functioning of agreements on customs unions, 
particularly the relevance of regional coordination on 
rules, standards and border procedures;18 conditionality 
of the degree of compliance with commitments, based on 
the provision of technical assistance, support for capacity 
building and financing for developing countries and LDCs, 
among others. 
(b) Development dimension and other issues
Differences and backlogs have systematically persisted 
on implementation issues 19 and special and differential 
treatment; and since the Hong Kong conference, considerable 
work has also been done on aid for trade. Outstanding 
issues in the negotiations since December 2005 include 
the following:20 (i) plurilateral negotiations on services 
(while also persevering with bilateral negotiations) and 
progress in terms of their internal regulation; (ii) within the 
work on standards, the decision adopted on a transparency 
mechanism for regional trade agreements (JOB(06)/59/
Rev.5), while less headway was made on new disciplines in 
relation to fishing subsidies, and proposals on anti-dumping 
continued to proliferate; and (iii) diverging views persisted 
on geographical indications on intellectual property.21
18
 Needs raised in the proposals made by India (WTO documents TN/TF/W/77 and 78) and other countries, including Peru (WTO document 
TN/TF/W/30).
19
 This includes issues relating among others to the following: investment standards, balance of payments, geographical indications, intellectual 
property and biodiversity. 
20
 For further background on this, see the WTO documents on: (i) services (TN/S/25 to 28); (ii) standards (TN/RL/16 - 19); and (iii) intellectual 
property (TN/IP/15 and 16). See also CINPE/ICTSD (2006) and ICTSD (2006).
21
 This debate includes the voluntary nature of the system and freedom for countries to define their own implementation provisions within their 
legal framework, a line adopted by the United States, Australia and 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries, among others (see TN/IP/W/10 
and addendum of April 2005). 
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4. The region and other stakeholders: their participation
 in the process
The region’s countries have continued to participate actively 
in various interest groups, especially on agriculture; and 
Brazil in particular has played a very important role, 
both in this and in other areas of negotiation, through 
its participation in key groups such as the current G-6. 
Nonetheless, given their inherent characteristics and the 
priorities they give to international engagement, countries 
adopt different positions on individual subjects, as shown 
in several debates in the developing country groups. 
Latin American and Caribbean countries have also 
played an active role and given leadership in groupings 
addressing specific topics, such as NAMA, anti-dumping 
and fishing subsidies; and, in the period following the 
conference in Hong Kong, they have played a key part 
in trade facilitation, formulating specific proposals on 
mechanisms for S&D treatment and the interrelationship 
with commitments arising from the negotiations.22 Four 
Latin American and Caribbean countries that have signed 
free trade agreements (Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Peru) expressed their concern about the difficulties in 
moving forward in a letter sent to the Director-General 
of the WTO at the end of April, in which they pointed 
out that individual agreements are no substitute for an 
ambitious multilateral round, since there are issues such 
as agricultural subsidies and trade rules that need to be 
addressed at this broad level of negotiation.
Latin American and Caribbean countries also continue 
to adopt both “offensive” and “defensive” positions on 
different topics within the agriculture negotiations. For 
example, whereas G-20, in particular Brazil and Argentina, 
are putting forward ambitious proposals on tariff cuts,23 
limitation of sensitive products and application of 
disciplines on the green and blue boxes, some members 
of that group support the more defensive proposals of 
the G-33 on special products and the special safeguard 
mechanism (several Latin American and Caribbean 
countries also participate in that group). Developing 
countries, including several from the region, notably 
Costa Rica, have shown special interest in liberalizing 
tropical products, e.g., by proposing to exclude them 
from the sensitive products that would receive differential 
treatment in terms of market access. These proposals 
have been strongly questioned by the Group of African, 
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), because the Caribbean 
countries have preferential access for several of these 
products, such as sugar or bananas, and an exclusion of 
this type would erode that preference.
Latin American and Caribbean countries have also 
put forward joint proposals in conjunction with other 
developing nations, such as China, India and South Africa 
(with whom they participate in G-20 and G-33), both 
for the agriculture negotiation and NAMA-11, among 
others. India, whose growth and export performance have 
been very impressive over the last few years, has often 
coincided with interests and proposals made by Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, e.g., in the groups 
and topics mentioned above, and in the proposal to move 
forward on mode 4 service provision, trade facilitation, 
intellectual property and public health, and special and 
differential treatment, among others. India has a vested 
interest in the NAMA negotiations, since manufactures 
dominate its export structure and it faces tariff peaks for 
key exports (textiles, clothing and leather products), and 
in several service subsectors (engineering, architecture, 
health, information technology and mode 4). It also has 
offensive and defensive interests in the agriculture sector, 
as a net exporter of food products; and it seeks protection 
for its fragile rural population through its membership of 
the G-20 and G-33 (WTO, 2006b). 
The position of China appears to be different, as it might 
be thought not to require further concessions following 
the commitments it assumed when joining the WTO in 
2001. This country would have much to lose from a failure 
of Doha, since it has relatively low tariffs (compared to 
other large developing countries), and progress in the 
multilateral system would strengthen the current growth 
effect of its exports. A strengthening of the multilateral 
system would also act as a defence against protectionist 
pressures from developed countries. Moreover, in view 
of the likely failure of those negotiations, the country is 
stepping up its efforts to negotiate preferential agreements, 
particularly in its own region (Hufbauer and Schott, 
2006). This raises genuine risks for Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, which may find themselves lagging 
behind, although China has also pursued agreements with 
some of these countries (see chapter II). 
22
 The topics of interest to these countries are shown in ECLAC (2005a), table II.1.
23
 Tariffs in these countries have lower averages than in developed countries and other developing countries (particularly in Asia). 
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Meanwhile, developed countries stood firm on the 
proposals made before Hong Kong, insisting that they 
would only be adjusted once better offers were received 
from other countries, both developed and developing 
alike. Whereas the European Union has adopted 
proactive positions on NAMA and services, but more 
defensive positions on several aspects of the agriculture 
negotiation, the United States is defensive on aspects of 
export competition —particularly food assistance— but 
clearly offensive in terms of market access. The European 
Union has also expressed interest in resuming work on the 
Singapore issues within the WTO and in other forums, 
which, except for trade facilitation, dropped off the agenda 
as a result of the July package. Nonetheless, the priority 
for the two leading players, the European Union and the 
United States, was to conclude the Doha Round in 2006; 
and they stressed the risk of failing to achieve its internal 
processing by the expiry of Trade Promotion Authority in 
the United States (European Commission, 2006; USTR, 
2006).24 The latter is persevering with an active policy of 
bilateral preferential agreements, encompassing several 
countries in the region (negotiations with Peru and 
Colombia are the latest to have been concluded). These 
agreements often trail disciplines that have not yet been 
developed in the multilateral system. 
As in earlier phases, variable geometry has been 
designed to coordinate the interests of these large 
stakeholders and cuts across the North-South axis,25 
although signs of differentiation and pressure on the larger 
developing countries to make further concessions also 
persist. Moreover, specific demands by small economies 
or LDCs —which are increasingly active participants on 
the issues of interest to them— to address their particular 
situations, have been rejected by other developing countries, 
and no agreement has been reached to establish new 
country categories.
Unlike what happened in the Uruguay Round, these 
negotiations have not elicited active support from industry 
in either the United States or Europe, or in the other leading 
developed countries. In contrast, private-sector and civil-
society groups that are critical of the WTO negotiations 
have organized to promote their arguments (Hufbauer 
and Schott, 2006). In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
negotiations in the multilateral system framework are 
also failing to attract interest from the private sector, 
which is more focused on bilateral negotiations and the 
corresponding approval and implementation processes. 
This panorama is further complicated by the proximity 
of elections in several of the countries that are key actors 
in the process. 
24
 There are several views on the difficulties in renewing Trade Promotion Authority, compounded by the conclusion of the Farm Security and 
Rural Investment Act (known as the Farm Bill) in late 2007 (see Hufbauer and Schott, 2006).
25
 This has been emphasised by the Government of the United States, for example, in its coordination with G-20 to eliminate agricultural export 
subsidies, or joint proposals with India and Chile on services (USTR, 2006). 
26
 For further background on this issue see ECLAC (2006c).
C. Critical task: how to empower the development
 dimension?26
1. General issues of the development dimension
The development dimension is not a new concern in the 
multilateral system, but over time its conceptualization 
and treatment have changed. At the present time, more 
attention is being paid to technical assistance needs, 
institutional capacity-building and, more recently, aid 
for trade to address adjustment costs and develop export 
supply capacity. From the inception of the Generalized 
System of Preferences to the introduction of special 
and differential treatment (as defined and implemented 
since the Uruguay Round) the emphasis has shifted from 
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demand conditions to the supply restrictions faced by the 
developing countries (WTO, 1999). The current version of 
special and differential treatment basically includes some 
flexibility and differentiated levels for the developing 
countries in terms of their commitments, as well as longer 
implementation periods in various agreements and the right 
to invoke special provisions (enabling clause, balance-of-
payments provisions, etc.). LDCs form a special category 
of developing countries for which the special treatment 
is expanded or made more flexible.
Aid for trade arises in this context as a useful and 
innovative approach, by focusing on eliminating export-
supply constraints in developing countries. It therefore 
complements efforts to position the development dimension 
as a key objective of the Doha Round (see WTO, 2001a, 
2001b and 2005a). 
2. Towards a new approach: aid for trade (A4T)
27
 See the Technical Assistance and Training Plan 2006 (WT/COMTD/W/142) formulated in this regard for 2006 in the WTO. Lengyel (2005) 
estimates the costs in Latin America of responding to adjustment needs and applying the Uruguay Round agreements.
The aid-for-trade perspective sees trade and aid as 
complementary elements, rather than substitutes as they 
have traditionally been viewed. Its implementation as a WTO 
discussion topic is largely aimed at supporting developing 
countries in adjustment processes and overcoming their 
supply-side constraints, to improve their international 
engagement, while strengthening technical assistance 
and initiatives for institutional capacity-building.27 The 
objectives, grouped together in two large categories of 
assistance, correspond to costs and requirements that 
also differ in terms of their nature and time horizon, as 
shown in table III.3.
Opinions differ as to the orientation, scope and 
modalities of the assistance. There are also differences 
concerning the institutional framework that would be 
responsible for management, coordination and provision of 
the aid, and in particular the appropriate role for WTO in 
this task; and there is debate as to whether these decisions 
should be part of the single undertaking of the Round. 
Establishing aid for trade raises considerable challenges, 
firstly because of the variety of constraints and the impact 
of trade reform on the different countries. Moreover, donors 
and lending organizations do not want to consolidate their 
aid commitments with a mechanism that is binding under 
WTO, so new institutional mechanisms are required to 
ensure that the funds needed by the developing countries 
are used effectively, especially funds for development. 
Lastly, while financial assistance can be made available 
rapidly, it may not be sufficient in view of existing needs 
(see Evenett, 2005; Stiglitz and Charlton, 2006). The 
negotiation on trade facilitation illustrates these challenges, 
by prioritizing the technical assistance and institutional 
capacity-building dimensions, and giving the proposals 




Category and orientation Basic characteristics
Type 1: Aims to Responds to long-term needs, to some
strengthen trade extent independent of the negotiations and
capacity for similar to those dealt with by official
competitiveness development assistance (ODA), but with
and development additional resource requirements that can
 take the form of concessional loans or
 subsidies for the requesting countries.
Type 2: Aims to Responds to short-term needs and is aimed
address the at “losers” (not always LDCs) in the
implementation negotiations. Among other things, this
costs of trade category involves the effects of liberalization
agreements on fiscal revenues, erosion of preferences,
 the effects of the required adjustments
 (including labour-market adjustments
 induced by restructuring) and agreement
 implementation costs, particularly in areas
 such as trade facilitation, intellectual
 property, standards and rules on services. 
 This slightly newer concept of aid is for a
 situation in which costs are imposed on
 some countries as a result of reform, while
 there are gains for other countries or overall
 gains. It is therefore argued that the
 additional resources needed to meet such
 costs, unlike the first type of aid, should be
 granted through subsidies.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Lauren Phillips and others, “Aid for Trade: What does it mean? 
Why should aid be part of WTO negotiations? And how much might it cost?”, 
Opinions, No. 61, London, Overseas Development Institute, 2005 and United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Concept Note on Aid for Trade: 
Context, Content, Concerns and a Way Forward”, New York, Poverty Group, 
Bureau for Development Policy, January 2006. 
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Box III.2
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON TRADE FACILITATION
The aim of the negotiations on trade 
facilitation is to clarify GATT articles V, VIII 
and X, relating respectively to: freedom of 
transit; fees and formalities connected with 
importation and exportation; and publication 
and administration of trade regulations. The 
Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation 
focused on these issues alone, having 
faced resistance from developing countries 
and LDCs when it began to address the 
“Singapore issues”.a 
Technical assistance in this area 
is hugely important and extremely 
complex, given the different degrees of 
implementation of trade facilitation measures 
that exist among developing countries, and 
because the issue is often not among their 
development priorities. In this context, the 
measures proposed for the negotiation 
can be divided into two types: those that 
do not require costly infrastructure but 
mainly administrative provisions (e.g., 
publication of trade regulations); and 
those that require sustained efforts, both 
with regard to resources and in terms of 
implementation capacity (e.g., installation 
of computerized systems to reduce or 
eliminate discretionality). The various similar 
proposals include a joint proposal made by 
11 of the region’s countries to implement 
technical assistance, involving various 
stages and implementation periods (see 
WTO document TN/TF/W/81).b
From the numerous contributions 
made by countries to the negotiations on 
trade facilitation in the areas of technical 
assistance, capacity building and special and 
differential treatment, it can be concluded 
that: (i) there is broad consensus among 
developing countries and LDCs on the 
importance of the technical-assistance 
dimension of the negotiations to achieve real 
progress on trade facilitation; (ii) although 
other international agencies must continue 
playing an important role, a coordinating 
and centralizing body needs to be created 
within the WTO, with responsibility for 
areas relating to technical assistance, 
capacity building, financing and the 
needs of countries, in the broadest sense 
of trade facilitation (which goes beyond 
the three negotiating articles mentioned 
above); and (iii) developing countries and 
LDCs should intervene actively to make 
appropriate diagnoses, obtain the necessary 
assistance and thereby make progress on 
trade facilitation to take advantage of the 
expansion of international trade. Against this 
backdrop, ECLAC held a seminar-workshop 
in November 2005 attended by 20 experts 
drawn from Ibero-American countries, for 
the purpose of exchanging ideas, opinions 
and proposals for efficient implementation 
of trade facilitation instruments. The 
conclusions of this event stressed the need 
to deepen regional coordination efforts in 
the framework of trade facilitation, taking 
advantage for this purpose of the electronic 
forum Knowledge Network on Information 
Technologies Applied to Trade Facilitation 
(RECTIFAC) made available by ECLAC for 
these purposes.c
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “The Role of Technical Assistance in World Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation 
Negotiations”, FAL Bulletin , No. 238, Santiago, Chile, June 2006.
a
  Trade facilitation issues are addressed in several other WTO agreements (customs valuation, and rules of origin, and others). 
b
  The proposal comes from Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 
c
  Conclusions in ECLAC (2006e) and reference to the forum: http://stnt01.eclac.cl/WBE/?boardID=rectifac.
Stiglitz and Charlton (2006) state that aid for trade 
should focus on three aspects: (i) strengthening of 
national and regional institutions responsible for applying 
development-oriented trade policies and regulations; 
(ii) helping firms to become more competitive, with 
support from governments; and (iii) dealing with 
domestic infrastructure barriers (trade facilitation). In 
this proposal, it is important to stress the linkages needed 
between the public and private sectors, and the key role 
of regional institutions. ECLAC is working on proposals 
for coordinating technical assistance on this issue at the 
regional level. 
Experience and recommendations 
The discussion on aid for trade draws on acquired 
experience, the debates that have been held and 
recommendations made by international organizations, 
including the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD).28 Various organizations 
28
 References include: UNCTAD, 2006; IMF/World Bank, 2005; UNDP, 2006b; IDB, 2006; and World Bank, 2006b. 
are facing challenges to contribute to the design and 
implementation of trade-complementary policies, and 
more effectively articulating the set of policies around the 
development strategy. These complementary policies include 
macroeconomic and financial, regulatory and competition 
policies, in addition to policies on infrastructure, among 
other areas (see WTO, 2004b and UNCTAD, 2004). 
Although market opening has been facilitated, strategies 
that take a narrow view of the key factors that enable trade 
to contribute to growth have not proven as effective in 
preventing the erosion of competitiveness and stimulating 
export diversification, with a view to strengthening linkages 
between exports and the rest of the economy. 
These organizations also point to the effect of the 
“conditionality” of loans and assistance on the limited 
domestic ownership of reform, which makes it more 
difficult to implement. Together with institutional and 
physical infrastructure to strengthen supply-side capacity 
and competitiveness, they also include investments and 
South-South technology transfer, among other things; and 
they suggest a more important role for regional banks in 
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supporting trade capacity.29 As a complement, various 
organizations stress the need to provide assistance to 
developing countries in trade negotiations and to more 
effectively combine openness with institution building 
and measures to mitigate the possible adverse effects, 
which requires evaluations of consequences and needs 
linked to trade reform and agreements. 
In aid for trade, such as that currently being proposed 
in several international organizations, trade and trade 
policies are seen as part of development strategies. This 
perspective is consistent with arguments repeatedly 
made by ECLAC, both in the past and more recently 
(see ECLAC, 2002 and 2004).30 The tasks undertaken by 
ECLAC in support of administration and implementation 
functions, arising from the signing of preferential and free 
trade agreements, start from the basis that exploitation 
of those agreements requires countries to review their 
policies, strategies and institutional framework (see www.
cepal.org/comercio). Consonant with emerging views, 
it has also been proposing the coordination of rules in 
various domains —origin, standards and trade facilitation, 
among others— in addition to regional-scale investment 
and financing efforts that would stimulate and facilitate 
trade between countries. Regional trade usually contains 
a higher value-added and technology content, which can 
provide greater stimulus to economies at large.
3. The mandate of the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference
 and the current debate
29
 To address the complexity of the multiple agreements in the region, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has proposed creating cooperation 
forums or networks between countries, and coordinated projects on trade facilitation and investments, to contribute to SME participation in the 
international arena, infrastructure initiatives (Initiative for the Integration of South American Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA) and the Puebla-
Panama Plan), and private-sector strengthening (IDB, 2006).
30
 Its work also highlights the scant share of the trade component in the ever-smaller amounts of official development assistance received by the 
region (United Nations, 2005).
31
 This includes coordinators from LDCs and the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, together with three countries from the region: 
Barbados, Brazil and Colombia.
32
 A group of six developing countries, including Guyana, Honduras and Nicaragua, claim that some of the more vulnerable countries have been 
excluded from these deliberations (WT/AFT/20).
The aid for trade envisaged in paragraph 57 of the Declaration 
issued by the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference aims to 
help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the 
supply-side capacity and trade-related infrastructure they 
need to implement and benefit from WTO agreements, and 
to expand their trade. As such it is a valuable complement to 
the Doha Agenda. This conference also decided to deepen 
work on LDCs, prioritize technical assistance and capacity 
building, and strengthen the integrated framework.
The Aid for Trade Task Force, created in February 
and consisting of 13 members drawn from developed and 
developing countries,31 is expected to make recommendations 
to the General Council on how to make assistance more 
operational and functional to the Doha Round development 
dimension. Through direct consultations with the WTO 
Director-General, a second line of work has made it possible 
to reaffirm the commitment to contribute additional resources 
(which have grown considerably) for aid for trade. 
Regional views can be seen in recent communications 
from various countries: (i) the Group of African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) States, which includes Caribbean 
countries; (ii) Brazil; (iii) three Andean Community countries: 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru; (iv) Barbados, with proposals 
from small, vulnerable economies; and (v) a group of six 
developing countries, including Guyana, Honduras and 
Nicaragua. Under various categories, the groups address the 
following four issues: general guiding framework, domains 
or scope of the aid, application and resources. Their views 
and proposals are described in box III.3.
Lastly, the countries suggest addressing the issue 
of aid through regional mechanisms and institutions 
(including regional integration schemes and United 
Nations commissions); and most consider that the 
integrated framework is a model platform for preparing 
the guidelines that should govern aid for trade in this 
new phase. The opinions expressed in the contributions 
reviewed are framed by a broader set of developing country 
concerns and issues, such as the low level of participation 
in the conceptualization and design of aid for trade, and 
the type and degree of conditionality that the loans will 
have, among other issues (UNDP, 2006a).32 An innovative 
proposal from the LDC group suggests using value-chain 
analysis to identify measures to strengthen supply-side 
capacity in developing countries (WT/AFT/W1).
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Box III.3
ORIENTATION AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGION’S COUNTRIES ON AID FOR TRADE
In the general framework the countries 
address the orientations of assistance and 
its relation with the development dimension 
in the current Round. For some countries, 
aid for trade is neither a topic nor a tool of 
negotiation, but an instrument for promoting 
the development dimension; and they 
propose widening the scope of the Hong 
Kong Ministerial Declaration to address new 
needs. They also call for special attention 
for a certain category of developing country, 
namely small, vulnerable economies (the 
group of six developing countries).
In terms of the domains or scope of 
aid, the countries basically consider the 
following: (i) assistance for adjustment, 
e.g., social costs (unemployment) and more 
specifically those arising from the ending 
of the agreement on textiles or higher food 
prices (Barbados); (ii) fulfilment of rules 
and trade capacity-building, including the 
institutional framework for trade policy 
(Brazil) and a legal advice centre (Andean 
Community); and (iii) development of 
supply and infrastructure for trade (e.g., 
trade facilitation), aiming to address the 
entry to new markets (African, Caribbean 
and Pacific States) providing services to 
SMEs (Barbados), mobilizing resources for 
migrant or temporary workers (Brazil) and 
developing business capacities (Andean 
Community). Brazil envisages a coordinating 
role for the WTO in the tasks listed in (ii). 
Some countries believe the system should 
target not only the results of this Round but 
also existing agreements (six developing 
countries) and the opportunities arising 
from regional agreements. In addition, it is 
considered difficult to establish the scope of 
assistance without knowing the implications 
of the Doha Round (Barbados). 
As regards the application of assistance, 
the countries propose mechanisms for 
management, coordination and administration, 
the forms, supply deadlines and links 
with transition periods, and supervision of 
implementation, among other things. The 
debate includes the role of the WTO in these 
tasks and the incorporation or otherwise of 
these agreements in the Round’s “single 
undertaking”. Non-inclusion would arise from 
opening assistance to other WTO agreements. 
The Andean Community countries stress that 
demands should be adapted to development 
policies, and the majority assign a coordination 
role to WTO, in the framework of an inter-
agency consultative group, for example, to 
strengthen efficiency and consistency. 
On the issue of resources, reference 
is made to additionality, the nature and form 
of delivery (grant or loan), non-conditionality 
(Barbados) and the timeliness of the 
assistance, among other points. The Andean 
Community countries stress the small share 
of official development assistance allocated 
to aid for trade and the small share of total 
ODA that the region receives; Brazil stresses 
the need for additional resources to offset 
the dwindling trend of ODA, and the Group 
of African, Caribbean and Pacific States 
proposed multilateralizing the assistance, 
strengthening bilateral support, and making 
arrangements for extended assistance 
(multi-year projects), in a timetable that can 
be adjusted to the transition periods. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Trade Organization (WTO), country communications WT/AFT/W/8, 10, 
12, 18 and 20, 2006.
The recommendations of the Aid for Trade Task 
Force formulated in late July state that effective aid 
for trade will enhance growth prospects and reduce 
poverty, complementing multilateral trade reforms and 
distributing their benefits more fairly. It thus complements 
the Doha Round but does not depend on its success. The 
assistance would include activities identified as trade-
related development priorities within the strategies of the 
recipient countries and basically distinguish the following 
categories: trade policy and regulation, trade development, 
trade-related infrastructure, productive capacity-building 
and trade-related adjustment. To make this operational, the 
Task Force adopts the principles of the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness, which include national ownership and 
accountability between the parties (World Bank, 2005). It 
also provides guidelines to strengthen the formulation of 
the demand and the response of donors, together with their 
coordination at the national, regional and global levels. 
Lastly, it stresses the need for monitoring and evaluation, 
among other issues and specific recommendations (see 
WTO document WT/AFT/W1). 
In synthesis, there is a broad consensus on the 
importance of aid for trade in the Doha Round, as 
a complement to other elements of the development 
dimension, and with the necessary interaction between 
trade, aid and deeper reforms in the countries. This in 
turn requires greater coordination between the public 
and private sectors in the individual economies, and 
better evaluations of developing countries’ needs in 
the context of their growth strategies. It is also agreed 
that more resources and deeper coordination between 
donors are needed; but there is less consensus on the 
binding nature of the commitments assumed by donors 
and the institutional framework required to carry 
them out (including the role of WTO). Nor is there a 
clear relation between aid for trade and the capacity 
and conditionality for complying with commitments 
by developing countries. Nonetheless, the regional 
perspective is increasingly present in diagnostic studies 
and initiatives in this field, which increases the chances 
of regional organizations of various types, including 
ECLAC, playing an important role.
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4. The future of the Doha Round and developing countries
Negotiations in the Doha Round were suspended in late 
July. Under the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, the 
political decisions needed for its conclusion had been 
postponed, but the political climate for producing those 
decisions did not alter during the first half of 2006. 
Basically, there are problems concerning the conditions 
that the negotiations need to fulfil to be acceptable to the 
main stakeholders. On the one hand, the United States is 
seeking better market access for its agricultural exports, 
both in the European Union and in the markets of a 
number of developing countries; it is also interested in 
other aspects of market access for non-agricultural goods 
and services. The European Union, on the other hand, 
needs results on market access for non-agricultural goods 
and services —to turn its internal reform of agricultural 
policy into a multilateral commitment. For the leading 
developing countries in the negotiation, the profile of 
results that would make it possible to conclude the Round 
remains unclear. At the present time, while they are on the 
offensive in agriculture, particularly against the European 
position, they are on the defensive on non-agricultural 
market access and services. Thus, the equation that would 
be satisfactory to them thus appears to be unviable.
It was always known that the negotiations would not 
conclude in December 2006, unless a package could be 
put together in July to resolve postponed decisions; and 
this ultimately did not happen. It should be noted that 
although pessimistic views of the Round and its results 
are expressed regularly, the outcome did not seem negative 
for developing countries. In terms of liberalization, while 
specific results have not been achieved, it is recognized 
that most developing countries, including all LDCs, could 
be exempted from liberalization commitments through 
one or more mechanisms. The negotiations are focused 
on a certain number of target developing countries, which 
represent the critical mass in terms of market access for 
goods (agricultural and non-agricultural) and services. 
Since the Hong Kong conference, LDCs have had a 
non-reciprocal commitment on access to the markets not 
only of developed countries but also several developing 
countries, which still has to be materialized. The least 
developed countries will be exempted from practically all 
the new Doha commitments; moreover, apart from trade 
facilitation, there are virtually no new disciplines requiring 
implementation efforts from developing countries, which 
was the major criticism of the results of the Uruguay 
Round. Although instruments remain that raise doubts 
as to the real market access that can be achieved when 
the modalities are defined, there is genuine willingness 
to address the problems of developing countries through 
the aid-for-trade mechanism (evaluated as one of the key 
issues among elements available on the negotiation table 
since the Hong Kong conference) and particularly as 
regards trade facilitation measures. Other important items 
for developing countries included having a date for ending 
export subsidies, together with a possible substantive 
cut and disciplines in domestic agricultural assistance, 
strengthening of rules offering more balanced conditions 
for their interests, or safeguards against protectionist 
temptations among developed country partners, and 
new mechanisms of special and differential treatment, 
among others.
Consequently, there was a set of elements on the 
table which could have led to an acceptable outcome for 
various developing countries. The dust cloud raised by 
major discussions among the leading WTO members has 
overshadowed this progress, and is eclipsing the more 
permanent importance of WTO as an anchor for the 
multilateral trading system. As mentioned on other occasions, 
the multilateral system offers a number of possibilities that 
are not available in regional, bilateral or other preferential 
agreements. Its importance lies in the potential for building 
a reliable system based on rules that have been agreed upon 
by its participants, offering a framework of negotiations 
between very different parties; and thus also a framework for 
addressing the asymmetries in capacities and requirements, 
and providing a robust system for settling disputes, which 
allows LDCs real access. 
The recent suspension of negotiations is generating 
great uncertainty as to the future of the agreements reached 
or the progress achieved in the process, several of which 
are very important for developing countries, including 
the recommendations on aid for trade. 
Lastly, in addition to the issues raised above, there 
is another more structural one. To what extent will the 
agreements arising from this Round make it possible to 
address the problems and challenges of the twenty-first 
century? These include anti-competitive practices with 
increasingly cross-border features, electronic commerce 
and information technologies, and domestic regulations 
and their effects on trade, including measures relating to 
security, health or the environment. On these issues, the 
multilateral system is increasingly out of step with the 
bilateral rules agreed upon in other international forums 
by a large number of its own members, developing 
countries included. 
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Chapter IV
Regional integration and trade-agreement 
convergence
Introduction
Recent experience in Latin America and the Caribbean indicates that intraregional trade is more 
conducive to export diversification, provides a friendlier environment for small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and is more intensive in value-added than trade with the rest of the 
world. Regional and subregional integration has been slow to gather momentum, however, and 
the political will to promote these processes has not been fully reflected in the steps taken to put 
them into practice. Intraregional trade has gained some ground since the 1990s, and a number 
of rules and institutions have been created, particularly in Central America and the Andean 
Community, but these advances have not measured up to the magnitude of the challenges 
involved. Nor has significant progress yet been made in terms of competitiveness, technological 
innovation and export diversification. Since the chances for making headway in all these areas 
hinge on the development of suitable national policies, the weakness of the region’s integration 
processes can be attributed to shortcomings in those policies.
Some important assets have been built up within the 
framework of these integration schemes, including a 
number of institutional advances, the Andean Community’s 
recently created social development programmes, the 
MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund, and the 
efforts devoted to devising uniform customs codes and 
fully applying the common external tariff. The challenges 
to be met in order to place the region in a competitive 
position within the international economy are of such a 
pressing nature, however, that the regional debate tends to 
focus on the weaknesses and shortfalls of its integration 
processes.
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It is important to ensure that regional integration 
does not remain in its present embryonic state for 
much longer, given the trends and developments being 
observed in the international arena, including the strong 
emergence of China and other Asian economies on the 
global stage and the bilateral trade agreements being 
reached between various Latin American countries and 
the United States, the European Union and, lately, Asian 
countries. All of this poses major challenges in terms of 
the region’s competitiveness and the current relevance 
of its integration schemes. Bilateral agreements entail 
a number of difficulties in relation to trade diversion, 
areas in which they may be at cross-purposes with 
multilateralism, an emphasis on matters that are of more 
interest to developed economies and certain types of 
institutional demands that not all developing economies 
are in a position to meet. They also afford a variety of 
benefits, however, such as improved access to the markets 
of major trading partners. Such arrangements can enable 
countries to consolidate positions and preferences that 
used to be subject to conditionalities and discretionary 
concessions. They also make it possible to do away with 
tariff escalation and thus promote export diversification. 
In addition, bilateral agreements can give rise to broader 
and deeper commitments on important matters than is 
usually the case with other integration accords, as well 
as more binding mechanisms and greater legal certainty 
(Rosales, 2005). The region’s governments must therefore 
weigh the costs and benefits of bilateral negotiations 
and of the other mechanisms available to them with a 
view to determining which option ––or combination of 
options–– will be most effective in strengthening their 
countries’ competitiveness and improving their position 
in the international economy. 
The immediate challenge is to bring about a rapid 
adjustment in the region’s integration schemes in order to 
avert an asymmetrical situation in which the commitments 
contained in agreements with developed-country trading 
partners are more demanding than those included in 
subregional schemes. Commitment asymmetry of this sort 
would undermine incentives for regional integration and 
pave the way for differentiated treatment. Greater efforts 
should also be made to standardize the different integration 
schemes’ rules and disciplines in order to avoid creating 
a network of “hub-and-spoke” agreements. 
The fact that progress towards Latin American and 
Caribbean integration has stalled cannot, however, be 
attributed to the attention being paid by the countries 
of the region to concluding free trade agreements 
(FTAs) with third parties. Instead, it has more to do 
with the scant amount of headway that has been made 
and with integration bloc leaders’ lack of sufficient 
political will to drive the process forward. This state 
of affairs jeopardizes the achievements made so far and 
dilutes the identity of each of the regional integration 
schemes. Since the Latin American and Caribbean 
region is currently enjoying a favourable international 
economic environment and higher GDP growth, while 
at the same time exhibiting fiscal responsibility and 
low levels of inflation, it may be missing the promising 
opportunity offered by a favourable business cycle to 
increase trade convergence and to step up the pace of 
integration. 
Existing subregional schemes should be deepened as 
a means of paving the way for the creation of a common 
market in the long term.1 To this end, steps need to be taken 
in several directions. To start with, commitments should be 
extended to areas now excluded or only partially covered, 
such as services, investment and public procurement, 
and convergence of the rules and disciplines established 
by the region’s various trade agreements. Headway also 
needs to be made in institutional bridge-building among 
the different integration schemes with a view to creating 
an expanded market in which goods and factors can 
move freely, achieving macroeconomic cooperation, 
setting up binding dispute settlement mechanisms, 
dealing with existing asymmetries appropriately, creating 
structural funds designed to yield balanced benefits, 
and coordinating social policies and bold initiatives in 
the fields of energy and infrastructure (ECLAC, 2005). 
The most pressing task of all, however, is to re-establish 
a climate for dialogue in which no party is excluded or 
disparaged. This stage in the process calls for tolerance 
of the diversity of national interests and trade strategies. 
The validity of existing mechanisms should be respected 
and used as a basis for identifying areas and instruments 
that can serve as a platform for progress, first, in carrying 
forward regional cooperation initiatives and, later, in 
devising means of fostering convergence in the areas of 
trade and integration. 
1
 A common market with policy convergence and a community-wide institutional structure is probably the most demanding of the many and varied 
ways to deepen integration. The establishment of gradual, realistic objectives may lead in this direction, but the challenge today is much more 
modest: to hold on to the ground gained, meet the existing commitments and pave the way for convergence among the different subregional 
groupings.
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A. Integration under a new set of conditions
1. Trends in intraregional and extraregional trade
For the third consecutive year, in 2005 intraregional trade 
—defined as the proportion of the region’s total exports 
represented by the total sum of intraregional exports— 
continued to win back some of the ground lost during the 
downswing that followed the Asian crisis and continued into 
2001 and 2002, although it has not yet regained its record high 
of 1997 (see table IV.1).2 This pattern was repeated in all the 
subregions, with growth rates in the Andean Community and 
MERCOSUR (23% and 23.6%, respectively) outstripping 
those of the Central American Common Market (CACM) 
and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Intraregional 
trade also expanded for the second year running, though 
slightly less strongly than in 2004, in the Latin American 
Integration Association (LAIA) countries.
Despite this momentum, intraregional trade has 
yet to return to the record level of 1997. This is mainly 
because of the trade patterns of the Andean subgroup and 
MERCOSUR, which together represented almost 50% 
of all Latin American and Caribbean trade and 74% of 
intraregional trade in 2005. These integration schemes 
have seen a significant increase in their extraregional 
trade flows in the last few years.
Table IV.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL EXPORTS BY SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEME, 1990-2006
(Millions of current dollars and percentages)
          January- January-
 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 June June
          2005 2006 d
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA)           
Total exports (1) 112 694 204 170 251 345 328 274 316 298 319 807 346 145 427 835 506 557 242 825 293 252
Exports to LAIA (2) 13 589 35 471 43 118 42 887 41 934 36 164 40 872 56 511 70 153 31 307 31731
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2/1)  12.1 17.4 17.2 13.1 13.3 11.3 11.8 13.2 13.8 12.9 10.8
Andean Community           
Total exports (1) 31 751 39 134 38 896 60 709 53 543 52 177 54 716 74 140 94 751 48 005 59 970
Exports to Andean Community (2) 1 312 4 812 5 504 5 167 5 656 5 227 4 900 7 361 9 056 4 132 4 552
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2/1)  4.1 12.3 14.2 8.5 10.6  10.0 9.0 10.5 9.6 8.6 7.6
MERCOSUR           
Total exports (1) 46 403 70 129 80 227 85 692 89 078 89 500 106 674 134 196 162 512 75 177 84 772
Exports to MERCOSUR (2) 4 127 14 199 20 322 17 710 15 298 10 197 12 709 17 319 21 406 9 859 11 468
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2/1)  8.9 20.2 25.3 20.7 17.2 11.4 11.9 12.9 13.2 13.1 9.5
Central American Common Market (CACM)           
Total exports a (1) 4 480 8 745 14 987 16 624 16 328 17 006 18 117 19 767 21 849 10 690 11 650
Exports to CACM (2)  624 1 451 2 754 2 616 2 829 2 871 3 110 3 506 3 911 1 865 2 089
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2/1)  13.9 16.6 18.4 15.7 17.3 16.9 17.2 17.6 18.0 17.4 17.9
Caribbean Community (CARICOM)            
Total exports (1) 4 118 5 598 4 790 6 358 6 072 5 732 6 712 7 880 8 274 … …
Exports to CARICOM (2) 509 843 1 031 1 230 1 384 1 220 1 419 1 810 2 329  …  …
Latin America and the Caribbean             
Total exports b (1) 130 214 227 922 280 065 359 396 345 484 347 610 376 590 461 323 548 975 263 209 314 690
Exports to Latin America and the Caribbean c (2) 18 727 45 180 56 644 62 552 58 607 53 424 59 635 79 484 100 016 44 543 55 856
Percentage intrasubregional exports (2/1)  13.9 19.8 20.2 17.4 17.0 15.4 15.8 17.2 18.2 16.9 17.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the respective subregional scheme and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. 
a
  Figures include maquila trade. 
b
  Includes LAIA, CACM, the CARICOM countries, Panama, Cuba and the Dominican Republic. 
c
  Includes intrasubregional trade in the Andean Community, MERCOSUR, CACM, CARICOM and trade between Chile and Mexico and the rest of the region, as well as trade 
between groups, plus exports from Cuba, Panama and the Dominican Republic to other countries in the region. 
d
  Preliminary figures.
2
 Examination of intraregional and extraregional trade flow patterns shows that the intraregional market accounted for a considerable proportion 
of the blocs’ total exports between 1990 and 1998. Exports to Latin America and the Caribbean by MERCOSUR, the Andean Community and 
CARICOM expanded rapidly and accounted for a larger share of total exports than those going to extraregional markets. Intragroup trade in 
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community accounted for much of the high proportion of intraregional trade in that period.
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In 2000-2005, extraregional trade was a decisive factor 
for the region as a whole and for each of the subregional 
integration blocs. The United States and Asia have been 
Latin America’s most dynamic extraregional trading partners 
during the last five years (see table IV.2). The United States 
market is particularly important for the Andean Community, 
CACM and CARICOM, as is Asia for MERCOSUR.
Briefly, then, regional integration in Latin America 
and the Caribbean is being affected by a new phenomenon 
that has to do mainly with the direction of the region’s 
export flows. With or without North-South FTAs, the 
region’s integration schemes and individual countries 
have been looking to extraregional markets as the 
main driving force for trade creation over the last five 
years. This pattern is clearer in the cases of the Andean 
Community, MERCOSUR and Chile, whereas CACM 
and Mexico have continued to rely heavily on the United 
States market. 
Table IV.2
EXPORT GROWTH IN THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN SUBREGIONS,
BY COUNTRIES AND BLOCS, 1990-1998 AND 2000-2005
(Contribution to total export growth) a
 Andean Community MERCOSUR CACM CARICOM
 1990-1998 2000-2005 1990-1998 2000-2005 1990-1998 2000-2005 1990-1998 2000-2005
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.0 2.5 4.7 3.3 4.6 2.1 2.0 2.3
 LAIA 2.0 1.7 4.7 2.6 4.3 1.7 1.4 2.1
 MERCOSUR 0.3 0.0 3.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
 Andean Community 1.7 1.1 0.5 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3
 Chile 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0
 Mexico 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.5
 CACM 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 3.7 1.3 0.2 0.0
 CARICOM 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.8 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.4
 Other b 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3
Rest of the world 0.7 9.6 2.7 10.9 11.8 6.1 -0.8 15.9
 United States  0.7 5.9 0.6 1.7 10.1 4.9 -0.2 13.6
 European Union 0.1 1.3 1.2 2.2 1.3 0.1 -0.1 1.8
 Japan -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
 Asia 0.1 1.0 0.3 3.9 0.6 1.8 0.0 0.9
 Other 0.0 1.3 0.4 4.0 0.3 0.0 -0.4 1.1
World c 2.7 12.0 7.3 14.1 16.3 8.2 1.2 18.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE), statistical 
departments of the customs unions, statistical institutes and central banks of the member countries, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics, 
for the CARICOM countries. 
a 
 Contribution is calculated as growth in exports to each trading partner, weighted by exports to that market as a proportion of the country’s/group’s total exports.
b
  Refers to Latin American and Caribbean countries (Cuba, Dominican Republic and Panama).
c
  Small differences in the sums reflect the rounding of decimals.
B. Proliferation of intraregional and extraregional
 agreements
In the 1990s, regional integration in Latin America and 
the Caribbean gained fresh impetus from the creation 
of new blocs and the reactivation of existing schemes. 
Now a new modality has emerged, in which integration 
is being driven mainly by bilateral agreements, both with 
other countries in the region and with nations in other 
regions of the world. The integration schemes in the region 
and countries not affiliated with any of the subregional 
blocs (e.g., Chile and Mexico) have taken steps to forge 
extraregional accords. Until recently, bilateral agreements 
had relatively little bearing on the volume or direction of 
the region’s trade flows. In the last few years, however, 
the proliferation of accords being negotiated by countries 
or groups of countries with extraregional trading partners 
has become a factor to be reckoned with at the regional 
level (see scheme IV.1).
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Scheme IV.1
SPHERES OF TRADE POLICY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: SOME EXAMPLES
INTRAREGIONAL
Economic complementation 
agreements in the framework
of LAIA 
Free trade agreements between 
Chile and Central America and 
Mexico and Central America, 
similar to the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
Free trade agreements signed 
between countries of the
region and CARICOM
MULTILATERAL



















Negotiations concluded: CACM, 
Dominican Republic and United 
States; Peru and United States; 
Colombia and United States
Negotiations under way: 
MERCOSUR – European Union 
Ecuador – United States
Extraregional free trade agreements 
along north-south lines, with
United States and European
Union, among others
EXTRAREGIONAL
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Up to December 2000, 61 agreements extending 
intraregional tariff preferences had been signed, most of 
them negotiated in the framework of LAIA. Only five FTAs 
had been signed with developed countries, four of them 
by Mexico —the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) in 1994 and accords with the European Union 
in 1997, Israel in 2000 and the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) in 2001— and one by Chile, with 
Canada in 1997. Since then, and particularly in the last five 
years (2001-2006), the number of extraregional agreements 
negotiated in the region has outnumbered new intraregional 
accords. As a result, of a total of 68 agreements in force 
or in the process of coming into effect as of May 2006, 
51 are intraregional trade preference agreements and 17 
are extraregional arrangements.3
Until 1991, the only types of subregional preferential 
agreements in existence were customs union arrangements, 
which covered only 6% of the region’s exports. This situation 
changed dramatically towards the end of the 1990s and even 
more rapid changes have taken place in the last five years. 
By the end of 2005, 64% of the region’s exports came under 
some type of intraregional or extraregional preferential 
agreement, whether bilateral or plurilateral. In particular, 
Mexico, the Central American subregion and Chile shipped 
94.4%, 84.8% and 73.7% of their exports, respectively, 
under preferential trade arrangements (see table IV.3). Given 
the other extraregional accords now being negotiated, the 
proportion of exports covered by tariff preferences is likely 
to rise from 64% to 72% by the end of 2007.
Table IV.4 shows the proportion of external trade 
(measured by exports) that has been covered by tariff 
preferences negotiated in intraregional and extraregional 
agreements in the last 15 years. In the first half of the 1990s, 
intraregional trade was liberalized under agreements signed 
in the framework of LAIA. The second half of the decade 
marked a new phase in Latin American and Caribbean trade 
policy, as a flurry of agreements were struck with non-regional 
trading partners such as Canada, the United States, Japan 
and the European Union. This process is now leading to an 
adjustment of integration schemes to encompass the different 
trade structures of the countries in the region. 
Even in the absence of more thorough-going subregional 
integration schemes, member countries have entered into 
FTAs with blocs or countries outside the region, either 
individually or in groups. As a group, MERCOSUR has 
concluded preferential agreements with developing nations 
(e.g., India) and is negotiating accords with the Russian 
Federation, the European Union and a number of African 
countries. Central America, as a bloc, has signed an FTA 
with the United States and is preparing another with the 
European Union. 
Two Andean Community countries (Colombia and 
Peru) have concluded free trade negotiations with the 
United States, and Ecuador is in the process of negotiating 
a similar accord. The efforts of these three countries, 
and of Bolivia, to secure more permanent preferential 
access to the United States market have been driven by 
the end of the unilateral preferences extended under 
3
 The most recent agreements either signed or in the process of being approved include those concluded by Peru and Thailand in 2005, Peru and 
the United States in 2006 and Colombia and the United States in 2006. An FTA between Chile and China will come into effect on 1 October 
2006. The 68 agreements mentioned above do not include accords that have been abrogated or subsumed into new agreements.
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the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication 
Act (ATPDEA), which expires in December 2006. The 
extension of ATPDEA is vital for the four beneficiary 
countries, 50% of whose exports to the United States 
are eligible for the regime. Bolivia and Ecuador in 
particular, as relatively less developed countries, stand 
to lose out with the end of ATPDEA (Durán, de Miguel 
and Schushny, 2006).
Table IV.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TYPES OF AGREEMENT AND SHARES OF EXPORTS a
(As of May 2006)
Subregional agreements/  Other intraregional agreements Extraregional agreements
Countries (tariff preferences extended) b (tariff preferences extended) b
(Intragroup preferences) b (percentages of total exports) (percentages of total exports)
Southern Common  12.9% MERCOSUR–Chile (Economic Complementarity Agreement 9.6% MERCOSUR–India (2004), covers 450 products; …
Market (MERCOSUR)  (ACE 35–1996)); MERCOSUR-Bolivia (ACE 36–1996);  MERCOSUR–Southern African Customs Union (SACU)c (2004) 
Economic Complementarity   MERCOSUR–Peru (ACE 58-2003); MERCOSUR–Colombia,   MERCOSUR–European Union (being negotiated)
Agreement (ACE) 18 (1991)  Ecuador and Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) (ACE 59–2004);
  Uruguay–Mexico (FTA–2004)  
Andean Community 8.8% Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of)–CARICOM (1992); Chile–Bolivia 9.7% Colombia–United States (2006); Peru–Thailand (2005) 14.5%
(1969)  (ACE 22–1992); Colombia–CARICOM (1994); Chile–Colombia   Peru–United States (2005); 
  (ACE 24–1992); Bolivia–Mexico (ACE 31-1994); Chile–Ecuador   Ecuador–United States (being negotiated)
  (ACE 32–1994); Colombia–Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of)–Mexico 
  (G3) (ACE 34–1994); Chile–Peru (ACE 38–1998); Peru–MERCOSUR 
  (ACE 58–2003); MERCOSUR–Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela 
  (Bolivarian Rep. of) (ACE 59–2004) 
Central American  18.6% Costa Rica–Mexico (1994); CACM–Dominican Republic (1998); 4.6% Costa Rica–Canada (2001); CACM–United States (2005); 61.6%
Common Market  CACM–Chile (1999); Costa Rica–Trinidad and Tobago (2002);   CACM–European Union (start of negotiations announced)
(CACM) (1960)  Costa Rica–CARICOM (2003); Nicaragua–Mexico (1998); 
  Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras)–Mexico 
  (2000); Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras–Andean Community 
  (being negotiated by the Andean Community Secretariat and the 
  Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA)) 
Caribbean Community 12.2% CARICOM–Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) (1992);  2.3% CARICOM–Canada (being negotiated) …
(CARICOM) (1973)  CARICOM–Dominican Republic (2001); Trinidad and Tobago–  CARICOM–European Union (negotiations begun in July 2004)
  Costa Rica (2002); CARICOM–Costa Rica (2003); 
  CARICOM–MERCOSUR  
 
Chile  Chile–Bolivia (1993); Chile–Venezuela (1993); Chile–Colombia  15.1% Chile–Canada (1997); Chile–United States (2003); 58.6%
  (1994); Chile–Mexico (1998); Chile–Ecuador (1995);   Chile–European Union (2002); Chile–Republic of Korea (2003);
  Chile–MERCOSUR (1996); Chile–Peru (1998);   Chile–European Free Trade Association (2004);
  Chile–Central America (1999); Chile–Cuba (2002)  Chile–New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei Darussalam (2005);
    Chile–China (2005) 
Mexico  Mexico–Chile (1992); Mexico–Venezuela and Colombia (G3)  2.2% Mexico, United States and Canada (NAFTA) (1994);  92.2%
  (1995); Mexico–Costa Rica (1995); Mexico–Bolivia (1995);   Mexico–European Union (2000); Mexico–Israel (2000);
  Mexico–Nicaragua (1998); Mexico–Uruguay (2003);   Mexico–European Free Trade Association (2001);
  Mexico–Northern Triangle (El Salvador, Guatemala and   Mexico–Japan (2005)
  Honduras) (2001); Mexico–Panama (1986)
Latin America and the   51 agreements d in effect covering 12.5% of total exports  17 agreements covering 51.5% of total exports
Caribbean  
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.
a
 The agreements shown include economic complementarity agreements (ECAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs).
b
 Percentage of total exports.
c
 The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) comprises South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland.
d
  Includes all the economic complementarity agreements in effect in the framework of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA).
Table IV.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PROPORTION OF TOTAL EXPORTS COVERED BY PREFERENTIAL AGREEMENTS a
 Intraregional Extraregional Total
1991 Distribution of total trade (A) 13.9 86.1 100.0
 With tariff preferences extended (B) 8.4 0.0 8.4
 Free trade (C=(B/A)*100) 60.4 0.0 8.4
1995 Distribution of total trade (A) 19.8 80.2 100.0
 With tariff preferences extended (B) 11.2 31.6 42.8
 Free trade (C=(B/A)*100) 56.6 39.4 42.8
2000 Distribution of total trade (A) 17.4 82.6 100.0
 With tariff preferences extended (B) 11.7 45.6 57.3
 Free trade (C=(B/A)*100) 61.5 55.2 57.3
2005 Distribution of total trade (A) 18.2 81.8 100.0
 With tariff preferences extended (B) 12.0 51.0 63.0
 Free trade (C=(B/A)*100) 65.9 62.3 63.0
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of M. Kuwayama, J. Durán and V. Silva, “Bilateralism and regionalism: re-establishing 
the primacy of multilateralism: a Latin American and Caribbean perspective”, Comercio internacional series, No. 58 (LC/L.2441-P/E), Santiago, Chile, December 2005, 
and official figures.
a
 Does not include trade conducted under non-reciprocal tariff preferences, such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).
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MERCOSUR and the Andean Community have set up 
an FTA between their members and, together with Chile, 
Guyana and Suriname, are working on an intraregional 
initiative known as the South American Community of 
Nations. A number of Central American countries have 
concluded FTAs with CARICOM countries and with 
the Dominican Republic, and several are negotiating an 
agreement with the Andean Community. In turn, CARICOM 
has approached Central America and has announced the 
start of free trade negotiations with MERCOSUR. 
In the second quarter of 2006, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela withdrew from the Andean Community and 
the Group of Three (G-3) when its Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs officially renounced both pacts, arguing that the 
conclusion of negotiations by Colombia and Peru with 
the United States would change the nature of the Andean 
Community. With notable celerity, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela then requested and negotiated full membership 
in MERCOSUR. This, too, was quickly settled, and in 
July 2006 the country signed a protocol of adherence with 
its new trading partners, with which it now has a trade 
agreement and corresponding tariff reduction schedule 
(Economic Complementarity Agreement No. 59). The 
process will conclude when the countries’ Congresses 
approve the protocol and the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela meets all the respective commitments by 
incorporating the group’s rules into its national legislation 
and implementing the common external tariff, by the 
end of 2010 at the latest. In addition, together with Cuba 
and Bolivia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has 
announced the signature of what it calls a “people’s trade 
agreement” (see box IV.1).
Box IV.1
THE PEOPLE’S TRADE AGREEMENT
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Cuba signed the People’s Trade 
Agreement (TLCP) in Havana on 1 May 
2006. The ground for this agreement was 
prepared by the Bolivarian Alternative for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, a joint 
initiative by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Cuba in response to the (now 
stalled) Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA). The aim of the accord is to build 
on the signatories’ complementarities by 
trading products over a barter platform based 
on the comparative advantages of each 
member. Hence, the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela has offered to assist with the 
development of Bolivia’s mining and energy 
sector and to export fuels to meet Bolivia’s 
domestic demand. In turn, Bolivia will export 
mining and agricultural products, especially 
soybeans, to the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and to Cuba. The key Venezuelan 
contribution lies in the energy sector, in 
which relations are being strengthened 
between Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) 
and Yacimientos Petrolíferos y Fiscales de 
Bolivia (YPFB). 
Only 13% of the three countries’ 
total exports go to Latin American and 
Caribbean markets, and their reciprocal 
trade flows amount to less than US$ 800 
million, which is less than 1% of the three 
economies’ combined exports. Initially, 
Bolivia stands to gain the most from the 
agreement, since the Venezuelan market 
accounts for just over a fifth of its total 
exports (see tables A and B).
Table A
PEOPLE’S TRADE AGREEMENT COUNTRIES: SELECTED GEOGRAPHICAL
AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2004
     Percentage of total
Country Area Population GDP Per capita GDP exports going to
 (millions of km2) (millions) (millions of US$) (thousands of US$) Latin America
Bolivia 1 098 580 9 227 8 773 951 65.0
Cuba 10 860 11 338 34 973 3 085 11.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 912 050 26 125 109 764 4 201 11.5
Total 2 021 490 46 690 153 510 3 288 12.9
Table B
PEOPLE’S TRADE AGREEMENT COUNTRIES: MATRIX OF RECIPROCAL EXPORTS, 2004
(Millions of dollars)
 Destination   Venezuela Total for the  Percentage
Origin  Bolivia Cuba (Bolivarian Rep. of) three countries World intragroup trade
Bolivia  0 489 489 2 254 21.7
Cuba 1  96 96 2 200 4.4
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of) 9 170   179 76 002 0.2
Total 9 170 585 764 81 480 0.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
In 2005, Bolivia’s main export markets 
were MERCOSUR (46%), the Andean 
Community (17%) and the United States 
(14%). The largest market for Venezuelan 
exports was the United States (59%). Cuban 
exports go mainly to the European Union 
and Eastern European countries (70%).
The figures suggest that the trade 
impact of this agreement will be very limited. 
An innovative aspect of the arrangement is its 
pronounced emphasis on social cooperation 
initiatives; although such programmes fall 
outside the usual scope of trade agreements, 
they may warrant closer consideration in the 
context of other integration agreements.
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Chile has accepted an invitation to join the Andean 
Community as an associate member, after having 
withdrawn from the group in 1976 over Decision No. 24 
on the Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital 
and Trademarks, Patents, Licences, and Royalties. 
Several countries along the Pacific coast4 are advocating 
the idea of forming an association in order to take 
advantage of their coastal location (El Mercurio, 28 
July 2006). This includes the possibility of closer trade 
ties with Asian countries on the Pacific coast. Chile 
has already invited Peru to join the FTA known as P4, 
signed by Chile, New Zealand, Singapore and Brunei 
Darussalam. The idea of a Latin American Pacific free 
trade area comprising the Andean Community countries 
and Chile began to emerge in the first half of 2006 
(FEDESARROLLO, 2006). Meanwhile, in September 
2006 Chile signed the agreement which makes it an 
associate member of the Andean Community.
Within MERCOSUR, consideration is being given 
to some sort of mechanism for trade negotiations with 
third countries. The groups’ smaller countries have 
lobbied for more freedom to enter into agreements 
with States outside the bloc and, in particular, Uruguay 
is keen to explore the possibility of negotiations with 
the United States. It has been argued that an imperfect 
customs union may be compatible, to some extent, with 
commitments involving key components of trade with 
third countries. The WTO provisions on the enabling 
clause negotiated during the Tokyo Round (1979) and 
article XXIV of GATT ––which are binding on the 
members of MERCOSUR–– may offer a way forward 
in this regard (Peña, 2006).5
C. Assets and liabilities of regional integration
A brief overview of the assets and liabilities of the different 
regional integration processes may afford an understanding 
of the stage each has reached, the quality of integration 
achieved and prospects for deepening it. To this end, this 
section looks at trade policy, institutional development, 
macroeconomic harmonization and common policies, 
including the treatment of asymmetries. Each of the 
subregional groups’ trading patterns are also examined.
1. Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
One of the main achievements of MERCOSUR in its 
first 15 years was to form a free trade area, even though 
some important sectors, such as motor vehicles and sugar, 
are still excluded from it. Another achievement was the 
establishment of a common external tariff for 85% of the 
tariff universe four years after the Asunción Treaty was 
signed in 1991. Basically, MERCOSUR functions as an 
incomplete free trade area and an imperfect customs union, 
with an average common external tariff of 12%.
Although important exceptions to the common external 
tariff remain, provision was made recently for the free 
movement of goods within MERCOSUR by eliminating 
the double tariff as of 2008. The association has decided 
to set up a single customs area, without rules of origin, 
by instituting mechanisms to distribute customs revenues, 
using a common customs code and computerizing customs 
facilities. A regime has also been approved for integrating 
production processes in some of the member States using 
goods originating outside the subregion.
Institutionally speaking, MERCOSUR has an 
intergovernmental decision-making structure backed up 
by technical and consultative bodies. The most prominent 
advances in this regard are the recent creation of the 
Permanent Court of Review as a community forum for 
4
 Mexico is apparently proposing a new partnership along these lines (see statements by Mexico’s Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Luís Ernesto 
Derbez, at http://www.sre.gob.mx/comunicados/conferencias/2006/confe_37.htm.
5
 A number of authors propose a straightforward two-speed model for MERCOSUR, deepening bilateral relations between Brazil and Argentina 
and creating wider degrees of freedom for the other partners. This would imply enhancing the free trade area and abandoning the idea of a 
customs union (Giambiagi and Barenboim, 2005).
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the resolution of trade disputes and the establishment of 
the MERCOSUR Parliament.6
MERCOSUR is one of the region’s most uneven 
integration schemes in terms of the size and competitiveness 
of its members’ economies. One of the first steps taken to 
deal with its acknowledged structural asymmetries was the 
creation of a US$ 100 million structural convergence fund 
in 2005, which will bring greater benefits for the smaller 
countries (MERCOSUR, 2005).
The lack of a common trade policy is a major weakness: 
MERCOSUR has no community rules on trade protection 
(such as safeguards or antidumping measures), quality or 
technical standards, or sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. 
Moreover, efforts to develop a consensus on such rules have 
yielded little real progress. The countries are still discussing 
how to adopt a definitive common external tariff and have 
extended the duration of preferential tariffs and exception 
regimes for certain goods. This does little to help lift the 
main non-tariff barriers within the group and allows new 
constraints on free trade to develop.
With regard to complementary trade policy, MERCOSUR 
is only just beginning to implement the provisions of a protocol 
that was adopted in 1998 to facilitate the free movement 
of a certain number of services. Its competition and public 
investment protocols have not been implemented, and the 
public procurement protocol has yet to be incorporated into 
national legislation in the member countries. There is no 
common standard on intellectual property.
Little headway has been made on macroeconomic 
harmonization. Work is in progress to standardize fiscal and 
monetary indicators, but little has been achieved in terms of 
meeting specific macroeconomic targets (Sánchez-Gómez, 
2006). No steps have been taken to harmonize fiscal or other 
types of measures that generate non-structural asymmetries, 
such as those arising from subsidies and investment and 
export incentives.
The institutional structure of MERCOSUR is limited 
in some quite significant ways. Apart from the main body, 
the Common Market Council, MERCOSUR lacks solid, 
well-established executive bodies. The limited powers of 
the Secretariat are juxtaposed with those of the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives but neither body acts as an 
executive arm. In addition, only 50% of the standards or 
resolutions adopted by the group have been written into the 
members’ national legislation and entered into effect. This 
is acting as a severe drag on the integration process (Durán 
and Maldonado, 2005).
Despite these constraints, MERCOSUR has developed 
more dynamic intragroup trade than any of the other integration 
schemes. From only 9% of total exports in 1990, intragroup 
exports came to account for 25% in 1998, representing no 
less than US$ 20.3 billion. In 2005, intrasubregional trade 
amounted to US$ 21.4 billion, or 13% of all the bloc’s 
exports (see table IV.3). Although intrasubregional exports 
now account for a smaller percentage of the total than they 
did a decade ago, they have expanded steadily for the last 
few years and have reached much higher absolute values 
than in 1998, at US$ 21.4 billion in 2005 (see table IV.5). 
Buoyant intragroup trade has helped each of the countries to 
diversify its exports and has allowed for a greater interchange 
of value-added within essentially inter-industry trade flows, 
especially in mid-level technology manufactures. The 
smallest countries have suffered the most in the wake of 
the macroeconomic crises of 1999 and 2002, however, in 
terms of both the volume exported to other group members 
and the quality of those exports.7
Table IV.5
MERCOSUR: TRENDS IN EXPORTS
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
          January- January-
 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 June June
          2005 2006 a
Total exports (1) 46 403 70 129 80 227 85 692 89 078 89 500 106 674 134 196 162 512 75 177 84 772
 Percentage annual growth -0.3 13.3 -2.9 12.3 4.0 0.5 19.2 25.8 21.1 21.0 12.8
Exports to MERCOSUR (2) 4 127 14 199 20 322 17 710 15 298 10 197 12 709 17 319 21 406 9 859 11 468
 Percentage annual growth 7.6 17.8 -1.1 16.8 -13.6 -33.3 24.6 36.3 23.6 25.6 16.3
Percentage exports within 
MERCOSUR (2/1)  8.9 20.2 25.3 20.7 17.2 11.4 11.9 12.9 13.2 13.1 13.5
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information form the MERCOSUR Secretariat and official country information 
(Secretariat of Foreign Trade of Brazil (SECEX), National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina (INDEC), Central Bank of Uruguay and Central Bank of 
Paraguay).
a
  Preliminary estimates. 
6
 Through the Common Market Council, the countries set up the Joint Parliamentary Commission to monitor progress towards the establishment 
of the MERCOSUR Parliament in December 2005. According to the Commission’s latest report, as of July 2006, Paraguay was the only member 
to have approved the founding protocol; the Congresses of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay had yet to ratify it (http://www.mercosurabc.com.ar/
nota.asp?IdNota=834&IdSeccion=2).
7
 According to the MERCOSUR countries’ external trade figures, between 2000 and 2005 Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s exports to MERCOSUR 
partners lagged behind those of Brazil and Argentina, losing ground in low- and mid-level technology goods and in resource-based manufactures 
(Durán and Masi, 2006).
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2. Andean Community
The Andean Community is the most advanced of 
the integration schemes in terms of setting up a free 
trade area, even though Peru was later in entering the 
system.8 First, there are no exclusions from the Andean 
free trade area. Second, it has common rules on trade 
protection (antidumping and safeguards) and community 
procedures for the regulation and quality certification 
of goods. In addition, an Andean Agricultural Health 
System has been created to harmonize provisions on 
sanitary matters.
The Andean Community also has common standards 
for trade in services and for the treatment of investment 
and intellectual property. These standards will now 
have to be carefully adjusted in order to reconcile them 
with the contents of Peru’s and Colombia’s FTAs with 
the United States. In 1991, the Andean Community 
approved a protocol on intra-community competition 
policy which was then improved and updated in 2005. 
Although it lacks community regulations on government 
procurement as such, the public procurement of services 
is already covered.
A first step has been taken towards macroeconomic 
harmonization with what are known as “convergence 
action programmes”, which are used to set monetary and 
fiscal targets. The Andean Community has also adopted 
decisions aimed at harmonizing the VAT and excise taxes. 
Substantial work has also been carried out on financial 
integration with the creation of the Andean Committee 
of Stock Exchange Regulatory Authorities.
The Andean Community’s greatest asset is its 
institutional structure, which is the most comprehensive 
of all the region’s integration schemes and has become a 
key tool for deepening Andean integration. The Andean 
Community General Secretariat has a well established 
and acknowledged executive function, and it works 
directly with presidential and ministerial decision-making 
organs. The Andean Community Court of Justice is a 
supranational tribunal with the power to deal with nullity 
proceedings against the decisions of the executive bodies, 
infringement of community rules, interpretation of those 
rules and arbitration proceedings. More recently, the 
Community established the Andean Parliament, which 
consists of directly elected representatives. The majority 
of the executive bodies’ decisions are written into the 
countries’ national legislation.
A prominent part of the Andean Community’s 
institutional framework is the Andean Development 
Corporation, which is viewed as the leading development 
bank in Latin America and the Caribbean. Its members 
include not only the Andean Community countries, but 
also the MERCOSUR, Central American and CARICOM 
countries and Spain. The Corporation’s total loan portfolio 
started out at just US$ 20 million when the institution was 
created in 1975 and grew to US$ 574 million by 1990. 
Between 1990 and 2005 it increased more than 10-fold 
and is worth over US$ 8 billion today. The institution has 
consolidated its position as the highest-rated Latin American 
issuer (it was the first to be awarded an investment-grade 
rating by the main international rating agencies) and 
has become a very important alternative to multilateral 
financial institutions for the region.
With regard to the treatment of structural asymmetries, 
the Integral Plan for Social Development (IPSD) was 
created recently to address problems of poverty, exclusion 
and inequality in the Andean Community and to mobilize 
funding for social cohesion programmes.
Despite its solid framework of Community institutions 
and significant progress towards the formation of a common 
trade policy, the Andean Community has made less headway 
than MERCOSUR in consolidating a common external 
tariff and building a customs union. A common external 
tariff was established in 1994, covering 60% of the tariff 
universe with an average tariff of 11%. Since then, efforts 
to broaden its coverage have repeatedly been deferred, 
and Peru remained outside the tariff scheme for 12 years.9 
The Andean countries have lodged multiple complaints 
and called for consultations over common external tariff 
violations, and there are still special customs regimes that 
act as tariff loopholes.
A number of trade-related difficulties remain as well. 
First, rules of origin are not fully standardized, and the 
safeguard system suffers from limitations with respect to 
certain types of products and the treatment of exchange 
rates. Second, price bands for agricultural goods act as 
a form of protectionism in trade within and outside the 
Andean Community. The countries have submitted numerous 
8
 Peru did not join the free trade area until the first half of 2006.
9
 Peru did not apply the common external tariff until January 2006.
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complaints in which they charge that the improper use of 
trade protection measures and technical and quantitative 
restrictions constitute barriers to intrasubregional trade. 
In fact, the constant infringement of rules agreed upon by 
the member countries is one of the most serious obstacles 
to the Andean Community’s operation as a free trade area 
(Durán, Maldonado and Meneses, 2006).
The Andean Community conducts less intrasubregional 
trade than MERCOSUR does. Its intragroup trade 
expanded very strongly in the 1990s, but has been 
relatively slack in the last five years, amounting to 
about US$ 9 billion and representing only 10% of 
the group’s total trade (see table IV.6).10 In the last 
few years, export growth has been more robust in 
external than in intragroup markets. Particularly sharp 
upswings have been seen in external sales to the United 
States and Europe and, more recently, to other Latin 
American markets (see table IV.2). The structure of the 
Andean Community has helped its member countries to 
diversify their exports and form a platform from which 
to access new markets (SGCAN, 2004).11 In the 1990s, 
intragroup trade expanded mainly on the back of exports 
of resource-based manufactures and of low- and mid-
level technology goods. Since 2000, however, growth 
in these categories of exports has tailed off sharply, 
shifting instead to commodities.12 Colombia and Peru, 
however, have been able to improve their position with 
regard to higher-tech manufactured goods.
10
 According to data calculated by ECLAC on the basis of official statistics, trade within the Andean Community peaked at 14% at the end of the 
1990s.
11
 In 2002, exports of Andean products using the subregional market as a platform to third markets represented US$ 1.2 billion. Between 1993 
and 2002, the proportion of products taking this route climbed from 12% to 63% (SGCAN, 2004). 
12
 Data from ECLAC, on the basis of official statistics. 
Table IV.6
ANDEAN COMMUNITY: TRENDS IN EXPORTS
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
          January- January-
 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 June June
          2005 2006 a
Total exports (1) 31 751 39 134 38 896 60 709 53 543 52 177 54 716 74 140 94 751 48 005 59 970
 Percentage annual growth 25.7 16.1 -16.5 36.1 -11.8 -2.6 4.9 35.5 27.8 34.9 24.9
Exports to the Andean Community (2) 1 312 4 812 5 504 5 167 5 656 5 227 4 900 7 361 9 056 4 132 4 552
 Percentage annual growth 26.3 28.2 -2.2 31.1 9.5 -7.6 -6.3 50.2 23.0 29.3 10.2
Percentage intra-Community 
 exports (2/1)  4.1 12.3 14.2 8.5 10.6 10.0 9.0 10.5 9.6 8.6 7.6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Andean Community and from the countries. 
a
  Preliminary estimates.
3. Central American Common Market (CACM)
CACM also became a free trade area at the start of this 
decade, although a number of (mainly agricultural) products 
are excluded from it. Apart from rules of origin, CACM 
has no community rules on trade protection or technical, 
sanitary or quality standards, but has instead adopted the 
WTO rules on these matters. Barriers to intraregional 
trade have come down significantly, and the obstacles that 
remain (mainly in the agricultural sector) have little effect 
on intraregional trade. The CACM members have been 
working on a Central American agreement on services and 
investment since 2001. There are no subregional rules on 
intellectual property or government procurement.
One of the main achievements of CACM has been 
to set up a customs union. The CACM common external 
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tariff covers 95% of the tariff universe and maintains a 
low level of effective protection, at only 6%, on average. 
CACM has a single customs procedures manual, a standard 
Central American tariff code and a customs union plan 
of action, which was approved in 2004 and is designed 
to eliminate the double tariff regime, distribute customs 
revenue and manage the common customs. In terms of 
macroeconomic harmonization, CACM has set convergence 
parameters for GDP variation, monetary and fiscal 
indicators, international reserves and external debt.
CACM also has a more advanced institutional structure 
than MERCOSUR does, and its achievements are much more 
similar to those of the Andean Community in this respect. 
The Central American Integration System encompasses an 
executive system, a parliament and a court of justice. The 
CACM dispute settlement mechanism, which is procedurally 
similar to the MERCOSUR system, is designed to avert 
infringements of the rules and establish the consequent 
compensation for damages. CACM also has a General 
Secretariat, to which a number of technical secretariats 
report. These secretariats have proven to be highly effective 
providers of support to the different member countries and 
their ministries in bilateral and multilateral negotiations, 
as well as serving as a channel for international financial 
cooperation.
Through their FTAs with Mexico, the Central 
American countries have benefited from the Puebla-
Panama Plan (to which Colombia recently acceded), 
which includes projects to facilitate energy, transport and 
telecommunications interconnection on the isthmus, as 
well as legal harmonization. The Puebla-Panama Plan 
encompasses projects to reduce structural asymmetries in 
competitiveness and human development. With respect to 
initiatives to tie in with social cohesion policies, CACM 
has a programme known as the Alliance for the Sustainable 
Development of Central America and a Secretariat for Social 
Integration, which was created in 2001 to assist with efforts 
towards achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
in the subregion. In addition, the Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration (CABEI) has financing programmes 
aimed at improving competitiveness, combating poverty 
and developing border areas.
The Central American countries have adopted a very 
dynamic and flexible approach to signing FTAs with Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, the United States and the CARICOM 
countries and are now negotiating another such accord with 
the European Union. Within CACM, 77% of trade comes 
under preferential agreements. The Dominican Republic 
—Central America— United States Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) functions particularly well for the subregion 
and should help to deepen common trade policy in Central 
America, since it has more comprehensive rules on each 
of the basic standards and on trade in services, investment, 
intellectual property, public procurement, the environment 
and labour matters (Jaramillo and Lederman, 2006).
Generally speaking, the bulk of Central American 
exports have always gone to the United States market, 
which has absorbed between 50% and 60% of Central 
American exports over the last 15 years. Intrasubregional 
trade reached a high of 18% of total exports in 2005 and 
has been holding at that level. Since 2003, however, 
intraregional exports have expanded at a higher average 
annual rate than overall exports (see table IV.7).13 One of 
the advantages of this intraregional trade pattern has been 
an increase in exports of mid-level and high technology 
industrial goods and of resource-based manufactures.
13
 ECLAC data, on the basis of official figures. Starting with this publication, total export figures include maquila and export processing zones; 
hence, the intrasubregional trade figure differs from that shown in previous years’ publications.
Table IV.7
CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: TRENDS IN EXPORTS
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
          January- January-Central American Common Market
 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 June June(CACM)
          2005 2006 b
Total exports a(1) 4 480 8 745 14 987 16 624 16 328 17 006 18 117 19 767 21 849 10 690 11 650
 Percentage annual growth 25.2 17.1 17.4 5.3 -1.8 4.1 6.5 9.1 10.5 10.4 9.0
Exports to CACM (2)  624 1 451 2 754 2 617 2 829 2 871 3 111 3 506 3 911 1 865 2 089
 Percentage annual growth 8.9 17.2 38.5 8.1 1.5 8.3 11.6 13.1 8.1 11.6 12.0
Percentage intra-CACM (2/1)  13.9 16.6 18.4 15.7 17.3 16.9 17.2 17.6 18.0 17.4 17.9
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration 
(SIECA) (http://www.sieca.org.gt/SIECA.htm), and official figures from the relevant countries.
a
  Total export figures include maquila and duty-free zones. The intraregional trade series shown therefore differs from series published in previous editions of the Latin America 
and the Caribbean in the World Economy, which do not include these areas of activity.
b
  Preliminary estimates, on the basis of official figures for January-April.
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy • 2005-2006 85
Table IV.8
REGIONAL INTEGRATION: ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
 MERCOSUR Andean Community Central American Common CARICOM
   Market
Free trade area Exceptions for motor vehicles  No exceptions Exceptions for some agricultural No exceptions
 and sugar  goods and for beverages
 Many non-tariff barriers to Numerous complaints over use  Many barriers to
 intraregional trade of non-tariff barriers  intraregional trade
Common trade Protocols for services,  Common rules on trade protection,  Agreement on services and Legislation exists on trade
policy investment and public  quality, agricultural health, services, investment. Other rules adopted protection, technical and
 procurement investment, intellectual property  since the expansion of CAFTA-DR sanitary rules, customs
  and competition policy (trade protection, public  procedures, services,
   procurement, intellectual property  intellectual property and
   and so forth) competition policy
 Protocols on competition,  Price band for agricultural goods Process of reconciling trade Rules written into
 investment and public  creates protectionism. Limitations protection rules with CAFTA national legislation in
 procurement not applied.  imposed by differentiated rules of  may create new forms of a few countries only. 
 No common rules on intellectual  origin, by safeguards and by lack protectionism within Barriers to trade in services
 property. Lack of consensus on  of technical rules the free trade area
 common standards regarding 
 trade protection and technical 
 and sanitary rules
Customs union Common external tariff covering  Common external tariff covering 60% Common external tariff covering Average common external
 85% of goods at an average of  of goods, at an average of 11.2% 95% of goods at an average rate tariff of 15%. Single market
 12%. Double tariff regime   of 6%. Customs code. Plan of and economy (CSME)
 eliminated and single customs   action approved for single proposed for 2008. Free
 area to be created by 2008  customs area movement of skilled
    labour and capital
 Deadline for winding down  Peru late in applying common external CAFTA-DR rules may enter into Most group decisions on
 special regimes and eliminating  tariff. Successive postponements of conflict with elimination of rules  the customs union
 list of products exempt from  new levels of coverage for common of origin in customs union and remain to be written
 common external tariff has been external tariff. Special customs may create differentiation and into national legislation
 extended regimes. Complaints over repeated dispersion of common
  violations of common external tariff  external tariff
Macroeconomic Macroeconomic targets set and Macroeconomic targets set. Tax and Macroeconomic targets set and
harmonization  indicators standardized financial harmonization efforts indicators harmonized
 Lack of political will to work   No efforts known apart from No progress
 towards fiscal and monetary   convergence parameters set for
 harmonization  economic growth indicators
   and macroeconomic stability
Institutional  Intergovernmental structure with Highly advanced institutional structure General Secretariat and executive, Executive bodies with
development Council of Ministers as decision- with General Secretariat and executive parliamentary and judicial bodies.  Secretariat. Court of Justice
 making body. Permanent Court  bodies, parliament and supranational Dispute settlement tribunal. recently created to settle
 of Review and Parliament judicial system. Andean Development Central American Bank for disputes. Caribbean
  Corporation is the leading Economic Integration (CABEI) Development Bank
  development bank in Latin America
  and the Caribbean
 Pronounced weakness due to  Demonstrated weakness in
 absence of solid and established implementing resolutions and
 executive bodies. Community  compliance with community rules
 decisions not well incorporated  even though they are well incorporated
 into national legislation into national legislations  
Structural  Structural Convergence Integrated Plan for Social Sustainable development Development fund created
asymmetries Fund (2005) Development (PIDS) programmes, (ALIDES), social
   integration (SISCA), 
   Puebla-Panama Plan
 Plans recently begun Plans recently begun  Recent initiative
Intensity and  Unprecedented growth (the Strong growth in the 1990s Trade oriented towards countries Intraregional goods
quality of trade highest in the region) in  Intraregional exports have broader outside the subregion.  trade represents a high
 intraregional trade. Export  manufacturing base Intrasubregional exports growing proportion of exports
 diversification, largely   faster than extraregional exports. and is growing faster than
 inter-industry  Intrasubregional trade is extraregional trade
   manufactures-based
 Intraregional exports have  Weakened intraregional export Intraregional trade can be Constraints on the
 declined as a proportion of total  performance since 2000. Stronger maintained only insofar as negotiation of FTAs with
 trade, with smaller countries  growth in trade with the United States, intragroup linkages strengthen countries and blocs. 
 losing ground in market access Europe and, recently, with countries exports outside the Services trade little
  and blocs in Latin America and the  subregion. developed
  Caribbean 
Other matters Amount of intraregional exports  Andean Development Corporation 77% of exports covered by Comparative advantages
 today is slightly higher than in  portfolio expanded more than 10-fold preferential trade agreements. greater in services trade
 1998 between 1990 and 2005 Dynamic approach to FTAs than in goods
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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4. Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
After a number of attempts to plot a course towards regional 
integration in the Caribbean, the members of CARICOM 
signed a treaty on the Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME), which will come fully into effect in 2008. A number 
of obstacles and limitations have to be overcome before 
that happens, however, since only 7 of the 12 members of 
CARICOM are signatories to CSME.
Although free movement of capital and of skilled 
labour has now been instituted among the 12 members of 
CARICOM, merchandise trade is still hampered by many 
non-tariff barriers and domestic barriers in the member 
countries. In 2002, legislation was drawn up on trade 
protection; technical, sanitary and customs harmonization 
rules; the free movement of services; intellectual property; 
and competition policy. Trinidad and Tobago is the only 
country to have written these Community decisions into 
its national legislation, however. Many obstacles remain 
to the free movement of services, too, and this is perhaps 
an even more important issue for the Caribbean than 
the movement of goods. With most of the Community’s 
decisions on the formation of a customs union yet to be 
incorporated into national legislation, the integration 
process is lagging far behind the other subregional 
integration schemes.
The decision-making bodies in the institutional 
structure of CARICOM are the Conference of Heads of 
Government and the Community Council of Ministers, and 
the CARICOM Secretariat is the principal administrative 
organ. The decision-making organs are backstopped by a 
large group of technical, social, educational, legal and other 
types of institutions, as well as consultative institutions 
and councils, including the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB). More recently, the Caribbean Court of Justice, whose 
main job is to settle disputes, was created. CARICOM 
has unfinished business in matters of macroeconomic 
coordination and treatment of asymmetries, although a 
development fund was set up recently to assist the countries 
that are lagging behind with a view to the establishment 
of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy.
Of all the subregional groups, CARICOM exhibits 
the highest percentage of intragroup trade, which has 
increased from 12% in the 1990s to 23% today (see table 
IV.9). Intraregional trade has, moreover, expanded much 
more quickly than exports outside CARICOM.
Table IV.9
CARICOM: TRENDS IN EXPORTS
(Millions of dollars and percentages)
 1990 1995 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 a
Total exports (1) 4 118 5 598 4 790 6 358 6 072 5 732 6 712 7 880 8 274
 Percentage annual growth 11.6 25.2 -18.3 23 -4.5 -5.6 17.1 17.4 5.0
Exports to CARICOM (2) 509 843 1 031 1 230 1 384 1 220 1 419 1 810 2 329
 Percentage annual growth 2.9 26.5 5.7 12.3 12.4 -11.8 16.3 27.5 28.7
Percentage intra-CARICOM exports (2/1)  12.4 15.1 21.5 19.4 22.8 21.3 21.1 23.0 28.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the respective subregional grouping and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics.
a
 These data do not include information for Bahamas, Haiti or Suriname. Hence, the intraregional trade ratios shown here would vary if these countries were included.
Since merchandise trade in CARICOM is dominated 
by a small number of countries and its members enjoy 
greater comparative advantages in services than in 
merchandise, the challenges posed by integration 
are different in some respects than they are for other 
subregional schemes in the region. First, any deepening 
of the CARICOM integration process must be based 
mainly on the liberalization of trade in services. Second, 
as far as its trade in goods is concerned, CARICOM 
would probably be better off maintaining the non-
reciprocal tariff treatment it now receives from the 
United States and Europe14 than if it were to sign FTAs 
with them, given its members’ lack of competitiveness 
in this area. It appears that these options are, however, 
no longer available. This being the case, the challenge 
is to determine how to take advantage of negotiations 
14
 Caribbean goods receive preferential treatment in the United States under the Caribbean Basin Initiative and enter Europe tariff-free under the 
Lomé Convention and the Cotonou Agreement. These preferential arrangements are in place for a limited period of time, however.
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with the European Union to strengthen the CARICOM 
institutional structure and incorporate a suitable sort of 
special and differential treatment that is also consistent 
with the Doha Round’s emerging core issues in relation 
to trade facilitation and, particularly, aid for trade. Third, 
preferential agreements with Latin American countries have 
been secured by the more competitive Caribbean nations, 
but not by CARICOM as a whole. Be that as it may, any 
agreements CARICOM negotiates, whether with developed 
countries or with other blocs in the region, must take into 
account the very particular traits of the type of trade that 
takes place within this subregional group.
D. The need for FTA convergence
1. Scope of the different agreements’ rules and disciplines
The multiplicity of bilateral, plurilateral and regional 
trade agreements in force in Latin America and the 
Caribbean could give rise to discriminatory practices 
among countries and regional sub-groups, given the 
variety of provisions relating to coverage, types of 
treatment and the depth of commitment entailed by their 
various disciplines and rules. Moreover, this unwieldy 
set of agreements makes trade facilitation in the region 
an arduous and complicated undertaking. Unless urgent 
steps are taken to achieve convergence among the 
different types of agreements, the region, instead of 
creating trade, runs the risk of triggering major trade 
diversions and bolstering development areas or enclaves 
with very different, or even conflicting, trade agendas, 
to the detriment of regional integration.
Countries and integration blocs in the region have 
signed no fewer than 68 bilateral and plurilateral trade 
agreements; these arrangements vary considerably both 
in terms of the coverage of disciplines and rules and as 
regards the level of commitment they command within 
and outside the region. Significant progress has been 
made in reducing tariffs, especially in intraregional 
agreements. Among the LAIA member countries, for 
example, approximately 85% of all tariff items and 
70% of bilateral trade operations are already fully 
liberalized (LAIA, 2005 and 2006).
In seeking to promote convergence towards free trade, 
the MERCOSUR and Andean Community secretariats, 
in conjunction with LAIA, have produced a study in 
which they measure the proportion of trade among the 
countries of the South American Community of Nations 
(SACN) that should be free of tariff barriers as of 2006, 
2010, 2014 and 2018 (see table IV.10 and SACN, 2006). 
The results point to a slow convergence towards free 
trade, since in 2006, between 35% and 60% of trade 
was reported to be free of tariffs, depending on how it is 
measured, whereas by 2014, between 60% and 70% of 
trade is expected to be completely free and, by 2018, the 
figure ought to be between 65% and 95%. Only Chile 
and Bolivia are expected to achieve market conditions 
approximating actual free trade by 2010, when more 
than 85% of their exports will be entitled to preferential 
market access in the subregion. Bilateral liberalization 
between the two countries will be shallower, however, 
because the asymmetrical treatment resulting from the 
negotiations will work in Bolivia’s favour.
As of 2006, the greatest achievements in terms of trade 
liberalization were recorded in the countries of the Andean 
Community, where, in theory, liberalization applies to all 
tariff categories. The situation in MERCOSUR is different, 
since exceptions to free trade are maintained in the sugar 
and motor vehicle industries, where no major changes are 
expected for the time being. Projections prepared by the 
Working Group on Integration Secretariats indicate that in 
2010 and 2014 there will still be a significant percentage 
of products that do not benefit from trade liberalization, 
with many cases in which the degree of trade liberalization 
will still fall far short of 90%; these lags are greatest in 
trade between the Andean Community and MERCOSUR 
and in Chilean exports to Bolivia (see table IV.10).
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Table IV.10
CHANGING PATTERNS OF FREE TRADE IN SOUTH AMERICA, SEVERAL YEARS a
(Percentages of the beneficiary’s exports, weighted by preferential tariffs)
 Granting authority          Venezuela
   Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay Chile Bolivia Colombia Ecuador Peru (Bolivarian
Beneficiary           Republic of)
Estimate for 2006
Argentina  76 85 82 72 58 3 4 7 13
Brazil 62  72 70 89 65 9 7 2 8
Paraguay 96 97   98 68 18 1 0 0 53
Uruguay 92 92 93   72 62 3 8 17 5
Chile 85 83 84 84   0 96 96 81 94
Bolivia 81 83 89 80 99   100 100 100 100
Colombia 15 14 1 21 97 100   100 100 100
Ecuador 69 75 18 32 46 100 100   100 100
Peru 64 69 7 58 86 100 100 100   100
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of ) 2 27 18 22 100 100 100 100 100
Projections for 2014
Argentina   76 85 82 96 100 24 17 65 27
Brazil 62   72 70 100 100 24 10 57 26
Paraguay 96 97   98 98 100 16 8 48 79
Uruguay 92 92 93   100 100 13 25 40 9
Chile 100 100 100 100   0 100 96 99 100
Bolivia 100 100 100 100 99  100 100 100 100
Colombia 56 64 1 49 100 100   100 100 100
Ecuador 86 91 41 65 46 100 100   100 100
Peru 100 100 7 71 100 100 100 100   100
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep. of ) 53 83 26 22 100 100 100 100 100
Source:  Secretariats of the Andean Community, MERCOSUR and LAIA, on the basis of the South American trade convergence data bank. 
a
  The darker the shading the less free trade takes place between the two countries. Bilateral relations with a degree of trade openness of over 90% are shown against a white 
background.
This outlook is scarcely encouraging for the 
region’s exporters and investors, since, on the one hand, 
the remoteness of the prospect of liberalization could 
discourage them from taking business decisions, and, on 
the other, several countries in the region could be parties to 
faster-paced export and import tariff reduction processes 
as part of agreements with the United States and probably 
with the European Union as well. In order to get around 
this difficulty and move forward towards deeper tariff 
reductions, the secretariats of these integration schemes 
have proposed speeding up their timetables in order to 
extend tariff-free status to at least 90% of regional trade 
in the short term. 
Tariff reduction does, however, require the concurrence 
of other fundamental rules and disciplines to guarantee 
its effectiveness. Not all of these rules have been fully 
incorporated into intraregional agreements, and —unlike 
the provisions of extraregional agreements signed with 
such countries and associations as the United States and 
European Union— even those that have been are no more 
comprehensive than WTO rules are.15 
There are substantive differences in terms of the 
coverage of rules and disciplines provided for by each 
type or group of agreements. Intraregional agreements tend 
to incorporate rules relating primarily to trade protection 
so as to expedite the tariff reduction schedule and avoid 
the introduction of non-tariff barriers to trade. Such 
agreements do not, however, offer broad-based coverage 
for other types of rules which, when not fully harmonized, 
turn into non-tariff barriers, as in the case of sanitary and 
phytosanitary rules and technical standards. At the same 
time, with respect to disciplines on non-trade matters, 
albeit trade-related, disciplines (services, investments, 
public procurement and intellectual property), intraregional 
agreements definitely have more limited coverage than 
extraregional agreements.
15
 In particular, issues such as competition policies, public procurement, services, investment, intellectual property and technical rules appear to 
be treated very sketchily. 
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In any event, intraregional agreements vary as regards 
the coverage of their trade disciplines. For example, 
South American customs union agreements and bilateral 
agreements deriving therefrom cover a broad range of 
trade protection and dispute settlement measures, but are 
less thorough when it comes to sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures and technical standards. By contrast, the FTAs 
signed between Chile and Mexico and by these countries 
with Central American nations cover these disciplines 
more comprehensively. In this regard, these agreements 
have more in common with the region’s FTAs with North 
America than with intraregional bilateral or plurilateral 
agreements. Admittedly, this is a sensitive issue, but it is 
one that should now be addressed if the aim is to gradually 
advance towards a unified regional market. 
The large number and diversity of bilateral and 
plurilateral agreements signed among countries of Latin 
America and between this group and countries outside the 
region could pose obstacles, especially to intraregional 
trade, in the form of non-tariff barriers. The problems of 
non-fulfilment that have arisen in some regional agreements 
could also account for the low degree of interconnection 
exhibited by intraregional trade flows (ECLAC, 2005; 
Durán and Maldonado, 2005).
2. Convergence modalities
The problems arising from the multiplicity of agreements 
and rules in the region fall within three categories. The 
first involves operational matters, such as rules and 
procedures relating to customs, transit and storage of 
goods, where unfamiliarity with the necessary formalities 
or confusion over methods of application become disguised 
barriers to trade. The second has more to do with the 
rules and disciplines established in different agreements. 
Such rules and disciplines may exist in some accords 
but be absent from others (provisions on investment, 
services and intellectual property, for example). At the 
same time, they represent areas in which intraregional 
agreements lag behind those signed with countries outside 
the region. These agreements may contain different 
provisions regarding similar issues (national treatment) 
or may mandate different treatments for identical issues 
(negotiation or commitment models). 
Lastly, cases of discrimination may occur between 
trading partners (less favourable treatment), as a result 
of differences in terms of regulations, policies and 
the degree of liberalization between intraregional and 
extraregional agreements. In the latter case, differences 
of this sort tend to be greater. 
Recently, some countries in the region seem to be 
placing greater emphasis on trade relations with third 
countries. A very sharp asymmetry has also been observed 
between bilateral and plurilateral agreements within 
the region and those concluded with nations outside 
the region (especially countries of the North) because 
the extraregional agreements contain more demanding 
obligations, provide for more binding mechanisms 
and afford greater legal certainty than those existing 
at the subregional level. The latter, on the other hand, 
appear to be limited to less stringent trade and non-trade 
disciplines and rules. 
Above and beyond the predominant course being 
followed by integration strategies in the region, this 
situation draws attention to the need to facilitate higher 
levels of intraregional trade. Efforts must be made 
to ensure closer ties among members of subregional 
integration schemes and between the latter and their peer 
organizations (Andean Community/MERCOSUR/CACM/
CARICOM), as well as to strengthen trade linkages 
between individual members of the region.
These efforts must be geared towards generating a 
level of convergence that promotes greater compatibility 
between the different integration processes with a view 
to creating an integrated Latin American market. The 
term “convergence” refers to the process whereby the 
agreements concluded by countries of the region adopt 
more or less similar rules and disciplines. Convergence 
may be based on three approaches: voluntary, semi-
voluntary and involuntary (Stephanou, 2003) (see 
box IV.2). 
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Box IV.2
CONVERGENCE MODALITIES
Voluntary: This modality is widely 
applied in a number of economic activities. 
The simplest form of voluntary convergence 
is that used in financial markets. Several 
countries built into their own regulations the 
capital requirements for internationally active 
banks drawn up by the Basle Committee 
on Banking Supervision. In 1997, this 
Committee, which operates under the 
Bank of Basle, also developed the 25 Core 
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
These principles are not incorporated in 
any type of binding international legal 
instrument, but are adopted unilaterally by 
countries. The main incentive for adopting 
these Principles is that a country’s financial 
market is evaluated on the basis of the 
level of compliance therewith. This has 
been an effective mechanism for improving 
international banking supervision and 
reducing the risk of financial crises and 
their contagions. This voluntary international 
convergence modality is also used in the 
securities and insurance market and in 
standardization procedures. As a way of 
reducing technical barriers to trade, countries 
are advised to adopt on a unilateral basis 
standards formulated by international 
organizations, such as the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in 
the area of non-agricultural products and the 
International Electrotechnical Commission 
(IEC) for electrical and electronic products. 
In the case of agricultural products, the 
international organizations are the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission for food safety, 
established by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO), 
the International Epizootic Bureau for 
animal health and the Secretariat for the 
International Plant Protection Convention. 
Countries adopt the rules, guidelines and 
recommendations of these organizations 
voluntarily, thus providing a common scheme 
of regulation and basis for comparison. In 
adopting recommendations, countries may 
adapt them to their particular situations, 
but are expected to provide a rationale for 
such departures. Lastly, still in the interests 
of standardization, many countries adopt 
unilaterally a given rule applied in one 
country because it may be deemed the 
most appropriate. This occurs in many 
cases in fields such as electricity. 
Cooperation between government 
agencies responsible for the management 
of trade through the establishment of 
formal arrangements (memorandum of 
understanding) and informal arrangements 
(exchange of information) is often sufficient 
to encourage voluntary convergence. These 
types of arrangements are used in different 
spheres of action ranging from questions 
relating to trade in goods to cooperation 
in terms of competition policies. 
Semi-voluntary: in these cases, 
convergence is prompted by a country’s 
interest in securing a benefit from another 
which, in turn, makes the extension of the 
desired benefit subject to compliance with 
specific requirements. The most obvious 
example of semi-voluntary convergence 
is the conditionality linked to protection 
of the environment or certain labour 
rules that some countries have adopted 
in order to accede to the benefits of the 
Generalized System of Preferences. 
Again in the sphere of international 
finances, countries increasingly have 
to adopt domestic measures to comply 
with international recommendations on 
money-laundering in order to participate 
effectively in the international market. For 
example, the free trade agreements signed 
recently by various countries of the region 
with the United States and Europe have 
included commitments on the signing of 
certain intellectual property agreements. 
In addition, with respect to sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, the negotiation 
of mutual recognition and equivalency 
mechanisms depends on compliance with 
specific requirements on either side; not 
usually on unilateral compliance.
Non-voluntary: although a country’s 
accession to a given international agreement 
is by definition voluntary, in many cases, it 
calls for the adoption of a significant number 
of rules which require modification of its 
domestic legislation. This is the case of 
countries which, in applying for membership 
of the World Trade Organization, must 
bring their trade policies in line with the 
principles and obligations contained in 
the different agreements. This is a lengthy 
process that calls for a great effort in terms 
of regulatory changes. This is also the case 
of countries that join the European Union, 
which must introduce into their laws the 
acquis communautaire, in other words the 
entire set of laws and regulations governing 
the trade relations of its members. In both 
of the above cases, countries do not have 
the leeway to decide which obligations 
they wish to espouse and which they 
wish to reject. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Convergence can be encouraged and achieved in various 
ways, and the possible options should be examined in the 
light of the specific topics involved. A flexible approach 
that is conducive to creative solutions is called for. In the 
case of operational issues, convergence may be achieved 
through informal or formal arrangements for exchanging 
customs information, cutting red tape and reducing 
technical obstacles, ensuring unilateral recognition of 
security and safety measures, and harmonizing trade 
facilitation rules relating to transport and border or 
immigration inspections. 
The relevant countries could also try to come to 
an agreement on common interpretations of rules and 
disciplines. In cases where agreements contain the same 
provisions but with different wordings, their members could 
agree upon a particular way of interpreting the provision, 
in accordance, for example, with the interpretations used 
by WTO. This would help to ensure legal consistency 
between whatever provisions different bilateral and 
subregional agreements may have in common. If a given 
agreement does not include certain disciplines and rules, 
they should be adopted through negotiation, bearing in 
mind that different approaches may exist for their treatment 
and application. If intraregional integration agreements 
lag behind bilateral agreements with countries outside the 
region in adopting certain disciplines, then the tendency 
will be towards voluntary convergence, since there would 
be no economic or political justification for members of a 
subregional integration scheme to grant more favourable 
treatment to extraregional partners, or, for that matter, 
different treatment for the same issues. Thus, countries 
would be well advised to adopt a common approach and 
to grant each other the most favourable treatment possible 
in order to achieve more balanced regional integration. 
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Institution-building is a policy matter that must 
be decided by countries and integration subgroups. 
A modernizing approach to convergence support 
might perhaps be developed on the basis of existing 
institutions, in particular, to help countries to create 
trade facilitation mechanisms, establish facilities for 
information and analysis, and provide technical support 
for interpreting provisions, implementing agreements 
and settling disputes. 
One of the first intraregional convergence initiatives 
was adopted by the South American Community of 
Nations (SACN) in September 2005 by means of a 
mandate instructing the LAIA, MERCOSUR, the Andean 
Community and CARICOM16 secretariats to prepare 
studies on the convergence of agreements among South 
American countries in three specific areas: trade-related 
and complementary rules and disciplines; institutional 
rules; and treatment of asymmetries. The SACN mandate 
was based primarily on a 2004 LAIA resolution17 
recommending the adoption of measures for the gradual 
establishment of a free trade area for the members of 
this association. In this resolution, LAIA stressed the 
importance of harmonizing rules and disciplines contained 
in such agreements that are designed to promote greater 
market access, support for relatively less developed 
countries (RLDCs) and the promotion of other areas 
of integration, including physical and digital matters, 
trade financing and links with the business, labour and 
academic sectors of member countries.
As regards the convergence of rules and disciplines 
observed by South American countries, work on trade-related 
issues has focussed on rules of origin, trade protection, 
customs valuation and special trade regimes and non-tariff 
measures. The countries have also decided to work on 
convergence issues in agreements relating to investment, 
services, intellectual property, public procurement and 
competition policy. In order to promote institutional 
convergence, efforts should be directed towards reconciling 
and streamlining the consultative and decision-making 
structures of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR, 
as well as improving dispute settlement mechanisms. In 
dealing with the existing asymmetries, the emphasis is 
on ensuring that the relatively less developed countries 
in South America converge towards common patterns of 
economic growth and trade integration based on provisions 
covering special and differential treatment, guaranteed 
access to intraregional markets and complementarity and 
competitive development.
The SACN and LAIA initiative for promoting 
convergence among regional integration agreements is 
not confined to existing rules and institutions as set forth 
in each of the South American intraregional agreements, 
as it also encompasses agreements signed between South 
American countries and nations outside the region. This is 
particularly important because the coverage of extraregional 
agreements is greater in terms of commitments and includes 
disciplines that are underdeveloped or simply non-existent 
within the Andean Community and MERCOSUR.
E. Conclusions
The proliferation of FTAs in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in recent years may be attributed to a number 
of economic factors, the foremost being uncertainty 
regarding WTO negotiations (see chapter III of this 
report), stagnation of the regional integration process 
and the quest for opportunities for market and product 
diversification in bilateral negotiations with third parties. 
None of these trends can justifiably be interpreted as 
indicative of a lack of interest in regional integration, 
however. The future challenge in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and especially in South America, is to agree 
on a common diagnostic analysis of the shortcomings of 
existing integration schemes and to put forward proposals 
for modernizing them while accepting the diversity of trade 
strategies, preserving the gains achieved and facilitating 
the gradual convergence of the many agreements in 
existence. The work to be done in this area must be based 
on a realistic timetable and programme of work that reflect 
a recognition of the urgent need for a renewed regional 
integration process.
Regional integration is necessary and must be pursued 
as a matter of urgency. It is justified not only for the 
traditional reasons, but also because of the exigencies 
of the current phase of globalization, and in particular 
the need to forge strategic international partnerships in 
the areas of production, logistics, marketing, investment 
16
 With the participation of Chile, Guyana and Suriname.
17
 Resolution 59(XIII) of 18 October 2004 of the Council of Ministers of LAIA.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)92
and technology. The demand for competitiveness and 
technological innovation is mounting (chapter V), while 
China’s and India’s competitive leapfrogging has redrawn 
the global map of trade flows and comparative advantages 
(see chapter II). Expanded markets, legal certainty and 
convergence in rules and disciplines, together with advances 
in infrastructure, energy and connectivity, are prerequisites 
for growth with equity. 
In addition to the benefits to be derived from free 
trade, integration entails a gradual increase in cooperation 
in connection with macroeconomic variables and with 
policies and rules in non-trade areas, the most important 
being infrastructure, energy and regulatory spheres, as 
well as migration, social security, health, education and the 
environment. Europe provides examples of policies aimed 
at reducing economic asymmetries among its members, 
encouraging social cohesion in their societies and building 
community institutions that reflect the balanced interests 
of all its members. 
The present results of regional integration efforts are 
too far removed from the situation described above, and 
a pervasive climate of dissatisfaction seems to prevail. 
This dissatisfaction is more marked in South America, 
where what are at times repeated cases of non-compliance 
with agreed provisions erode the political credibility of 
integration efforts and legal certainty, deflecting would-be 
investors away from integration schemes. In the absence 
of effective means of dealing with existing asymmetries, 
the smaller countries do not feel that current integration 
arrangements offer the best framework for their economic 
growth and export diversification. 
Existing integration schemes do not satisfactorily 
address key competitiveness issues in such areas as services, 
investments, e-commerce, technological innovation, trade 
facilitation, logistics, and air and maritime transport. 
This is reflected in the positions that the countries of the 
region hold in international rankings in this area. Thus, 
these integration schemes are not fulfilling the roles that 
they were expected to perform at the outset, when it was 
thought that they would develop into effective learning 
platforms for exporting to third markets and serve as tools 
for negotiating important matters with the region’s main 
trading partners.
By contrast, the debate in Central America is quite 
different. Here a shifting geometric configuration prevails, 
with the integration process progressing at varying speeds 
and with countries willing to accept negotiations by member 
countries with third parties. In negotiating the Central 
American Free Trade Area (CAFTA), the Central American 
countries decided to apply the provisions that each had 
established with the United States among themselves; 
in so doing, they are seeking to modernize their own 
integration scheme, incorporating new commitments in 
services, investments and other spheres. Thus, they have 
been laying the groundwork for an expanded economic 
area, with common disciplines and with prospects for 
the formation of trade alliances to take advantage of the 
expansion of the Central American market and of access 
to the United States market. Central America has used 
its trade negotiations with the United States and, more 
recently, with the European Union to renew its integration 
process, persevering in its effort to forge better international 
linkages. The Caribbean, for its part, is strengthening its 
integration institutions in preparation for negotiations with 
the European Union.
In the absence of good news at the multilateral level or 
in the sphere of regional integration, it should come as no 
surprise that small and medium-sized countries are seeking 
free trade negotiations with industrialized economies such 
as the United States or the European Union in order to 
gain access to major markets. Within the region, 11 Latin 
American countries and 14 Caribbean economies ship 40% 
or more of their exports to the United States market, and it 
therefore makes economic and commercial sense for these 
countries to attempt to lock in and deepen stable access to 
that market. The debate in the United States Congress on 
foreign investment, Chinese manufactures and outsourcing 
reveals signs of protectionism; in this regard, bilateral 
agreements serve as a sort of insurance against the possible 
emergence of trade-averse situations. 
While accepting the existing differences in size and 
trade orientation, the achievements of the region’s integration 
processes must be preserved by promoting convergence in 
trade and non-trade issues (Rosales, 2006a). At the same 
time, of course, each integration scheme must take stock 
of its contributions to the growth and competitiveness of 
its member countries. 
Integration schemes must provide for closer ties with 
the private sector and strive to achieve greater congruence 
between that sector and public integration initiatives. This 
does not reduce the scope for action for public policies. 
On the contrary, it focuses policy measures on grappling 
with market and government failures and in building the 
necessary public-private partnerships, both of which are 
crucial to successful integration outcomes. 
In pursuing the creation of common areas of endeavour 
and the adoption of more flexible operating rules for 
integration schemes, the best option would be to promote 
policy convergence in the fields of energy and infrastructure 
before moving on to such areas as the environment, 
tourism, connectivity, information and communications 
technologies, e-commerce and regulatory practices. Given 
this plurality of options, bridges can be built among the 
different intraregional trade agreements so as to define a 
basic core of shared obligations based on flexible timetables, 
particularly for the smaller economies, in conjunction with 
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special infrastructure, trade facilitation and connectivity 
programmes that include the dimension of special and 
differential treatment. 
In order to achieve these objectives, maintaining the 
quality of the integration process is of crucial importance 
(Rosales, 2006b). This entails respecting differences, 
observing established procedures, incorporating flexibilities, 
understanding the interests of each country and their diversity 
in terms of economic and trade conditions, placing priority 
on consensus-building in areas where agreement will be 
the most meaningful, while bearing in mind the relevance 
of integration efforts and the need to bring them into line 
with the demands of today’s world. A joint assessment of 
the costs and of possible reciprocal concessions that could 
minimize them and help ensure their acceptance by the 
respective societies is a fundamental task for consensus-
building and for improving the quality of the region’s 
integration processes.
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Chapter V
Competitiveness, technological innovation 
and natural resources: the experiences of 
Australia and New Zealand
Introduction
Despite Latin America’s export boom and greater access to destination markets in recent 
years, the region has made limited progress in terms of competitiveness. In the long term, 
competitiveness is vital for ensuring the growth capacity of its economies, and in the short 
term it is crucial for taking advantage of the opportunities offered by free-trade agreements that 
facilitate the launch of additional products and ones with higher value-added in new markets. 
Increasing competitiveness is also a way of protecting the region’s position in the world market 
and coping with new global players and competitors such as China and India.
There is no single way of measuring competitiveness. 
The most direct way is to measure export performance 
on the basis of variables such as market share, per capita 
exports or technological content of export products. 
These variables, or indicators, show gains or losses 
in terms of positioning and foreign exchange, based 
on a country’s level of competitiveness. The World 
Economic Forum publishes another type of indicator 
related to factors that determine competitiveness: the 
latest Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 gives 
the Growth Competitiveness Index for 117 countries. 
The index is made up of technological indicators (linked 
to the capacity for innovation, technology transfer and 
adoption of free-trade agreements (FTAs)); strength of 
public institutions (formulation of laws and contracts, 
level of corruption and public spending efficiency); and 
indicators of macroeconomic stability and country risk. 
This set of variables is more comprehensive and integral 
than results-based indicators, and both sets are therefore 
used for the purposes of the analyses in this chapter.
Although all Latin American countries export raw 
materials to some extent, there were three identifiable 
export models during the 1990s: South American countries 
that were clearly oriented towards exports of raw materials 
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and natural-resource-based processed products; Mexico 
and Central America exporting assembled manufactures 
or maquila in electronics, automobiles, clothing and/or 
footwear; and lastly Caribbean countries that focused on 
service exports. This chapter concentrates on analysing 
competitivity in countries that export natural resources, 
and its conclusions are therefore especially relevant for 
those that fit the first export model (i.e., South American 
countries). 
The first section compares competitiveness indices 
for Latin America with the following six countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD): Australia, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway 
and Sweden. These countries have been selected on the 
basis of their current or recent status as major exporters 
of natural resources. 
A long-term view of trends in the region’s market 
share is not particularly encouraging. Latin America’s 
share of world imports plummeted dramatically during 
the second half of the last century, followed by a 
slow recovery from 1990 onward. The basic pillars 
underlying performance, as measured by the Growth 
Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, 
show that all Latin American countries (except Chile) 
are in the bottom half of the international ranking of 
117 countries. 
The same analysis, when applied to the six selected 
OECD countries, shows that they suffered less of a decline 
in the long term, while the Asian countries were the overall 
winners during the period. However, this phenomenon 
belies the fact that the selected countries have a much 
higher value of exports per capita than Latin American 
countries do, and that they are in a better position to face 
competition in the global market. Innovation strategies 
were vital for their growth and competitiveness. 
The second section of the chapter therefore describes 
the strategies of Australia and New Zealand, whose 
productive and export structures are similar to many South 
American countries’. Innovation has been the lynchpin of 
both countries’ development strategies and positioning in 
the world economy. This is because the innovation process 
is designed at the highest levels of government, brings 
together all stakeholders and benefits from financing at 
the local, regional and national levels. Their experiences 
can be of great use to Latin America, particularly at a time 
when many of its economies are experiencing significant 
booms in terms of trade, amidst discussions of how best 
to use these extra resources.
A. Competitiveness indicators
One of the challenges facing Latin American countries 
is recovering the position they occupied in world trade 
in the middle of the last century. At that time, over 10% 
of world imports came from Latin America (see table 
V.1). By 1990, when economic reforms were being 
implemented throughout the region, the region’s share 
had fallen to 3.6%. This was because the region failed 
to jump on the bandwagon in terms of higher technology 
products, and was also unable to cope with the rise of 
Asian countries, led by China, as they gained ground in 
the world market by stages.
By 2005, the region had recovered just over one 
percentage point, but a closer look reveals that this was 
largely thanks to Mexico and its rapid development of 
the assembly industry (electronics, automotive, clothing, 
footwear) for the United States market following the signing 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
Some of the other countries (mainly Brazil and Chile) 
increased their participation during the 1990s, while the 
remainder recorded very moderate progress. Over the entire 
1948-2005 period, the subregion that fared the worst was 
MERCOSUR, as its initially agricultural member countries 
were models of truncated industrialization throughout the 
previous century (Fajnzylber, 1983), with no significant 
advances in competitiveness. The same indicator of world 
market share shows that the Andean Community and the 
Central American Common Market registered a slight 
increase between 1990 and 2005, although this was not 
the case for Caribbean countries. These patterns can be 
explained by determinants of competitiveness described 
in the report of the World Economic Forum.
The indicator shows that, between 1948 and 2005, the 
selected OECD countries also lost world market share: a 
fall of 26% compared with the 52% lost by Latin America. 
The former group lost out despite some countries’ major 
efforts to diversify into technology-intensive products 
(Finland, Ireland and Sweden) and add value to natural 
resources (Australia and New Zealand).
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Per capita export value indicates what a country receives 
in current dollars in relation to its population, which in some 
way serves to correct the export indicator in accordance 
with country size. In Latin America, per capita exports in 
2005 represented US$ 1,100, which is almost triple the 
amount recorded in 1990, following a pattern similar to 
that of the six OECD countries (table V.1, columns 4 and 
5). Although this growth has not been enough to recover 
the market share lost up until 1990, the improvement is 
considerable given that all the region’s countries posted 
increases (with the largest rises recorded in Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, El Salvador and Mexico). It should, however, 
be borne in mind that performance was influenced by 
petroleum and copper prices in 2005. The case of Brazil 
is especially noteworthy as the country managed to revert 
the marked domestic-oriented approach that had prevailed 
until the 1980s.
These results seem less positive when compared with 
those for the six OECD countries, whose average per 
capita export value is almost 12 times higher than for Latin 
America (reaching US$ 14,600 in 2005). Those countries 
with greater technological content and diversification in 
their exports (such as Finland, Ireland and Sweden) have 
particularly high figures. The performance of Ireland is 
particularly interesting, as it multiplied its export value by 
a factor of five. Also, the per capita exports of Australia and 
New Zealand are five and six times higher (respectively) 
than in Latin America. This leads to the conclusion that, 
although specializing in natural resources may have limited 
these countries’ positioning on the world market, their 
performance was nonetheless far superior to that of Latin 
American economies based on such resources. The same 
is true of oil-rich Norway, compared with a country such 
as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. This suggests 
that Latin America does have development potential, 
and that it is linked to the incorporation of knowledge, 
innovation and value-added. 
Table V.1 also includes an indicator of the level of 
commodity concentration of countries’ exports. This 
indicator is the result of multiplying the Herfindahl index 
by the proportion of exports represented by raw materials 
and processed products based on natural resources (see 
column 8 of table V.1 and figure V.1). This shows how 
vulnerable countries are to the volatile nature of international 
prices. A high value for the indicator points to a greater 
impact of volatility. Given the distribution of values in 
the sample, an index of 0.10 or above indicates high 
vulnerability.1 This high vulnerability affects countries of 
the Andean Community and CARICOM, and others such 
as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Paraguay. As for OECD countries, Norway 
is the most vulnerable, while Australia and New Zealand, 
despite the high proportion of raw materials in their exports, 
have a high level of diversification so they do not depend 
so heavily on a single product (like copper in Chile or oil 
for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).
Figure V.1
INDICATOR OF VULNERABILITY TO COMMODITY PRICE SHOCKS
1
 For Latin America, the indicator ranges from 0.02 to 0.78, with an average of 0.13. For the OECD countries, the indicator ranges from 0 to 0.32, 
with an average of 0.07. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the United Nations Commodity Trade Database 
(COMTRADE) and official country information.
Indicators of the proportion of manufactures within total 
exports (table V.1, columns 9 and 10) show the different 
patterns of manufacturing exports from the Southern Cone 
compared with those from Mexico and Central America 
(where manufacturing linked to the maquila industry has 
mushroomed in the last 15 years). Mexico turned in the 
best performance, with almost 80% of its exports coming 
from non-natural-resource-based manufactures. Among 
the OECD countries, Ireland has become an almost 
exclusive exporter of high-technology manufactures, and 
Australia and New Zealand have made slower progress 
while specializing in processed raw materials. 
A couple of simple regressions were carried out in 
order to illustrate the effects of export development on a 
fundamental economic variable such as per capita income. 
The sole aim of the exercise is to ascertain the level of 
correlation between the variables. The first regression 
is between the logarithm of per capita income and the 
logarithm of per capita exports, with the constant and the 
slope corrected by a fictitious variable representing the degree 
of industrialization. Heteroscedasticity was corrected using 
White’s method, and the coefficients of per capita exports and 
degree of industrialization are highly significant, while the 
resulting correlation is 0.89 (0.88 for adjusted R2) —which 
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environment and technological factors. Also worthy of 
note is the fact that the indices are not weighted in the 
same way for all countries. The innovation index is 
more heavily weighted for Finland than for any of the 
Latin American countries, which in turn have a higher 
weighting for technology transfer. It should be borne in 
mind that the indicators do not provide rankings that are 
truly comparable over time, since the methodology is 
revised every year. 
The growth competitiveness index for 2005 shows 
that almost all Latin American countries rank below 54th 
position (see figure V.3), i.e., among the least competitive 
of the 117 countries in question. Chile constitutes the 
exception, as it stands at number 23, above Ireland (best 
export performance between 1990 and 2005 among 
the selected OECD countries). Figure V.3 also shows 
technological readiness, which is the index of countries’ 
position in terms of their technological advances and 
innovation capacity. Finland is in first position among the 
selected OECD countries (ranking second in the world 
as a whole), followed by Sweden and Norway. Australia 
and New Zealand rank 14th and 18th, while Chile stands 
at number 35.
Figure V.2
RESULT OF REGRESSION BETWEEN PER CAPITA
EXPORTS AND PER CAPITA INCOME
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Lastly, the same exercise was carried out using the 
participation of each country’s exports within world imports 
(i.e., its market share) as the independent variable. The 
results were less compelling (R2 = 0.54), but the result is 
positive considering that only two variables are correlated. 
The conclusion drawn from these exercises is that the 
degree of integration into the world economy, as measured 
by the per capita export value or participation in world 
trade, helps to explain the variance of per capita income 
in a cross-sectional sample. This implies that it constitutes 
a significant component of income differentiation. 
So far, we have analysed variables that are a result 
of the competitiveness achieved by the countries of the 
region. However, this in itself is a complex phenomenon 
determined by a number of different elements. One 
of the indices that encompasses the largest number of 
institutional, technological and economic factors is the 
index calculated by the World Economic Forum. The 
Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006 gives the 
Growth Competitiveness Index for 117 countries (see 
table V.2).
This exercise is interesting because it groups together 
determinants of national productivity linked to the business 
Table V.2
COMPOSITION OF THE GROWTH COMPETITIVENESS INDEX
Growth 
Competitiveness  Subindices Source of information
Index
Technology index Innovation  Survey
  Patents in United States
  University enrolment rate
 Technology transfer  Survey
 Information and communication  Survey
 technology (ICT)  Hard data
Public institutions Contracts and law  Survey
index  Corruption  Survey
 Government waste variable Survey
Macroeconomic  Macroeconomic stability Government surplus/deficit
environment index  National savings rate
  Inflation
  Real effective exchange rate
  Interest rate spread
  Government debt
 Country risk Hard data
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, 
New York, Oxford University Press, 2006.
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Figure V.3
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Source:  World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2005-2006, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 2006.
a
  The indices show each country’s position in the world ranking of 117 countries. 
Finland ranks first overall.
The indicators analysed definitely lead to the conclusion 
that Latin America is performing well below its potential. 
Countries such as Australia and New Zealand with similar 
productive structures achieve per capita exports and 
income five or six times higher than the regional average 
in Latin America. The positive performance of countries 
like Australia and New Zealand is linked to, inter alia, 
their institutional stability, good quality policies and the 
competitiveness and international integration strategies 
that are analysed below. Finland, Ireland and Sweden have 
come even further, and their situation is fairly different 
from that of Latin American countries. Their experiences 
will be studied in more detail in the next edition of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the World Economy.
B. Australia and New Zealand: innovation strategies
 aimed at increasing competitiveness
Australia and New Zealand are small open economies 
with high levels of per capita income and low inequality 
indices. As two of the world’s most developed countries, 
they are both incorporated into the world economy thanks 
to exports based on natural resources (mineral, forestry, 
agricultural, agro-industrial and fish). In the case of these 
two countries, specializing in natural resources has served 
growth and development, partly thanks to the way in which 
the export sector is linked to the rest of the economy and 
a strategy based around innovation. 
Table V.3
BASIC INDICATORS FOR AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND SELECTED LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIES
  Population Per capita Gini Inflation Exports Average growth
 Km2 2005 income 2004 coefficient a 2005 2005 1990-2005
  (thousands)  (US$)  (percentages)  (percentages)  (US$ billions)  (percentages)
Australia 7 686 850 20 264 27 070 35.2 2.7 103 3.3
New Zealand 268 680 4 076 19 990 36.2 3.0 22 2.9
       
Argentina 2 766 890 38 592 3 580 52.2 12.3 40 3.6
Brazil 8 511 965 187 597 3 000 62.1 5.7 118 2.5
Costa Rica 51 100 4 322 4 470 49.3 14.1 7 4.7
Colombia 1 138 910 46 039 2 020 53.8 4.9 22 2.9
Chile 756 950 16 267 5 220 55.6 3.7 41 5.7
Mexico 1 972 550 106 147 6 790 52.4 3.3 214 3.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures provided by the countries’ statistical institutes; ECLAC databases; 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Main Economic Indicators Database [online]; and World Bank, World Economic Indicators Database 
[online].
a
  Coefficient calculated by countries in different years. Calculations based on most recent figures available.
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Innovation strategies are closely linked to the 
strengthening of international trade and the integration 
of businesses into the world market. This is due to the 
small size of the local markets, and manifests itself in 
outward-looking government programmes and private-
sector activities. Innovation is considered a more complex 
process than scientific and technological research. Inventions 
become innovations when they are commercialized and 
acquire value. Private enterprise is therefore the key 
to transforming invention into innovation, hence the 
importance of the partnership between academia and 
the business world.
Innovation is not always synonymous with invention, and 
companies depend initially on the imitation and adaptation 
of technology. However, there comes a stage in countries’ 
development when they must rely heavily on research 
and development to defend their place in the international 
market and increase their competitiveness. This is a time 
of productivity and competitiveness advances, which in 
turn generate considerable increases in R&D spending as 
a proportion of GDP and in innovation incentives.
Australia and New Zealand appear to be in this stage 
of development and therefore benefit from the joint efforts 
of their public officials, scientists, public and private 
research centres, universities, technology institutes and 
business associations. The work of all these stakeholders 
is guided by a vision that establishes targets, policies and 
programmes with concrete incentives that are constantly 
assessed to avoid distortions and the generation of income 
not associated with productivity increases. There is also 
an across-the-board commitment to use policies and other 
instruments to develop partnerships between the public, 
private and academic sectors to ensure that cooperation 
between these various actors and organizations serves to 
boost innovation efforts.
This proactive attitude manifests itself in public sector 
investment in R&D infrastructure and research platforms, 
as well as in incentives for participation in international 
networks and specific incentives targeted at the private 
sector and academia. For the private sector, incentives are 
aimed at creating innovation capacity within firms and 
establishing institutions that support the dissemination 
of technology. Companies therefore benefit from tax 
incentives for research and development and subsidies 
for entrepreneurial, commercialization and international 
marketing activities. Countries that have gone beyond 
imitating foreign technology and that therefore need to 
boost R&D to speed up the innovation process —such as 
Australia and New Zealand— then increase government 
funding of research carried out by public and private centres 
of excellence. Private centres of excellence receive grants 
and subsidies, which are also awarded to universities. 
Incentives have also been created to link scientific research 
with the needs of industry, as discussed below. 
1. Strategy of innovation for competitiveness
One of the main features of Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
innovation strategies is that they are devised as part of a 
general strategy of growth and improving the standard of 
living of their inhabitants. They are not isolated strategies 
with no link to the competitiveness policies implemented 
by sectoral ministries, and the resulting programmes 
commit the government as a whole, involve all ministries 
and are formulated in commissions chaired by the most 
senior public authorities. 
Australia’s current strategy is called “Backing 
Australia’s Ability – Building Our Future through Science 
and Innovation”,2 which is based on the recognition of 
ideas, scientific and technical knowledge and skills as the 
cornerstones of economic and social progress. Since 2002, 
New Zealand has been implementing the “Growth and 
Innovation Framework” (GIF) strategy,3 also known as 
“Growth Through Innovation”. The strategy is designed to 
achieve sustainable growth and improve the population’s 
standard of living in the long term.
Although Australia and New Zealand do not have 
the same institutions or organizations, their strategies 
share some features. First, efforts to encourage public and 
private collaboration with academia by means of special 
programmes and policies are common to both. Second, 
the strategies of both countries include incentives (in the 
form of substantial public resources) for increasing private 
spending on innovation and bringing academia and industry 
closer together. Research and development is a fundamental 
element of the strategies (albeit not the only one), and 
innovation is understood as a multidimensional process 
that plays out across a variety of systems, business models 
and strategies, markets, clients and value networks.
2
 For further information on this strategy, see website http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/.
3
 New Zealand, Ministry of Economic Development (2005). 
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The strategy “Backing Australia’s Ability”, for instance, 
is based on the premise that innovation does not occur in a 
vacuum, but rather requires support and a structure of incentives 
to facilitate the dissemination of ideas and the development, 
creation and successful commercialization of the final product. 
The strategy is therefore implemented through a series of 
grants for the generation of new ideas, commercialization, 
skill-building and training. The funding amounts to 
AU$ 5.3 billion for 2006-2011, which is the equivalent of 
US$ 4 billion, or total government expenditure on science 
and innovation in 2005 (1.7% of GDP) (Government of 
Australia, 2004b).4 This follows on from the AU$ 3 billion 
strategy implemented between 2001 and 2004. Combined with 
other science and innovation programmes, the Government 
is demonstrating its commitment to this policy by increasing 
innovation funding by 25% a year.
Both countries’ strategies recognize that business 
innovation is the core factor in productivity growth and 
improved economic performance, hence the importance 
of strengthening the networks that link businesses with the 
scientific community. In New Zealand, where private-sector 
participation in innovation expenditure is considerably 
lower than the OECD average, there is a special stimulus 
programme within firms, in addition to efforts to strengthen 
international connections and networks. According to the 
most recently published statistics, New Zealand invested 
US$ 1.0 billion on such purposes in 2005 (about 1.16% of 
GDP): 61.5% was public funding and 38.5% private-sector 
finance. Although private spending has been below the OECD 
average, it nonetheless increased by 29% between 2002 
and 2004 (Statistics New Zealand, 2004). Total expenditure 
was supplemented by contributions in the context of the 
“Growth Through Innovation” strategy, which amounted 
to NZ$ 169 million (US$ 108 million) (New Zealand, 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology, 2005). These 
funds were mainly used to strengthen networks between 
firms and link firms with international value chains and 
innovation in models for business, learning and training 
in commercialization and marketing. 
The pace of technological change and market 
dynamics have forced Australia and New Zealand to devise 
policies aimed at developing new industries and activities. 
In this sense, innovation strategies not only support 
mature natural-resource-based sectors but also attempt 
to develop new areas. There are two sectors that are “up 
and coming” in both countries: information technology 
and biotechnology. Both types of activity boost and add 
value to natural resources while also seeking out new 
areas. Australia currently has the advantage in terms of 
biotechnology advances in agro-industry and mining, and 
intends to achieve similar progress in pharmaceuticals, 
health and the environmental industry. New Zealand is 
more involved with developing creative industries on the 
basis of the potential of an existing group of enterprises, 
with positive results achieved to date. Support for such 
industries is crucial, especially given their growing 
importance at the international level.
Growth and innovation strategies also have their regional 
and sectoral expressions, like the National Food Industry 
Strategy in Australia, which aims to help processed food 
exports tap into top markets worldwide.5 Australia has 
developed special programmes to generate value added 
in wool, meat, cereals, manufacturing niches, the food 
and beverage industry, life sciences, textiles, clothing and 
footwear. Both countries have also launched programmes 
to create new biotechnology and IT industries (particularly 
in creative industries in New Zealand). 
In Latin America, by contrast, most countries lack a 
national innovation strategy to link industry, sector and 
cluster needs with academia by means of programmes, 
policies and incentives. However, the more agriculturally 
developed countries are strengthening their sectoral 
innovation systems in response to demand and the need 
to reduce costs. This has forced them to incorporate their 
own technological advances driven by the private sector, 
the public sector or more recently specific public-private 
partnerships. Brazil provides a good example of such 
cases (see box V.1).
4
 The exchange rate at the time of publication was one Australian dollar to 0.756 United States dollars.
5
 See http://www.nfis.com.au/.
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Box V.1
INCORPORATING TECHNOLOGY INTO AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: THE CASE OF BRAZIL
According to figures from the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), Brazil is the world’s third 
largest exporter of agro-food products 
after the United States and the European 
Union. Over the last 15 years, the value 
of Brazilian agro-food exports has tripled. 
This production and export boom was 
made possible thanks to a series of factors, 
including the expansion of the agricultural 
land area and the incorporation of significant 
technological advances in terms of inputs, 
primary production and the processing of 
agricultural products.
The agro-food sector is increasingly 
turning to science and technology in all 
areas, from input production to the marketing 
of final products, including agricultural and 
livestock production, industrial processing, 
services included with products, industrial 
organization, packaging, transport and 
logistics. The technologies used, whether 
they were developed internally or externally, 
have diversified considerably in recent 
years (Rodrigues, 2002). This process has 
included internal innovations but also the 
incorporation of technologies developed 
in other sectors, particularly chemical and 
mechanical industries and, more recently, 
microelectronics and biotechnology. 
The computerization of all stages of 
the agro-food production chain, including 
satellite positioning and tracking, has resulted 
in significant increases in productivity. Other 
major advances in agricultural inputs include 
biotechnology development of transgenic 
plant varieties that are most resistant and/or 
produce greater yields, the use of biodiesel 
and biological pest and disease control. 
Progress in food processing has included 
research into ingredient fractionation and 
food reconstitution, new techniques for 
preserving fresh foods and developing 
“nutraceutical” products that benefit health 
by combating or preventing disease. 
These advances in input and agricultural 
production and agro-industrial processing 
are integrated and have required the 
implementation of a series of innovations 
at the distribution and commercialization 
stages. Many innovations in various stages 
of the agro-food production chain are 
therefore interdependent. 
The large-scale use of external 
technologies and the coming together of 
different scientific disciplines to generate 
technical advances make the agro-food 
sector a catalyst for interaction between 
industries and services that develop 
cutting-edge technology. This interaction 
is constantly being strengthened through 
a complex network of functional links 
between agriculture, services of input 
production, agro-industrial processing, 
services and other technology-generating 
industries (Ribeiro, 2000). The network 
involves both public and private agents 
that develop agro-food technologies, and 
the participation of the private sector in 
particular has increased considerably in 
recent years.
Public-private agreements usually 
arise in specific areas of work or, in the 
case of more general issues, if and when 
national research institutes have reached 
a standard of international excellence. 
Brazil is probably Latin America’s best 
example of recent growth in the area 
of public-private alliances for agro-food 
sector research. In the soybean sector, 
for instance, the Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Enterprise (EMBRAPA) and 
Monsanto have an agreement on the latter’s 
“Roundup Ready” genes and technology for 
transforming soya from EMBRAPA-owned 
germplasm assets. The partnership has 
resulted in a variety of “Roundup Ready” 
soya adapted to the local market. Monsanto 
intends to sell the modified soya through 
its distributor network, while EMPBRAPA 
will receive royalties from sales (Silveira 
and Borges, 2005).
The scientific community in Brazil 
has also become internationally renowned 
in the last decade for its significant 
contributions to biotechnology, such as 
the genome project of the State of São 
Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). 
One of the main outcomes of the project 
was the identification of the genetic code 
for xylella fastidiosa bacteria that cause 
disease in the country’s citrus production 
industry (Pray, 2001). The private sector was 
also involved through the Fund for Citrus 
Plant Protection (FUNDECITRUS), an 
organization representing citrus companies, 
although its financial contribution to the 
project was minimal.
Following the successful sequencing 
of the xylella bacteria, the genome project 
went on to research the genetic code of 
sugar cane, this time with the participation 
of the Cooperative of Sugar Cane, Sugar 
and Alcohol Producers of the State of São 
Paulo (Coopersucar) (Silveira and Borges, 
2005). This project marked a turning 
point in the technological development 
of sugar and ethanol production in Brazil, 
as it revealed 90% of sugarcane genes 
to researchers. This has enabled them to 
develop transgenic varieties resistant to 
disease and drought, with greater yields, 
adapted to the conditions of certain producer 
regions or even with special characteristics 
such as higher sucrose content. The latter 
development results in greater ethanol 
yields per cultivated area of sugarcane, and 
was achieved in response to the current 
trend of seeking alternative and renewable 
energy sources in the face of soaring oil 
prices (FAPESP, 2006).
The genome project and biotechnology 
research in Brazil have tended to focus on the 
country’s main agricultural export products: 
oranges, sugar, ethanol, soybean, tropical 
fruits and, more recently, beef. The need to 
compete on international markets that are 
subject to a series of price distortions and 
trade barriers puts pressure on research 
institutes and companies to achieve 
greater yields and reduce production costs. 
Furthermore, new patterns of demand are 
dictating a series of innovations in terms 
of the quality, presentation and special 
processing characteristics of agricultural 
raw materials and final products.
In the sugar and ethanol chain, for 
instance, innovations are not limited to 
primary production but include various 
stages of industrial processing and 
the extension of the use of ethanol in 
the automobile industry through the 
development of flex fuel cars (Dias and 
Galina, 2000; Quadros, Consoni and 
Quintão, 2005). This has placed Brazil 
at the forefront of research in this sector, 
with the generation of totally national 
technologies patented internationally. The 
public sector clearly dominates this process, 
while the private sector collaborates in 
specific stages, more in terms of the 
dissemination of new technologies than 
in financing research.
Despite these impressive advances, 
the dissemination of technology throughout 
all parts of the agro-food production chain 
and, even more so, among the various 
agents involved in these stages continues 
to be an issue (FAO, 2004). The access that 
small-scale producers have to technology 
developed by and/or for corporate agriculture 
is restricted by the following factors: limited 
resources, technology ill-adapted to the 
needs of these producers, low levels of 
education and information, etc. The limited 
dissemination of available technology 
obviously has a strong impact on levels 
of productivity in developing countries, 
which tend to be far below the average in 
developed countries.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the Agricultural Development Unit.
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(a) Institutions
The innovation systems in Australia and New Zealand 
involve the ministries of education, science and technology, 
agriculture, industry, health, economic development and 
tourism. The ministries have departments, corporations 
and centres of excellence responsible for researching and 
implementing innovation policies and programmes, in 
addition to centralized and regional fund administration.
As far as academia is concerned, universities, their 
research centres and independent institutes are actively 
involved. Companies participate through technological 
centres linked to trade associations and corporate research 
departments. In addition to those people directly involved 
in science and innovation, there are a large number of 
governmental and non-governmental organizations that 
facilitate the processes involved by means of policy 
coordination, fund administration and regulation of 
intellectual property rights and the system in general.
In these systems, companies are important but academia 
is even more vital as its capacity to create new knowledge 
and transfer it to companies enables it to sow the very 
seeds of change. The State therefore makes serious efforts 
to establish links for research- and innovation-oriented 
cooperation between scientists of various universities, 
independent research centres and companies, productive 
sectors or clusters. This tends to build trust and create 
incentives for collaboration. 
The density of the networks and the close links forged 
between those involved make for a national innovation 
system with a dynamic structure in which new entities appear 
while others are eliminated, institutions are strengthened 
by experience and learning and networks are strengthened 
and modified in keeping with the challenges and priorities 
of the national innovation strategy. While Australia has 
recently placed much emphasis on sectoral entities such 
as Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) and Research 
and Development Corporations (RDCs), New Zealand has 
prioritized the stimulation of innovation in public research 
centres and consortia linking industry and universities.
(b) Research and development (R&D)
R&D performance can be measured in relation to 
spending by those involved, but also on the basis of its 
results. Spending on R&D and its implementation in 
Australia and New Zealand is below the OECD average, 
which is partly due to the fact that the production structure 
is closely linked to primary sectors and partly attributable 
to innovating consisting of imitation and adaptation of 
technology. However, they seem to be catching up in 
terms of all indicators, including private-sector spending 
and implementation. Data from 2003 suggests that this 
has reduced the involvement of public institutions in 
investment, a trend in keeping with the OECD average. 
Indeed, in the last 12 years, private-sector financing of 
research and development has grown by 7.7 percentage 
points in Australia and almost 10 percentage points in 
New Zealand. Private-sector involvement has increased 
in response to government incentives and a greater 
awareness of the importance of innovation for maintaining 
competitiveness in the increasingly fierce battle for market 
share. The quest for “novelty” as part of diversification 
implies ever increasing expenditure on innovation. 
Table V.4
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND OECD: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS
 Australia New Zealand OECD Total
 1990 2002 1990 2003 1990 2002 2003
R&D expenditure as percentage of GDP 1.3 1.7 1.0 1.2 2.3 2.2 2.3
Total number of researchers per 1,000 employees 5.5 7.8 4.1 10.2 5.9 8.3 ..
Percentage of R&D expenditure financed by companies 41.1 48.8 29.3 38.5 57.8 62.5 61.8
Percentage of R&D expenditure financed by Government 54.9 42.4 60.3 45.1 36.8 29.6 30.4
Percentage of expenditure implemented by companies 40.2 51.2 28.2 42.5 68.6 67.8 67.7
Percentage of expenditure implemented by universities 25.5 26.7 27.9 28.5 14.4 17.3 17.4
Percentage of expenditure implemented by public institutions 32.6 19.3 43.9 28.9 14.7 12.3 12.3
R&D expenditure in higher education as percentage of GDP  0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators, 2006 [on-line] http://www.sourceoecd.org/rpsv/
statistic/s20_about.htm?jnlissn=16081242.
In terms of analysis of the indicator results, figure V.4 
shows that Australia is above the OECD average in 10 out 
of 15 indicators, including publication of scientific and 
technical articles, higher education, number of science 
graduates in the work force and number of researchers 
in the labour force, foreign affiliates in R&D, Internet 
usage, investment in new equipment and international 
scientific collaboration.6 Although Australia is below the 
OECD average in terms of patents, the cost of each patent 
(reflecting effectiveness of dollars spent) is lower than in 
Sweden, Finland and Norway. The same applies to New 
Zealand (see Machinea and Vera (2006)).
6
 For further information, see http://backingaus.innovation.gov.au/.
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Figure V.5 shows a set of indicators that enables us 
to compare New Zealand’s innovation capacity with the 
OECD average. For indicators such as level of patenting, 
R&D expenditure, private financing and availability of 
risk capital, New Zealand is below the OECD average. 
On the other hand, the country is above average in terms 
of the number of scientific and technical publications, 
implementation of projects financed by the private 
sector, higher education and innovation in services and 
manufacturing (Williams, 2005).
Figure V.4
INNOVATION INDICATORS, AUSTRALIA, 2004
(OECD average = 100)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Government of Australia, “Backing Australia’s 
Ability - Building Our Future Through Science and Innovation”, 2004. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Julian Williams, “Frameworks for horizontal innovation policy in New Zealand”, 
Governance of Innovation Systems: Case Studies in Innovation Policy, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), vol. 2, Paris, 2005.
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(c) Centres of excellence
Much of the R&D in Australia and New Zealand is 
carried out by public-sector centres of excellence, which 
house a critical mass of scientists, train new professionals 
and provide industry with knowledge and services through 
their increasingly sophisticated departments of applied 
research. 
One of the main examples in Australia is the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research 
Organisation (CSIRO), one of the world’s top research 
agencies with subject area coverage including all primary 
sectors and industry.7 CSIRO has 6,500 scientists and 
ranks in the top one per cent of world scientific institutions 
in 12 of 22 research fields. It is also ranked sixth for 
animal, plant and agricultural sciences and eighth in 
environmental sciences. The work of CSIRO is based on 
the six national research priorities: light metals, preventive 
health, wealth from oceans, water for a healthy country, 
food futures and energy transformed. 
New Zealand has the Crown Research Institutes (CRIs)8 
that implement a third of R&D investment, much of which 
is intended to add value to natural resources. CRIs carry 
out basic research and applied science and technology 
research and development for commercial purposes. Their 
clients include central and local government and private 
sector markets in New Zealand and abroad. 
A common feature of these organizations is that their 
researchers work closely with businessmen (in small-scale 
farming, manufacturing and mining) and forge scientific 
research partnerships with universities. They are grouped by 
science and technology subject areas, which change according 
to sectoral demands. The current missions of such centres are 
to ensure the sustainability and profitability of production 
chains and to establish a biotechnology system to add value 
by creating biotechnology products for export. 
2. Entities that facilitate collaboration between companies
 and academia
In Australia, much of the innovation system is made up 
of entities that facilitate collaboration between business 
stakeholders, public research institutes and academia.9 
They are known as Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) 
and Research and Development Corporations (RDCs). 
New Zealand has recently established a similar, albeit 
less advanced, initiative which is being implemented by 
a number of research consortia.
Australia’s Research and Development Corporations 
(RDCs)10 were created by the public sector in the 1990s 
to facilitate innovation in rural areas, which were 
considered a priority for the country’s development. 
Although RDCs are public bodies attached to sector 
ministries, farmers also participate in their management 
and financing through associations and the formation 
of R&D companies. An important part of the funding 
is provided by a levy collected from companies in each 
industry.11 The State matches the contribution it levies 
from companies, and the funds are then invested by the 
RDCs. Public-private collaboration is therefore clearly 
an important requirement for the effective functioning 










 The sectors in which the private sector makes contributions to innovation are: forestry and wood, fishing, grape and wine industry, crops and 
cereals, new rural industries, as well as a public initiative for the sustainable use of land and water. 
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Box V.2
ORGANIZATIONS FOSTERING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION FOR INNOVATION
Rural Industries Research and Development 
Corporations include members from 
businesses big and small (RIRDC, 2005). 
Their administrators and committees of 
advisors identify R&D priorities, contract 
or commission researchers, manage 
the portfolio of projects and then deliver 
the results to industry, communities 
and the government in the form of 
publications, products and services. To 
guarantee a return on innovation, these 
corporations have paid special attention to 
managing intellectual property rights while 
disseminating technological advances and 
new processes. In this sense, RDCs act 
as innovation transfer centres, hence their 
interest in communication strategies as a 
means of bringing new developments to 
industry, thereby immediately reducing 
costs. They achieve this through workshops, 
field tests, websites, publications, 
reviews, newsletters, and formal and 
informal communication networks in 
each industry.











• to create 
opportunity














Source:  Rural Industries Research and Development Corporation (www.rirdc.gov.au).
As for the Cooperative Research 
Centres (CRCs) in Australia, their 
programmes have a renewable duration 
of seven years. CRCs are limited 
liability companies run by a council of 
representatives from member organizations 
(companies, trade associations, universities 
and centres of excellence). In order to 
determine the State’s contribution to 
the centre, CRCs are supervised at the 
governmental level by a council that 
assesses whether the programme will 
be continued, on the basis of indicators 
such as number of patents applied for, 
income from research or consultancy 
carried out for industry, and income from 
companies established as a result of 
projects. In newer centres or those with 
unquantifiable impact, this assessment is 
carried out by external consultants (Allen 
Consulting Group Pty Ltd., 2005).
In New Zealand, Research Consortia 
were created in 2002 in the same vein 
as the Australian Cooperative Research 
Centres (CRCs) to link industry with 
academia through the implementation 
of research projects of mutual interest. 
The State cofinances 50% of investment 
for five years, a period that be extended 
if the assessment proves positive. The 
areas covered by cofinancing are: quality 
control in primary production, sustainable 
production systems, biological services 
and product niches, food innovation, 
high-value manufacturing processes, 
knowledge-intensive services, optimization 
of physical use of infrastructure and the 
sustainability of technological development 
in New Zealand. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of G. Moguillansky, “Australia y Nueva Zelandia, dos ejemplos de competitividad con 
innovación”, Comercio Internacional series, No. 72 (LC/L.2564-P), Santiago, Chile. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), June 2006.
In Australia, Cooperative Research Centres (CRCs) 
were also set up in the 1990s to increase the effectiveness 
of public contributions to research and development by 
providing linkages between businesses and researchers. 
Unlike Research and Development Corporations (RDCs), 
CRCs cover all economic activities and sectors but only 
those research institutions and groups of companies 
that take the initiative to make progress in an area of 
innovation. Another difference is that CRCs provide for 
a direct link between companies and academia (see box 
V.2). In 2004, there were 72 programmes in the following 
6 sectors: environment, agriculture, information and 
communications, mining, medical science and technology 
and manufacturing. One of the main achievements of CRCs 
is the boost they provide to the usage, commercialization 
and transfer of technology. 
New Zealand currently has 10 Research Consortia, 
which are associated with many more companies and 
research centres (such as Crown Research Institutes 
(CRIs)), universities and even foreign organizations. Their 
aim is to increase the critical mass of research capability, 
which will in turn increase the chances of success at the 
commercialization stage. The Government assesses how 
the project is developing after one year to see whether it 
needs to provide assistance.
For Latin American countries, the experiences of 
Australia and New Zealand in this area can be most 
valuable. The idea is not to copy their models, but discover 
how they work and their advantages, while learning from 
the various forms of association. It is well known that 
participation in networks linking efforts, knowledge and 
initiatives is vital for innovation, especially for small 
and medium-sized enterprises that can accomplish little 
in isolation. Let us take the example of agricultural 
innovation: although a public institute or university can 
carry out the basic scientific research, businesses are 
more likely to need applied research. One company does 
not have the critical mass necessary to negotiate with 
universities or public institutes. These R&D corporations 
are therefore exceptionally useful in successfully linking 
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and coordinating the requirements of large corporate 
groups to constitute a critical mass for innovation, in 
addition to disseminating innovation among all those 
involved in a way that either generates across-the-board 
modernization (for innovative productive processes) or 
contributes to commercialization on the world market 
(in the case of new products). It should be borne in 
mind that, as far as R&D corporations are concerned, 
innovation, as such, does not actually take place until 
the product is sold on the market, hence the importance 
of commercialization and marketing within innovation 
policy (see box V.3). 
3. Funds for business innovation
The innovation systems in Australia and New Zealand include 
programmes and funds used for the various requirements of 
companies: R&D, start-up, commercialization of products, 
technology and services, innovation development in small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and incentives to 
join international networks.
(a) Financing for companies
Both countries’ innovation budgets are significantly 
increasing the funds available for encouraging company 
research and innovation. In New Zealand, for instance, 40% 
of the innovation budget is targeted at directly productive 
Box V.3
INNOVATION IN THE AUSTRALIAN WINE INDUSTRY
Australia ranks fourth in the world wine 
market and first among the so-called 
New World countr ies (Chile being 
second). The figure below shows the 
options analysed by the Australian 
wine industry during the 1990s, when 
it quickly chose to focus on high-
value segments of the world market. 
This called for an innovation strategy 
incorporating production, R&D and 
marketing policies to establish the 
Australia brand and improve distribution 
channels, prices, sales, promotion and 
industry communication (see WFA, 
2000).
Table
SHARE OF WINE EXPORT CATEGORIES, 2003-2004 a
(Percentages)
 Price US$/Litre Australia Chile
Basic wines Less than 2 17 44
Table and Premium wines 2 to 3.5 45 47
Super Premium, Ultra 
 Premium and Icon wines Over 3.5 38 9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of Compendio vitivinícola de Chile, Santiago, Chile, Nuevos 
Mundos, 2004; and Australian Wine and Brandy Corporation, “Australia at 
a Glance Sales”, 2004.
a
 Chilean price categories are standardized on the basis of sales per litre to wholesale 
distributors.
Figure 
AUSTRALIA’S POSITION ON THE INTERNATIONAL WINE MARKET
Source: Winemakers’ Federation of Australia.
The results of the strategy can be 
seen in the above table. Between 2003 
and 2004, Chile sold almost half of its wine 
at less than US$ 2 per litre, compared to 
only 17% for Australia, which sold more 
in higher price categories. To achieve this 
result, the Australian wine industry devised 
a long-term strategy that was disseminated 
and implemented by regional associations 
linked by the Winemakers’ Federation of 
Australia (WFA). 
The Winemakers’ Federation is 
responsible for the industry’s strategic 
development, international positioning 
and R&D and training policies. Technology 
and innovation strategy is defined by the 
Federation’s own Australian Wine Research 
Institute. This long-term vision within the 
industry is linked to the Government’s 
sectoral policy making.
In this model, the public sector 
provides considerable leverage for sectoral 
development by providing services to 
producers and exporters, industry information 
and market analysis through the Grape 
and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation and the Australian Wine and 
Brandy Corporation, the latter being the 
industry regulator responsible for establishing 
and monitoring wine standards, quality and 
integrity. The private sector provides an 
equitable contribution to financing scientific 
and technological development by means of 
the proportional levy applied to the company’s 
production and paid to the Research and 
Development Corporation.
These institutions have provided the 
Australian wine industry with a strong 
network linking enologists, company 
executives, researchers, academics and 
public officials. Such a network has been 
made possible thanks to a common vision 
and close alliance among all stakeholders: 
a fundamental factor in a successful 
innovation process.
Source: Graciela Moguillansky, “Innovación en la cadena del vino”, document prepared for project on determinants and impact of innovation in Chilean export industries, 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the Chilean Production Development Corporation (CORFO) and the Universidad Adolfo Ibañez 
(UAI), April 2006.
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activity.12 Out of this percentage, 70% accounts for applied 
scientific research and 21% is used to guide knowledge flows 
to and from industry. The main programme is Technology 
New Zealand,13 which aims to increase companies’ in-
house skills for adopting new technologies and applying 
new knowledge for business growth. This is achieved by 
raising awareness about new cutting-edge technological 
developments through promotion and information services, 
motivating businessmen to help finance basic technological 
research, hiring specialized professionals, researchers 
and scientists to work in companies or business research 
organization projects and creating networks to increase 
understanding of technological innovation.14 
The Government of Australia has been focusing its 
attention on innovation commercialization, since it is 
vital if innovation is to be relevant and the appropriate 
value generated. As is the case in New Zealand, the funds 
help with start-up, production and commercialization 
of the product.15 For instance, the new “Commercial 
Ready” programme encourages the growth of innovative 
Australian companies in emerging and high-technology 
industries. More than 1,700 small and medium-sized firms 
are supported to undertake research and development, 
proof-of-concept, technology diffusion and early-stage 
commercialization. Participation is competitive, and 
applicants are selected on the basis of a detailed business 
plan for all stages, commercial potential of the project, 
capacity for product development and the commercialization 
plan. The programme values collaboration among firms 
and between firms and Australian and international 
research centres, as such cooperation is a key feature of 
successful experiences. The programme also encourages 
firms to employ new graduates in the area of company 
innovation. In short, the policy not only aims to make 
innovation viable, but also to close existing productivity 
and competitiveness gaps.
(b) Risk capital and seed capital for financing 
innovation 
Although innovation in Australia and New Zealand 
is mainly funded publicly, capital risk funds are playing 
an increasingly important role, especially in Australia 
where there is a growing market for such financing. The 
Australian Private Equity & Venture Capital Association 
Limited (AVCAL), which was set up in 1992 as a private 
entity consisting of around 60 investor members, aims 
to create an environment that assures capital inflows for 
business ventures. Membership comprises venture capital 
firms, banks, incubators, angels,16 academic institutions and 
other industry service providers. Also involved are specialist 
consultancy firms that assist companies in the early stages 
in order to make their ventures suitable for subsequent risk 
capital investment. In 2005, these funds had AU$ 3.5 billion 
(US$ 2.6 billion) invested in 912 companies.17 
Australia also has companies specialized in granting 
seed capital for innovation, especially in the area of 
information and communications technologies. Foundation 
Capital, which is the country’s main risk capital company, 
targets technological investment and has a special innovation 
investment fund that constitutes a joint venture with the 
Federal Government.
In New Zealand, where risk capital for innovation is 
much less developed, the Government joined forces with 
private investment funds to form the New Zealand Venture 
Investment Fund (NZVIF), which channels its resources into 
joint investments in various sectors, especially new businesses 
based on technology and products with value added. The 
Fund grants seed capital and resources for investment in new 
ventures. New Zealand is attempting to develop its risk capital 
market based on the models of Israel and Singapore, while 
stepping up capacity-building for businessmen in terms of 
skills and experience in risk capital investment.
12
 See Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (2005). 
13
 The other industry-oriented programme is Grants for Private Sector Research and Development (GPSR&D), which provides grants to small 
and medium-sized enterprises to assist them with the costs of investing in R&D. It is a kind of cofinancing system to encourage firms to absorb 
and exploit new technology that they would otherwise to unable to use due to lack of resources and the huge financial risks involved.
14
 In addition, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise has a series of support programmes to assist companies in developing new products and services 




 An angel investor is a person who invests in a business venture at start-up, in exchange for a higher rate of return.
17
 See Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2005). 
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C. Conclusions
Although this chapter only presents partial indicators, 
they nonetheless show how the competitiveness of Latin 
America has deteriorated over time. Although economic 
reform, market liberalization, trade agreements and greater 
economic stability have enabled the region to recover some 
of its market share, much remains to be done, especially if 
per capita income variance among countries is as strongly 
influenced by export development as suggested by the 
exercise in section 1.
Countries such as Australia and New Zealand give the 
lie to the idea that natural resources are a curse for growth 
(Sachs and Warner, 1995): with a production structure 
similar to that of Latin America, their per capita exports 
are five or six times higher than in this region. Much can 
be learned from this kind of strategy, both to reduce the 
volatility of growth in the short term and (see chapter I) 
and in terms of long-term innovation strategies. 
Australia and New Zealand based their development 
on natural resources and, unlike Latin America, they have 
achieved high per capita income, maintained stable growth 
and eradicated poverty. This is not only due to effective 
macroeconomic management, but also to a growth and 
international insertion strategy based around innovation. 
Given their level of development, the only way companies 
in these countries could improve their positions in global 
value chains, remain competitive and continue to raise 
income is through diversification (new industries or adding 
value to products and services). All of the above encourages 
the private sector to increase its innovation spending and 
motivates the public sector to support that effort with 
investment and incentives.
For these governments, the concept of innovation goes 
beyond research and development to cover technology 
imitation and adaptation, research into products and 
processes, new business and marketing models —any 
measure that adds new value to the market.
Their national innovation and competitiveness strategies 
are in keeping with the emergence of sectoral and regional 
strategies. Australia’s hopes to soon become a major global 
player in the food production chain, for instance, have 
prompted the country to complement policies stemming 
from the national innovation strategy with a national food 
industry strategy. Including such coherent linkages in their 
policies and programmes poses another major challenge 
to governments in Latin America.
In Australia and New Zealand, programmes that include 
an innovation strategy for competitiveness involve more 
than large amounts of resources: more importantly, these 
programmes have precise aims and targets, in addition to 
result assessment indicators. In some cases, their results 
are assessed by external agencies. The decision to reinvest 
money or extend the timeframe and budget depends on 
performance. Measuring performance on the basis of market 
indicators is therefore another cornerstone of implementing 
their innovation strategies.
The authorities of both countries acknowledge that 
a lack of close cooperation between businesses, the 
public sector and scientists can seriously hamper policy 
implementation. Even if policies are well defined, the results 
will not be positive unless there is smooth communication 
between those involved. National innovation systems are 
therefore viewed as a complex network of relations and 
interdependencies, rather than a disperse collection of 
organizations and actors. In the two countries, programmes 
receive support from various entities by supplementing 
research areas or joint efforts to form a critical mass for 
research, or in the form of resources.
The link between business and academia is one-to-
one, in the sense that some scientific development must be 
applicable in companies. Incentive programmes therefore 
emphasize commercialization, while companies have a need 
for scientific knowledge. The link between enterprises and 
the academic world is one of the most difficult relationships 
to strengthen in Latin America. 
In Australia and New Zealand alike, policy priority is 
given to developing innovation in natural-resource-processing 
industries and in new industries, especially biotechnology and 
information and communications technologies. This is not 
a chance occurrence, but is in response to the cross-cutting 
needs and demands of a range of activities. Biotechnology 
forms the basis for new knowledge, provides much value 
added to natural resources and enables new products to be 
commercialized in agro-industry, forestry, aquaculture and 
mining. Information technology is in turn fundamental for 
integrated management systems and for the data sources 
that make innovation possible.
Although education and training have not been 
mentioned in this chapter, they are nonetheless an important 
part of both countries’ innovation strategies. The innovation 
process grinds to a halt unless an ever-increasing number 
of professionals receive training in basic sciences. This 
requirement has led to syllabus reforms and incentives to 
encourage students to opt for sciences, persuade expatriated 
experts to return home and motivate teachers to constantly 
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update their skills. Such programmes are developed in 
conjunction with others aimed at stimulating innovation 
in companies and promoting R&D in universities.
In conclusion, innovation systems in Australia 
and New Zealand benefit from considerable incentives 
(tax breaks, subsidies, grants, awards and investments) 
administered by programmes and funds that target the 
various requirements of companies throughout the innovation 
process: R&D, start-up, commercialization of products, 
technologies or services, innovation development in SMEs 
and incentives to join international networks. Herein lies 
another difference between these and Latin American 
innovation systems —innovation support is not limited 
to increasing resources, but includes integral support 
to sectoral clusters (especially natural resources) and a 
comprehensive concept of innovation for competitiveness 
that goes beyond simple R&D to reflect the complexity 
of achieving competitive success.
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Chapter VI
Bird flu and foot-and-mouth disease: 
impacts and regional cooperation
Introduction
International trade in animals and foods of animal origin, especially meat, is governed by strict 
quality requirements that, to a large extent, determine the volume of such trade and the price of 
commodities. The effect of quality criteria on trade has increased with the emergence of new 
risk factors associated with outbreaks of diseases that have the potential to impact strongly on 
the economy and on human health. One such disease is avian influenza, avian flu or bird flu, 
which is now a serious threat to health and to the global economy and has forced governments 
to take measures to prevent, detect and control contagious diseases that may represent public 
health and safety problems.
This chapter describes the main economic losses caused 
by avian flu and foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), two 
transboundary diseases that together represent one of the 
global meat trade’s main challenges today. Bird flu cut 
world poultry trade by 8% in 2004 and altered projections 
for this year. FMD is now one of the main sanitary problems 
affecting South American livestock and has played a part 
in redistributing market shares in the region. The disease 
has jeopardized the position of Brazil, which is facing trade 
embargoes in dozens of importing markets and risks losing 
its status as the world’s largest beef exporter. 
This chapter will examine specialized studies on the 
financial, economic and social costs of recent outbreaks 
of these diseases. It discusses the repercussions on 
international trade and the regional and international policy 
response to the fallout. The last section looks at trends 
and future challenges for global meat markets and warns 
of the urgent need for governments to take coordinated 
preventive measures as the most efficient way to control 
bird flu and FMD. Joint efforts to conduct surveillance, 
prevention and control, together with political, technical 
and financial commitment to undertake coordinated sanitary 
measures in response to the existing global zoosanitary 
and public health risk, are not only essential to preserve 
trade competitiveness but also serve greater regional 
integration in a real and significant way.
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A. Overview of the global meat market
Since the early 1980s, the world’s production, 
consumption and trade of meat, particularly poultry, 
have expanded considerably. In 2002, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
estimated that global meat consumption would increase 
by 2% annually up to 2015 (FAO, 2002). Most of this 
increase was expected to occur in developing countries, 
where total meat consumption was to grow by 2.7% per 





 1997-1999 1969-1999 1979-1999 1989-1999 1997/1999-2015 2015-2030
 Thousands of tons Growth rates (annual percentages)
World
 Bovine 57 888 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.4 1.2
 Ovine 10 706 1.9 2.2 1.4 2.1 1.8
 Pig 86 392 3.2 2.9 2.7 1.4 0.8
 Poultry 60 809 5.2 5 5.2 2.9 2.4
 Total meat consumption 215 795 2.9 2.8 2.7 1.9 1.5 
Developing countries
 Bovine 28 074 3.4 3.5 4.1 2.3 2.0
 Ovine 7 625 3.5 3.8 3.7 2.7 2.2
 Pig 49 522 6.1 6 5.8 2.1 1.2
 Not including China 11 393 3.6 3.2 3.7 2.7 2.4
 Poultry 31 920 7.8 8 9.4 3.9 3.1
 Total meat consumption 117 141 5.3 5.6 6.1 2.7 2.1
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Animal diseases: implications for international meat trade”, Committee on Commodity Problems, nineteenth 
session, Rome 27-29 August 2002; and World Agriculture: Towards 2015/230, Rome, 2002.
This projection of world meat consumption was 
based on two trends: the expansion of demand and the 
gradual reduction of trade barriers. But these two trends, 
specifically, have begun to change direction in the last 
few years, either because of recent outbreaks of animal 
disease or because of the resulting imposition of tougher 
sanitary barriers by non-infected countries. FAO has 
revised its 2006 projections for poultry, assuming a drop 
of 3 million tons in world consumption and 6% in world 
exports, with respect to the estimates made in 2005 before 
avian flu broke out on several continents (FAO, 2006f). 
Any straightforward assessment of the potential 
global impact of avian influenza is, however, complicated 
by the recent outbreaks of FMD in Brazil, which is a 
major world meat exporter. This will also influence 
world meat markets over the short term, especially 
since chicken and beef are normally used as substitutes 
for each other. FAO estimates that the adverse impact 
of poultry shortages in international markets (because 
of avian flu) will be heightened by reduced exportable 
beef supplies from Brazil (because of foot-and-mouth 
disease), putting considerable upward pressure on all 
meat prices, similar to the situation in 2004 when the 
absence of North American beef due to concerns over 
bovine spongiform encepalopathy (BSE) pushed up all 
meat prices.
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1
 The avian flu virus is transmitted from birds to humans through contact with virus-containing bird excreta that enter the human body through 
the mouth or nose. The disease is not passed on through consumption of poultry, eggs or derived products.
B. Avian influenza
1. Socio-economic impacts of the disease
Avian influenza, avian flu or bird flu is an infectious 
disease of birds caused by the influenza virus. It can 
be transmitted to humans who enter into close contact 
with infected birds.1 The danger of the virus lies in its 
resistance, ability to mutate and ease of propagation. 
The first known case of human infection with avian flu 
occurred in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
of China (Hong Kong SAR) in 1997. Previously, avian 
flu had been detected only in South-East Asia, but in the 
last few years outbreaks have occurred in Africa, Europe, 
the Middle East and the Americas (FAO, 2005a). Up until 
July 2006, the highly pathogenic H5N1 strain of the virus 
had not been found in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
although a number of countries have reported other, less 
pathogenic varieties.
The socio-economic impacts of bird flu take the 
form of deaths, medical costs (medicines, hospitalization 
and treatment), loss of working days and reduced 
employment performance and the effects on trade and 
on the services sector. As well as being an important 
source of work and income for rural communities, poultry 
provides high quality proteins for human consumption. 
The magnitude of these impacts depends on a range 
of factors, from the biological characteristics of the 
disease to the country’s domestic structural features. 
The scientific aspect refers to the pathological traits 
of the disease, which determine the lethality of the 
pathogen and how it is spread, i.e., bird to bird, bird 
to human or human to human (as yet there is no record 
of the last of these). 
The first two forms of contagion have already occurred 
and are known to have caused economic losses mainly 
through poultry culls, and the destruction of poultry 
farms to avoid propagation, the decline in poultry trade, 
the disappearance of income sources, medical costs and 
expenditure on infrastructure investments and prevention 
programmes. The financial losses of the poultry farming 
sector in Asia were estimated at some US$ 10 billion 
(FAO, 2005b).
The third form of contagion, from one human 
to another, could unleash a pandemic. This scenario 
remains hypothetical, although some experts have 
said that it is simply a matter of time until it occurs. 
The economic losses in such a situation are difficult to 
quantify because the entire global production system 
would be affected. The international community has 
begun to venture some projections, however, based on 
the two major human pandemics experienced in the past: 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and Spanish 
flu (see table VI.2). Significantly, though SARS affected 
a limited geographical area and spread relatively little 
(with 8,000 people infected and 700-800 deaths), it 
strongly impacted on the world economy, with US$ 30 
billion to US$ 50 billion in losses and a 2% contraction 
in East Asia’s regional GDP in the second quarter of 
2003 (Newcomb, 2005).
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Table VI.2
ESTIMATED ECONOMIC COSTS OF A POSSIBLE PANDEMIC
Source Observation Cost
Lowy Institute for Estimate of economic losses in four impact scenarios “Ultra” scenario: over 142 million deaths and world GDP
International Policy (mild, moderate, severe and ultra), based on the loss of US$ 4.4 trillion
 historical experience of major pandemics a Mild scenario: 1.4 million deaths and world economic
  output loss of around 0.8% (about US$ 330 billion)
International Estimate based on the socio-economic impact of Loss of 2% in world GDP, only through the loss in
Monetary Fund Spanish flu (1918-1919) b human productivity (drop of some 20 million in the
  labour force in the first 6 weeks)
World Bank Estimate based on impacts on the labour force Loss of 2% in world GDP (a annual loss of some
 through deaths, absenteeism and low productivity US$ 800 billion)
Centers for Disease Estimate of economic impacts on the United States Loss of some US$ 166.5 billion, taking into account
Control and Prevention  only the social impacts (death, work days and
  productivity lost and medical expenses)
Asian Development Bank Estimate of economic impacts in Asia, based on Mild scenario: losses of US$ 99 billion through drop
 mild and severe scenarios in consumption; US$ 14 billion through deaths and
  productivitydecline; and loss of the equivalent of 2.6%
  of Asian GDP
  Severe scenario: losses of US$ 279 billion in the short
  term (6.8% of Asian GDP)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of W. Mckbbin and A. Sidorenko, Global Macroeconomic Consequences of Pandemic 
Influenza, Lowy Institute for International Policy, February 2006; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook. Globalization and Inflation, Washington, D.C., 
2006; M. Brahmbhatt, Avian Influenza: Economic and Social Impacts, Washington, D.C., World Bank, September 2005; M. Meltzer, N. Cox and K. Fukuda, The Economic 
Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the United States: Priorities for Interventio, Atlanta, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, September-October 1999; J. Newcomb, 
Economic Risks Associated with an Influenza Pandemic, Bio Economic Research Associates, November 2005.
a
 Each of the scenarios was based on a different pandemic depending on gravity: the mild scenario took as a basis the 1968-1969 pandemic in Hong Kong; the moderate scenario 
the Asian flu of 1957; the severe scenario Spanish flu; and the ultra scenario would be one worse than that caused by Spanish flu.
b
 Spanish flu infected a quarter of the world’s population and claimed the lives of 40-50 million people worldwide. Its mortality rate varied from one country to another, from 0.6% 
in the United States to 5% in India and 20% in some Pacific islands. India is thought to have experienced a contraction of 3.3% in agricultural production and an 8% drop in the 
labour force (IMF, 2006).
2. Repercussions for the global poultry trade
In the last decade, world trade in chicken has expanded 
at an average annual rate of 10% in volume terms and 
6% in value. Prices for chicken have dropped in this 
period. The largest world exporters of poultry meat in 
2004 were Brazil, United States, Netherlands and France 
(see figure VI.1). The continued expansion of the poultry 
sector has been threatened, however, by the worsening 
of bird flu in the last few years, especially in Asia and 
Europe, whose exports have dropped considerably. In 
addition, world imports, which used to come from the 
regions now infected, are now coming mainly from the 
Americas (see figure VI.2). 
Figure VI.1




















Source: FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
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Figure VI.2
POULTRY MARKET DURING THE SPREAD OF AVIAN FLU, 2003-2005
(Growth rates in percentages)
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Meat Market Assessment, June 2006.
Notes: Up to 2003, Europe had 15 member countries; after 2004 it had 25 member countries.
Growth rate in percentages by variation in volume (100 metric tons).
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As the outbreaks of the disease move towards the West, 
restrictions on imports of poultry products from affected 
countries have increased. In the last year and a half, the 
main trade impacts on the world market have been: (i) a 
decline in world poultry trade; (ii) an increase in chicken 
meat stocks in infected producer countries; (iii) a drop 
in prices in infected countries; (iv) falling consumption 
of poultry in infected countries; (v) diversion of trade, 
with more imports coming from disease-free countries; 
(vi) toughening of sanitary requirements.
(a) Downswing in poultry trade
Asia and Europe are the regions whose trade has 
suffered the most from avian flu (see table VI.3). 
The impact of these trade losses has been very bad in 
Asia, where the poultry business is crucial to several 
countries’ economies. In the Philippines, the poultry 
trade represents 2% of GDP, which is one of the highest 
rates in the world. The World Bank reports that in 
Thailand, Viet Nam and China and the countries that 
sustained the heaviest financial losses during the avian 
flu outbreaks of 2003-2004, poultry trade accounts for 
0.5%, 0.6% and 1.3% of GDP, respectively (Brahmbhatt, 
2005). In the event of a pandemic, GDP in South-East 
Asia would shrink by an estimated 1.5%. Avian flu 
was responsible for almost halving Thailand’s chicken 
exports between 2003 and 2004 and losing the country 
its place as the world’s fifth largest exporter. From there 
it slipped to seventh place and avoided losing further 
ground by investing in the export of processed chicken 
meat (FAO, 2005b).




 2003 2004 Variation
Brazil 1 953  2 813 44%
United States 1 934  2 211 14%
France 1 357  1 346 -1%
Netherlands 1 357  1 336 -2%
Belgium 626 757 21%
Germany 639 713 12%
Thailand 1 138 675 -41%
China 796 625 -21%
Source: FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
Europe’s poultry trade, too, has been affected by avian 
flu. Many of the European countries are prominent in the 
world poultry trade: Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands together accounted for 30% of all poultry 
exports in 2004 (see figure VI.1). The largest exporters 
are France and the Netherlands, though their exports have 
declined since 2003. Conversely, there has been a rise 
in exports from European countries, including Belgium 
(where no H5N1 was reported in 2003) and Germany 
(where less was detected), which appear to have gained 
the market share of the others.
(b) Impacts on prices and consumption
In 2003-2004 outbreaks of bird flu initially pushed 
the international prices of poultry meat up by 20% or 30%, 
since the sanitary embargoes placed on exports from China 
and Thailand, which are among the world’s main suppliers, 
reduced the volume available on the international market.2 
The detection of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), 
also known as “mad cow disease”, in North America also 
helped to push up the price of chicken, which was used to 
substitute beef. Rising world prices contrasted with those 
dropping in the countries affected, as the exportable supply 
was channelled into domestic markets and local demand 
shrank owing to food safety and health concerns on the 
part of consumers.3 In late 2005, poultry consumption was 
down by an annual 1% on average in 15 European Union 
countries. This drop has been uneven, however, and has 
steepened in 2006, varying from 70% in Italy to 20% in 
France and 10% in northern European (FAO, 2006c). 
(c) Diversion of trade flows
Avian flu has also altered the flows of international 
poultry trade. In the last few years the exports of the main 
Asian suppliers have gradually declined, while those of 
South America (mainly Brazil) and the United States, where 
the H5N1 virus has not yet been found, have climbed. Those 
countries have become the largest world suppliers of poultry 
meat, substituting the Asian supply (see table VI.3). Japan, 
which imports 70% of the poultry it consumes (three quarters 
of which used to come from China and Thailand), is now 
importing much more chicken from Brazil. In 2004 Japan 
was the largest consumer of Brazilian poultry, accounting 
for 18.9% of Brazil’s chicken exports that year.4
(d) Prospects
Food safety issues will continue to divert trade flows 
in the global meat markets and South American shares in 
the world poultry trade are expected to keep growing in 
the short and medium terms. The long-term outlook for 
countries that are traditionally exporters (Brazil, among 
others), as well as the maintenance of their market share, 
hinges basically on two factors: (i) the countries remaining 
free from avian flu; and (ii) the ability to adapt to stricter 
sanitary requirements in importing markets. 
In the long term, it is expected that traditional 
importers will continue to dominate the poultry trade and 
that Brazil and the United States will continue to supply 
the bulk of exports. Interestingly enough, Chile is gaining 
a growing foothold in the global poultry trade and should 
continue to supply major regional markets, such as Mexico. 
Projections show that poultry consumption will increase 
in the OECD countries, which will account for 37% of all 
meat consumed in 2014. The developing countries will 
become net importers of poultry meat once world prices 
come down and as local industries strive to compete with 
sales of low-price imports of chicken cuts. World trade rules 
are likely to hasten a shift towards consumption of more 
processed poultry products, because of sanitary barriers 
on unprocessed poultry (OECD/FAO, 2005). 
Be this as it may, the question of how long the impacts 
of avian flu on trade will last is complicated by the growing 
complexity of the global markets, the uncertainties of 
consumer demand and the prolonged imposition of sanitary 
barriers. Moreover, the emergence of a virus that could be 
spread among humans could cause unprecedented losses, 
not only in the global poultry trade, but across the board.
In the light of recent bird flu developments around 
the world, FAO projections for poultry consumption for 
2006 are currently 3 million tons lower, with a downward 
revision of 6% in world exports, than previous estimates 
based on outbreaks that intensified in 2005. 
2
 The price of frozen chicken rose by 45% in Japan and by 20% in Singapore (FAO, 2006d).
3
 Apprehension among consumers causes avian flu to impact on products derived from poultry meat, processed products (whole chickens, 
refrigerated or frozen) and eggs, even though the disease is not transmitted through consumption of these products.
4
 According to data from the Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE).
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy • 2005-2006 119
3. Trade impacts in Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America has experienced outbreaks of different types of 
avian flu in the last 10 years, though none have been highly 
pathological: Mexico (1995), Chile (2002), Central America 
(2003) and Colombia (October, 2005). The disease caused 
Chilean exports to drop heavily in 2002, with a loss of US$ 21 
million in comparison with the previous year (see table VI.4). 
A trade quarantine was imposed on Colombia by the other 
Andean countries (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru), leading Colombia to lodge a complaint 
against Ecuador with the Andean Community’s dispute 
settlement body.5 Given that no incidences of the H5N1 virus 
have been encountered on the American Continent as yet, 
the flow of world imports from Latin American countries 
has increased and they have gained market niches previously 
occupied by Asian countries.
Table VI.4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN POULTRY 
EXPORTERS
(Millions of dollars)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Variation Variation
      2003-2004 2000-2004
Brazil 904 1 439 1 498 1 953 2 813 44% 33%
Chile 37 57 36 54 116 113% 33%
Argentina 14 18 22 40 65 63% 47%
Latin America and
the Caribbean 986 1 541 1 576 2 057 3 017 47% 32%
Source: FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
One consequence of these developments is that between 
2003 and 2004, the period that coincided with the outbreaks 
of avian flu in Asia, poultry came to account for a higher 
share of the region’s total agricultural exports (see figure 
VI.3). In 2004 Latin American and Caribbean poultry exports 
expanded by 47% with respect to 2003 and accounted for 
4% of agricultural exports that year (see table VI.4 and 
figure VI.3). Brazil is the region’s largest poultry exporter, 
accounting for 20% of this market. Its exports increased 
by 44% in volume between 2003 and 2004. Argentina and 
Chile are the other two large exporters in the region. 
A breakdown of poultry exports reveals uneven 
growth patterns across the different components. Exports 
of chicken meat have expanded steadily, especially in 
2003-2004 (48%), as a result of avian flu in Asia. Turkey 
5
 The General Secretariat of the Andean Community ruled that there was no proper justification or technical grounds for Ecuador’s ban on all 
poultry products from Colombia. Accordingly, Ecuador was required to amend its resolution No. 024 by including an article allowing the sale 
of poultry products treated to inactivate the avian influenza virus (see resolution 982 of the General Secretariat of the Andean Community).
6
 According FAO statistics, Thai duck meat exports plunged from US$ 39 million to US$ 3 million. Those of Hong Kong SAR dropped from 
US$ 21 million to US$ 5 million and those of China fell from US$ 26.5 million to US$ 20 million.
exports have also moved upwards fairly constantly, except 
in 2002, when avian flu broke out in Chile, which is the 
region’s second largest exporter of turkey (its exports 
dropped from US$ 12 million in 2001 to US$ 4 million 
in 2002). Exports of eggs also rose, except in 2002, as a 
result of the same outbreak (see table VI.5).
Figure VI.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: POULTRY EXPORTS AS A 
PROPORTION OF TOTAL AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS
(Percentages)
Source: FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
Table VI.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: POULTRY EXPORTS
(Millions of dollars)
       LAC share
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Variation in 2004
      2003-2004 world
       exports
Chicken meat 848 1 344 1 381 1 776 2 637 48% 31%
Turkey meat 90 124 116 159 231 45% 5%
Tinned chicken
 meat 48 73 78 122 148 21% 2.4%
Eggs  33 43 29 19 33 74% 14%
Source: FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
The Latin American and Caribbean countries export 
no goose meat and very little duck meat, though duck 
exports expanded sharply from US$ 95,000 in 2003 to 
US$ 940,000 in 2004. This increase may be attributable 
to the global supply shock caused by the sudden drop in 
exports of duck meat from Thailand, Hong Kong SAR 
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Poultry farming for export is highly mechanized 
in the region, as may be seen in Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile. This means that there is less contact between 
humans and birds in poultry farms and producers are 
in a position to respond quickly to disease prevention 
and control plans. In several countries, however, a 
good deal of chicken meat is also produced in small 
and medium-sized rural farms for the domestic market. 
These farms are at higher risk of catching and spreading 
avian flu.
Lastly, an important point is that financial losses are not 
confined to the poultry trade, but spill over to the production 
of maize and soybean, on which poultry feed is based. 
Argentina and Brazil would be the region’s worst affected 
countries in this regard, since they are the largest exporters 
of cereal and vegetable oil (maize and soy, respectively) 
for use in feed for the world poultry industry. Much of 
this feed goes to the domestic market, however. In Brazil, 
the domestic poultry sector alone absorbs 49.5% of maize 
production and 27% of powdered soybean production.7
4. International agency response and mobilization in the region
Responding to the urgency of the situation, international 
agencies mobilized and joined forces to provide technical 
assistance to the countries. They have conducted a series 
of activities individually and jointly, led by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO)8 and the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE).9 Among other efforts, 
they have organized seminars, workshops and technical 
assistance, including support for national authorities 
in investigating outbreaks, stepping up surveillance in 
affected regions and coordinating regional programmes 
to tie in with international directives.
In the framework of global mobilization around this 
issue, FAO, OIE, WHO and the World Bank convened 
the Meeting on Avian Influenza and Human Pandemic 
Influenza in Geneva in November 2005. At the meeting, 
the organizations looked at the FAO proposal for a global 
programme of avian influenza control and eradication 
and examined the countries’ main short-, medium- and 
long-term financial needs. It was agreed that FAO would 
coordinate the global programme with regional initiatives, 
which would cost an estimated US$ 476 million (see table 
VI.6). Significantly, this estimate does not include the 
costs of financing the regional initiatives.10
Despite the socio-economic importance of the poultry 
sector in the region, the countries’ response to bird flu 
has been very uneven (see table VI.8). As well as regional 
7
 Data from the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Supply (MAPA) of Brazil.
8
 Information from FAO is available at on its website: http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/es/health/diseases-cards/special_avian.html.
9
 Information from OIE is available at: http://www.oie.int/eng/avian_influenza/guidelines.htm#AIEurope.
10
 Regional programmes include the Global Early Warning and Response System for Major Animal Diseases (GLEWS) for tranboundary animal 
diseases (estimated cost of US$ 3 million) and those run by the Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) in Bangkok 
(the cost of activities in the Asian region is estimated to be US$ 5.6 million) (FAO, 2006e).
11
 For further details see: “Influenza pandémica”. http://www.col.ops-oms.org/repositorio/vertema.asp?id=20&idrepositorio=1.
meetings of governments and animal health agencies, once 
the existence of the H5N1 virus was known, the regional 
agencies spurred on the preparation of a regional avian flu 
pandemic preparedness plan, under the guidance of WHO, 
OIE and FAO. Domestic mobilization in the countries has 
been led by ministries of health and of agriculture and 
livestock, in coordination with public and private bodies. 
The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) is also 
working with the Latin American and Caribbean countries 
to develop national pandemic preparedness plans and has 
stipulated that all members must have their preparedness 
plans finalized by July, 2006.11
Table VI.6
ESTIMATED COSTS TO FAO OF COORDINATING GLOBAL 
CONTROL AND ERADICATION EFFORTS
(Millions of dollars)
FAO activity First 6 First full Second Third Total
  months year year year
Coordination 9 838  18 500  15 892  15 337  49 711
Infected countries 22 220 56 129  24 637  23 652  104 418 
Countries at risk 16 197  21 007  29 123  27 492  77 622
Newly infected countries 16 100  44 000  62 700  137 500  244 200 
Total 64 355  139 636  132 352  203 981  475 969 
Estimated prevention
 costs
Americas 3 239  4 201  5 825  5 498  15 524 
Source:  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Avian Influenza 
Control and Eradication. FAO’s Proposal for a Global Programme, January 
2006.
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C. Foot-and-mouth disease
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) does not infect humans, 
but it is one of the most contagious diseases of mammals 
and has great potential for causing severe economic loss 
because of the ease with which it spreads, the significant 
deterioration of the animals affected and its ability to 
spread through the sale of the meat. It is therefore an 
issue of great concern in the international beef trade. 
An intensive cooperation effort between health and 
agriculture sectors has achieved significant progress 
in controlling and eradicating the disease in several 
countries, almost exclusively highly economically 
developed nations, while South America has yet to 
reach this point. According to the Secretariat of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), FMD heads the list 
of animal health concerns, together with BSE (mad 
cow disease).12
1. Impacts on the international beef trade
FMD affects trade because it reduces livestock productivity 
(meat, milk and derivatives), forces sanitary restrictions 
on exports and pushes up production costs through 
compliance with international sanitary standards and the 
provisions of public control and eradication programmes. 
In addition to deaths caused by the disease and the 
necessary cull of livestock,13 it causes spontaneous 
abortion, loss of reproductive capacity, gestation problems, 
increased secondary conditions (such as mastitis) and 
heightened vulnerability to other infections. Another 
indirect economic effect is the impact on tourism. The 
losses to tourism and recreational activities caused by 
the restriction on access to rural areas during the FMD 
outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001 amounted to 
US$ 4.9 billion, which represented half the total cost 
of the disease (DEFRA, 2005).
These outbreaks of FMD impacted immediately on 
world trade in beef and cattle, which declined by 4%. 
Trade losses in Uruguay and Argentina, which were also 
hit in this period, are estimated at US$ 178 million and 
US$ 440 million, respectively. Outbreaks of BSE in the 
European Union and of FMD in Argentina, the Republic 
of Korea, the United Kingdom and Uruguay slowed world 
trade in beef in 2000 and 2001 and triggered a shift in 
consumption trends that pushed up the prices of all meat 
other than beef. Trade flows were also diverted, much like 
what happened in the world poultry trade in response to 
the spread of avian flu. The FMD outbreak in the Republic 
of Korea in 2000 hurt the country’s trade with Japan, 
which was worth US$ 300 million, and enabled other 
major exporters to gain a larger share of the Japanese 
market (FAO, 2004). 
In sum, the short-term trade impacts of FMD 
outbreaks in 2000-2001 in the main exporting countries 
were reduced availability of FMD-free meat in the 
international markets; a drop of almost 3% in global 
beef trade and a consequent 3.5% increase in world 
prices; and an increase in the prices of other meats, such 
as pork, poultry and lamb or mutton, which were used 
as substitutes (FAO, 2004).
12
 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is the scientific name given to the condition commonly known as “mad cow disease”, which was 
first diagnosed in the United Kingdom in the 1980s. 
13
 Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth led to the culling of 4.03 million animals in Taiwan Province of China in 1997 and 6.24 million in the United 
Kingdom in 2001 (FAO, 2004b).
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2. Foot-and-mouth disease in South America
Two changes in the international rules have contributed 
to the growth of regional beef exports in the last few 
years: the recognition of zones classified as FMD-
free with vaccination and the regionalization concept. 
Previously, the international market recognized only 
FMD-infectious areas and FMD-free areas, which 
placed South America at a disadvantage, since this 
classification did not distinguish countries that were 
free of the disease through vaccination (as in the cases 
of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay), but only 
whether FMD had been eradicated in the region or not. 
This had two implications for trade. First, meats from 
FMD-free areas were in greater demand, attracted higher 
prices and enjoyed access to the markets of countries in 
the FMD-infectious areas. Second, countries that had 
not eradicated FMD could sell only to other countries 
within the same FMD classification, or market processed 
(cooked or salted) meat at a lower market value (PAHO, 
2005). In this regard, beef from Argentina and Brazil, 
though of high quality, did not attain the high market 
value of meat from Australia, the European Union or 
United States, which were FMD-free.
In the 1990s, OIE devised the sanitary category of 
“FMD free zone with vaccination” in its International 
Animal Health Code. This is the first disease for which 
OIE has established an official list of countries and areas 
that are disease free with and without vaccination. This 
category provides for the trading of beef under conditions 
that are advantageous to countries of South America, 
which has the world’s largest beef herd and where, with 
vast stretches of land devoted to livestock farming, it is 
difficult to completely eradicate the disease throughout 
the continent.
14
 The outbreak in Mato Grosso do Sul triggered the suspension of that State’s FMD-free with vaccination status, together with that of Tocantins, 
Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, Bahia and Sergipe (from 30 September 2005). The outbreak in Paraná led the suspension of FMD-
free with vaccination status there and in the States of Sao Paulo, Goias, Mato Grosso and the Federal District of Brazil (from 21 October 2005). 
Argentina’s FMD-free with vaccination status was suspended as of 8 February 2006 following a report of an outbreak of FMD in the province 
of Corrientes that month.
15
 Article 6 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the “SPS Agreement”) requires governments to recognize 
areas within other countries as safe sources for imports of food and animal and plant products, instead of taking measures based solely on national 
boundaries.
16
 The International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) has three rules dealing with regionalization: International Standard for Phytosanitary 
Measures (ISPM) No. 4 on requirements for the establishment of pest-free areas; ISPM No. 10 on requirements for the establishment of pest-free 
places of production and pest-free production sites; and ISPM No. 22 on requirements for the establishment of areas of low pest prevalence. 
The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code sets out requirements for certification of freedom from diseases.
17
 The purpose of the regionalization principle is to allow part of a country to be declared FMD-free, even if outbreaks have occurred in other parts 
of the country. This avoids the need for a country-wide embargo on meat exports.
The great majority of the developed countries are 
classified as FMD-free without vaccination. All the 
Central American and Caribbean countries and Chile have 
attained this category too. A number of South American 
countries, including Paraguay and Uruguay, have been 
classified as FMD-free through an efficient system of 
herd vaccination. Argentina and some States in Brazil, 
having gained FMD-free with vaccination status, then had 
it suspended.14 In terms of trade, this suspension strips a 
country of one of the main entry requirements laid down 
by the world’s largest beef importers. 
(a) The challenge of overcoming resistance to 
regionalization
Another important development that broadened the 
export prospects of countries where FMD had not been 
eradicated was the introduction of the regionalization 
principle enshrined in article 6 of the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the 
SPS Agreement),15 and its subsequent regulation by the 
international organizations, namely OIE and the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC).16 This principle is crucial 
for large countries reporting outbreaks of disease that are 
restricted to a particular geographical area.17 Argentina and 
Brazil have benefited from the regionalization principle, 
since it enables them to export beef from FMD-free regions 
and avoid beef embargoes on the whole country as a result 
of isolated outbreaks. These two changes in the international 
rules had much to do with the considerable increase in the 
region’s beef exports in 1994-2004. In 2000-2004, Brazil 
led export growth (33%), followed by Paraguay (22%) and 
Uruguay (14%) (see table VI.7). 
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Table VI.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN BEEF EXPORTERS
(Millions of dollars)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Variation
      2000-2004
Brazil 783 1 009 1 090 1 508 2 429 33%
Argentina 662 249 475 595 1 020 11%
Uruguay 376 229 272 383 629 14%
Paraguay 70 76 20 60 158 22%
Source:  FAO Statistical Databases (FAOSTAT), 2006.
Paraguay and Uruguay attained unprecedented growth 
in their beef exports thanks to their FMD-free status. Both 
growth rates outstripped that of Argentina, which has a 
much larger herd and volume of beef than either Paraguay 
or Uruguay. Although both these countries are working at 
full capacity, the combined volume they export (349,000 
metric tons in 2004) is not enough to cover all the market 
supplied by the exports of Brazil and Argentina, which 
ship almost five times as much.18
Although it has certainly had a positive impact on 
regional beef trade, the regionalization principle would 
yield much greater benefits if all the WTO member 
countries were to respect it. Of all the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries, Argentina lodged the largest 
number of WTO notifications under the regionalization 
principle, followed by Brazil (WTO, 2005b), between 
1995 and 2004 (WTO, 2005b). 
D. Trends and future challenges for the global
 meat market
South America is an unusual region in that is prominent 
in global trade of both chicken and beef and both are 
crucial to its agricultural sector. The region has the largest 
commercial beef herd in the world and it is the world’s 
second largest exporter of beef and largest exporter of 
chicken. The production and sale of these products are 
not only important sources of employment and income 
for rural communities: they also contribute heavily to 
human well-being by supplying high-quality proteins 
that are essential for good health.
As new sanitary barriers are imposed, governments 
and producers must continually take preventive measures 
if they are to maintain their exports of livestock products, 
since it takes some time to regain access to destination 
markets and recoup consumer confidence after a sanitary 
problem has occurred.
(a) The three main weaknesses
These “sanitary shocks” have revealed issues that, 
though not new, point up three main difficulties for 
the countries of the region: (i) lack of effective public 
inspection procedures; (ii) weakness of pubic-private 
partnership; and (iii) lack of legal provisions designed, 
at least, to standardize sanitary protection, even if they 
are not identical in content.
18
 According to FAOSTAT data, Brazil and Argentina combined reported a volume of 1.664 million tons in 2004.
Recent outbreaks of FMD call into question the 
capacity of the region’s countries to deploy a rapid and 
effective response to transboundary diseases, which 
heightens concerns over the potential spread of avian flu 
to the American continent. What is more, it shows up the 
institutional weakness of many countries, i.e., the lack of 
inspection agencies properly prepared to undertake sanitary 
surveillance, prevention and control. The spread of these 
diseases also demonstrates on the ground that public-private 
collaboration is essential for any satisfactory sanitary 
programme. On the one hand, it is the responsibility of 
the public sector to formulate and produce instruments for 
achieving clear objectives in disease control and eradication, 
since only the public sector has the authority to define 
epidemiological profiles and interact with productive units in 
the best possible way. On the other hand, the private sector 
is responsible for implementing the sanitary measures set 
out in government programmes, not only when a disease 
worsens, but at all times.
Another difficulty is that, typically, farming methods vary 
widely in Latin America and the Caribbean, for both beef and 
poultry. Large industries with advanced, high-tech production 
methods exist alongside medium-sized and small producers 
using traditional techniques of animal husbandry. The broad 
variety of types of meat production in the region places limits 
on the efficiency of public plans of sanitary inspection and 
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coordination with the plans of neighbouring countries. This, 
together with Latin America’s ecological diversity, makes it 
difficult to put the discourse on harmonization of sanitary 
rules into practice in the region.
Despite these difficulties, if the spread of avian flu in 
the Americas is to be avoided, a common regional strategy 
must be formulated as a matter of urgency and coordinated 
with the respective international strategies. In the case of 
FMD, given that several regional plans have started up in 
the last few years, the main obstacle now is the region’s 
institutional heterogeneity, which prevents more effective 
surveillance by the responsible bodies in each country. 
Effective FMD eradication plans need closer coordination 
between public authorities and rural producers. Better 
investment in municipal or provincial surveillance systems 
would represent a step in this direction.
Short-term initiatives in response to transboundary 
disease focus on prevention and control within production 
units, but in the long term what is needed is an effective 
institutional structure conducting surveillance at all times, 
not only when the international alarm is raised over an 
outbreak that is already spreading. It is therefore necessary 
to strengthen services of surveillance, prevention and control 
within the countries and to establish a joint, standard strategic 
system based on sanitary rules that offer a common level of 
protection, thereby creating “sanitary armour-plating” that 
can safeguard the stability of the region’s livestock trade.
The countries of the region have made some headway 
in putting their respective national avian flu prevention 
plans in place. However, the only effective way to deal 
with a disease that spreads rapidly across geographical 
boundaries is to devise a coordinated response by all the 
countries, lest trade barriers compromise access to export 
markets. Efforts should therefore be focused on coordinated 
activities, of which examples are the creation of the Ad 
hoc Group on Avian Influenza19 by the Southern Cone 
countries and the preparation of the Regional Strategy 
on Avian Influenza Prevention aimed at standardizing 
sanitary measures in the region.
The containment of FMD, too, is vital for the international 
positioning of the livestock sector and must therefore 
by dealt with by the governments. For example, Brazil’s 
national FMD eradication programme drastically reduced the 
incidence of the disease and eradicated it altogether in several 
states.20 Bolivia has implemented a similar programme and 
has managed to have the area of Chiquitanía recognized as 
FMD-free with vaccination.21 Although several eradication 
programmes have achieved positive results, however, the 
latest outbreaks in Argentina and Brazil show that the 
countries still have a long way to go to eradicate the disease 
in Latin America. In this regard, proposals for joint action 
by institutions such as the Southern Agricultural Council 
(CAS) and the Agricultural Policy Coordination Network 
(REDPA)22 are crucially important for the countries that form 
one of the world’s largest beef producing areas.
(b) Investment in traceability, regionalization and 
mutual recognition agreements
The diseases discussed here spark consumer concerns 
over human health impacts and this has heightened the 
need to implement methods to verify the origin of foods 
consumed. Food traceability or trackability lets consumers 
know where food comes from, offers guarantees of food 
safety, improves quality management and risk assessment 
to increase consumer confidence and provides a basis for 
timely measures to be taken in response to risk-inherent 
problems.23 In order to enter markets such as the European 
Union, the United States and Japan, meat exporters must 
provide accurate information on the history of the imported 
food from its point of origin to the consumer’s table. This 
is why it is important to have traceability systems in place 
permanently.
With regard to the regionalization principle, since 
the approval or rejection of requests calls for technical 
and legal evidence, efforts must be made to minimize the 
political factors that are sometimes involved in consultations 
undertaken in the framework of WTO. The countries 
should be represented at the main WTO and OIE meetings 
addressing the issue, in order to engage the international 
community in the problems the countries face in securing 
recognition of the regionalization principle.
Mutual recognition agreements arise out of assessment 
processes in which two or more countries agree that the 
systems they employ can permit the goods traded in one 
country to be traded freely in any other country party to 
19
 This working group is an initiative of the Permanent Veterinary Committee of the Southern Cone.
20
 Brazil recorded 2,000 outbreaks of FMD in 1994, compared to just 2 in 2004 (Lima and others, 2005).
21
 Further details available from PANAFTOSA and the National Agricultural Health and Food Safety Service of Bolivia (SENASAG).
22
 CAS was established in 2003 by the member and associate countries of MERCOSUR and comprises the ministers for agriculture of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. Its main tasks are to harmonize agricultural policies in the region, exchange information on the 
agricultural matters in the member countries, coordinate sanitary defence, adopt common positions on international trade negotiations and promote 
regional integration. REDPA is a mechanism of regional coordination on agricultural policy implementation. Further details are available at: 
http://www.iica.org.uy/casonline/inicial.asp and http://www.redpa.org.
23
 The traceability system applies to foods, feed and animals from which food products derive. Monitoring encompasses all operations along the 
production chain, industry, transport, distribution and retail.
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the agreement. The purpose of such agreements is to allow 
goods to flow more freely among countries and avoid 
impediments to trade caused by differences in the trading 
partners’ national rules, on the condition that each country 
maintains a proper level of sanitary protection —which 
does not require the rules to be identical. In practice, a 
mutual recognition agreement facilitates trade and reduces 
or eliminates the need for inspection of goods at the point of 
entry, on the basis that the importer trusts the effectiveness 
of control systems in the exporting country.
Mutual recognition agreements are based on the 
notion that different rules can result in an acceptable 
degree of assurance of food safety, even if the contents 
of the legislation are different. Among countries with 
such varied sanitary situations as those of the region, this 
is essential. Such agreements merit a place on the Latin 
American countries’ trade policy agendas, because they 
would represent substantial progress towards improving 
regional trade flows, in view of shared sanitary problems 
such as FMD. Unquestionably, the countries need to inject 
urgency into the joint initiatives that have been developed 
over the last few years to even out sanitary policies in their 
agricultural sectors, since this would represent a first step 
towards forging mutual recognition agreements.
Table VI.8
REGIONAL ACTIVITIES AIMED AT AVIAN FLU CONTROL AND PREVENTION
Institutions
 • Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)
 • FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (RLAC)
 • OIE Regional Representations
 • Permanent Veterinary Committee of the Southern Cone
 • Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (IICA)
 • International Regional Organization for Plant and Animal Health
 • Inter-American Committee on Avian Health
 • OIE regional commission on avian health
Activities
 • Technical assistance for training and institution-building of veterinary services and national laboratories
 • Organization of information seminars and workshops
 • Guidance on scientific research and risk assessments
 • Capacity building
 • Guidance on national prevention plans
 • Meetings to improve regional coordination
 • Financing of national and regional activities
Forums and instruments
 • Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases on the American Continent a
 • Regional strategy of avian flu prevention
 • Hemispheric Conference on the Surveillance and Prevention of Avian Influenza (Brasilia, 2005)
 • Technical cooperation projects for detection of avian flu in Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean region and the Southern Cone
  (FAO)
 • Guide to prevention and control of avian flu in small-scale poultry farming in Latin America and the Caribbean
 • Ad hoc Group on Avian Influenza created by the Permanent Veterinary Committee of the Southern Cone
By country
   Brazil   Costa Rica   Bolivia
 • Avian flu prevention plan • National commission on influenza • National plan for avian influenza
 • National poultry health programme  pandemic preparedness  National avian health programme
 • Inter-agency working group on avian • Influenza pandemic preparedness • National programme of control and
  influenza  and response plan  eradication of Newcastle disease and
 • Inter-ministerial executive group on • National influenza virus surveillance  avian influenza surveillance
  potential avian influenza pandemic  system
 • Contingency plans and operational manuals • Guide to integral patient treatment
   Chile   Peru   Argentina
 • Influenza pandemic preparedness plan • National avian health programme • SENASA Resolution No. 1078/ 99 on
 • National programme of epidemiological • Sanitary regulations for the rearing and  avian influenza
  surveillance in avian diseases  slaughter of poultry for consumption • Epidemiological surveillance
 • Livestock emergency plan and contingency • National preparedness and response for  programme
  plan for avian influenza (SAG)  a potential outbreak of avian influenza • National poultry health plan
 • Avian influenza prevention system (SAG) • Registration and operation of farms • National poultry health commission
 • National outbreak response and sanitary  and incubation plants
  emergency commission
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official data from the institutions cited.
a  The Global Framework for Transboundary Animal Diseases (GF-TADs) is a joint FAO/OIE initiative, which combines the strengths of both organizations to facilitate alliances among 
countries to combat transboundary animal diseases and assist with the establishment and development of programmes to control such diseases, including FMD and avian flu. 
Asia was the first region to implement GF-TADs and in 2005 it was introduced on the American continent with the support of a number of regional organizations.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)126
Bibliography
Brahmbhatt, Milan (2005), Avian Influenza: Economic 
and Social Impacts, Washington, D.C, World Bank, 
23 September.
DEFRA (Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs) (2005), Cost Benefit Analysis of Foot and 
Mouth Disease Controls, London, Risk Solutions, 
May. 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations) (2006a), Guía para la prevención 
y el control de la Gripe Aviar en la avicultura de 
pequeña escala en América Latina y el Caribe, 
FAO Regional Office for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, March.
(2006b), Programa Global para el Control 
Progresivo de las Enfermedades Transfronterizas de 
los Animales (GF-TADs). Resumen de Actividades 
sobre Influenza Aviar, FAO Regional Office 
for Latin America and the Caribbean [online] 
http://www.rlc.fao.org/prior/segalim/animal/
noticias.htm.
(2006c), “Escalating bird flu crisis jeopardizes 
global poultry trade prospects”, FAO Newsroom, 28 
February [online] http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/
news/2006/1000240/index.html.




(2006e), Avian Influenza Control and Eradication. 
FAO’s Proposal for a Global Programme, January. 
(2006f), “Poultry trade prospects for 2006 
jeopardized by escalating AI outbreaks” [online] 
http://www.fao.org/AG/againfo/subjects/en/
economics/facts/poultry_trade_jeopardised_ai.pdf.
(2005a), “Update on the Avian Influenza situation 
(as of 5/11/2005)”, FAOAIDEnews: Avian Influenza 
Disease Emergence, No. 35 [online] http://www.rlc.
fao.org/prior/segalim/animal/aviar/pdf/AVIbull035.
pdf.
(2005b), Economic and Social Impacts of Avian 
Influenza, Anni McLeod and others, Emergency 
Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases 
(ECTAD).
(2005c), “December 2005. Avian flu: The potential 
market impacts of further outbreaks” [online] http://
www.fao.org/ES/ESC/en/20953/21014/highlight_
108706en.html.
(2004), Trends and Challenges in Latin American 
and Caribbean Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
2004, FAO Regional Office for Latin America and 
the Caribbean. 
(2002), “Animal diseases: implications for 
international meat trade”, Committee on Commodity 
Problems, nineteenth session, Rome, 27-29 August.
FAO/ECLAC (Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations/Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean) (2005), Grandes 
órdenes de magnitud del impacto socio-económico 
que podría tener la influenza aviar en América 
Latina y el Caribe, 22 November.
FAO/OIE (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations/World Organisation for Animal 
Health) (2004), Global Framework for the 
Progressive Control of Transboundary Diseases 
(GF-TADs), Rome, 24 May.
FAO/OIE/WHO (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations/World Organisation for 
Animal Health/World Health Organization) (2005), 
A Global Strategy for the Progressive Control of 
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) [online] 
http://www.fao.org/ag/againfo/subjects/documents/
ai/HPAIGlobalStrategy31Oct05.pdf.
Government of Dominican Republic (2005), Estimación 
de la carga de enfermedad y el impacto económico 
potenciales de la próxima pandemia de influenza en 
República Dominicana, December.
Government of Honduras (2005), Estimación de la 
carga de enfermedad y el impacto económico 
potenciales de la próxima pandemia de influenza 
sobre Honduras, December. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2006), World 
Economic Outlook. Globalization and Inflation, 
Washington, D.C., April.
Lima, Rodrigo A. and others (2005), Febre Aftosa: 
Impacto sobre as exportações brasileiras de carne 
e o contexto mundial das barreiras sanitária, São 
Paulo, Institute for International Trade Negotiations 
(ICONE), October.
McKibbin, Warwik and Alexandra Sidorenko (2006), 
Global Macroeconomic Consequences of Pandemic 
Influenza, Washington, D.C., Lowy Institute for 
Internacional Policy, February.
Meltzer, Martin I., Nancy Cox and Keiji Fukuda (1999), 
The Economic Impact of Pandemic Influenza in the 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy • 2005-2006 127
United States: Priorities for Intervention, Atlanta, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
September-October.
Ministry of Health, Costa Rica (2005), “Impacto 
estimado de una pandemia de influenza en Costa 
Rica, 2005-2006”, San José, December.
Ministry of Health, Peru (2005), “Plan nacional de 
preparación y respuesta frente a una potencial 
pandemia de influenza” [online] http://www.senasa.
gob.pe/Plan_Influenza_Peru.pdf , October.
Ministry of Public Health, Guatemala (2005), “Impacto 
potencial de la pandemia de influenza en Guatemala”, 
Guatemala City, December.
Newcomb, James (2005), Economic Risks Associated 
with an Influenza Pandemic, Bio Economic Research 
Associates (bio-era), Cambridge, MA., November.
OECD/FAO (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development/Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations) (2006), OECD-
FAO Agricultural Outlook: 2005-2014, Paris.
OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) (2004), 
Report of the Meeting of the OIE ad hoc Group on 
Avian Influenza, Padova, Italy, 8-10 November.
PAHO (Pan American Health Organization) (2005), 
“Las perspectivas de erradicación de la fiebre aftosa 
en la América del Sur y su reflejo en el precio de 
la arroba de buey”, Pan American Foot-and-Mouth 
Disease Center, 6 August.
(2003), Influenza Pandemic: Preparation in the 
Western Hemisphere (CD44/13) [online] http://
www.paho.org/English/gov/cd/cd44-13-e.pdf.
(2002), “Lineamientos para la preparación de un 
plan subregional de países del Cono Sur para una 
pandemia de influenza” [en línea] http://www.
paho.org/Spanish/AD/DPC/CD/Informe-Pandemia-
Influenza.pdf.
PAHO/WHO (Pan American Health Organization/
World Health Organization) (2005), Estimating the 
Potential Economic Impact of the Next Influenza 
Pandemic upon Belize, December.
PANAFTOSA (Pan American Foot-and-Mouth Disease 
Center) (2001), “VII Seminario internacional de 
control de vacuna antiaftosa”, Rio de Janeiro, 10-14 
September.
(1983), “Manual de procedimientos para preservar, 
ampliar y lograr Áreas Libres de Fiebre Aftosa en 
América del Sur”, Manuales técnicos series, No. 7, 
Pan American Health Organization (OPS).
UNWTO (World Tourism Organization) (2005), Tourism 
Highlights. 2005 Edition, Geneva.
Valencia, Juan Raúl Zegarra (n/d), “Sistema Sanitario 
Avícola: visión peruana, modelo y roles”, Programa 
Nacional de Sanidad Avícola [online] http://www.
senasa.gob.pe/publico_general/novedades/sistema_
sanitario_avicola.pdf.
WHO (World Health Organization) (2005a), WHO 
global influenza preparedness plan. The role of 
WHO and recommendations for national measures 
before and during pandemics (WHO/CDS/CSR/
GIP/2005.5), March.
(2005b), Avian Influenza:Assessing the Pandemic 
Threat, Geneva.
(2005c), WHO intercountry-consultation. Influenza 
A/H5N1 in humans in Asia (WHO/CDS/CSR/
GIP/2005.7), Manila, Philipinnes, 6-7 May.
(1999), Influenza pandemic plan. The role of WHO 
and guidelines for national and regional planning, 
Geneva, April.
World Bank (2006), Annual Report, 2006, Washington, 
D.C.
WTO (World Trade Organization) (2005a), Review of 
the operation and implementation of the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (G/SPS/36), 11 July.
(2005b), Specific Trade Concerns. Note by the 
Secretariat (G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.5), 25 February.
 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Division of International Trade and Integration 
Fax: (562) 210-2727 
Postal address: Casilla 179-D, Santiago, Chile 
comercio@eclac.cl 
Survey on document quality and value  
(Also available online at http://www.eclac.cl/comercio, together with the document) 
 
Dear reader, 
The Division of International Trade and Integration values the opinions of its readers. We would like to 
receive feedback from you about our documents so that we can meet your needs more effectively. We 
would be grateful if you would complete this survey and return it to our office in whatever way is most 
convenient for you (mail, fax, electronic mail or online).  
 
1. Title or symbol of document: Latin America and the Caribbean in the World Economy,  
2005-2006 (LC/G.2313-P) 
 
You read:   All of it   Part of it 
 
2. Usefulness 
y To what extent did it contribute to your work? 
 
 Fully  Substantially  Sufficiently  Not sufficiently  Not applicable 
 
3. Quality of the report Excellent Very good Good Acceptable Poor 
 
y Up-to-date contents; 
 treatment of issues;      
 analytical rigour 
 
4. Impact 
y To what extent did you or your organization make use of the information, recommendations, policy 
guidelines and options provided in the document? 
 
 Fully  Substantially  Sufficiently  Not sufficiently  Not applicable 
 





Information on the person who completed the questionnaire: 
Name: ................................................................................................................................................................ 
Areas of interest:  The position of the region in the world economy  Regional integration  
 Trade relations of the region  International negotiations  Trade facilitation 
 Foreign trade statistics  Trade in goods and trade in services 
Other areas: ........................................................................................................................................................ 
Job title: .................................................................. Organization: .................................................................... 
Address: ............................................................................................................................................................. 
Country: ......................... Tel: ......................... Fax: ......................... Electronic mail: ..................................... 
 
Thank you for your cooperation 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Division of International Trade and Integration 
Postal address: Casilla 179-D, 
Santiago, Chile 
 
